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Abstract
Possibly the greatest advantage that a distributed computer control 
system has over a centralised control system is that the failure of one or 
more of its constituent computers does not prevent the other computers from 
operating normally. Unfortunately, the loss of the executive and 
application software hosted by a failed computer will prevent the surviving 
part of the control system from fulfilling its role. Whereas it is 
possible to design the executive software so that the loss of one of its 
constituent kernels will not prevent the others from functioning normally, 
it is not possible to do this for the application software.
Process survivability was conceived as a way of preventing 
application processes from being lost as a result of a computer failure. 
Process survivability enhances the high availability of a distributed 
computer control system’s hardware by making its application software 
invulnerable to computer failure. Process survivability is performed in a 
way that is transparent to the application programmer.
In this thesis we first describe the distributed computer control 
system called PROSUP (PROcess SURvivability) which we designed as an 
environment in which to develop process survivability.
The major part of this thesis is concerned with the design and 
development of process survivability for PROSUR. In particular, we 
describe how redmdant inactive copies of all of the application processes 
are incorporated into the application software and how the processes are 
recovered to a consistent state after a computer failure.
As well as showing that process survivability is practicable, we 
also investigate its practicality. A simulation study of a distributed 
computer control system incorporating process survivability has been 
performed to gain an insight into the effects that process survivability
might have on a control system's performance. The results of this 
simulation are presented and a number of interesting conclusions are drawn.
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1. Introduction
1.0 Introduction
Once a computer has been Introduced into an organisation it quickly 
becomes indispensable and the parent organisation has to rely on the 
computer's continued correct operation. As familiarity with the computer's 
powers increases so does the work load that is placed on it. This in turn 
means that the organisation's ability to operate normally without the 
computer decreases and the reliance placed on the computer's continued 
operation increases.
When such reliance is placed on a computer any interruption to the 
service that it provides (down-time) is much more than an inconvenience. 
In an on-line data processing system down-time costs money, and in a 
process control system down-time may not only be expensive, it may also 
result in a situation arising *>ere lives are endangered. Protracted 
down-time can result in the financial collapse of a commercial 
organisation: a recent survey in the United States of America found that 
"80* of companies would fail to survive a large scale computer disaster" 
(reported in Bremen 1983)»
A computer is said to have failed when it ceases to meet the 
specifications that define its behaviour. A computer's reliability is 
normally measured by the probability that it will not fail during a 
specified time period. The higher the probability and the longer the time 
period, the more reliable the computer is.
Obviously there is potentially a large market for reliable 
computers. Unfortunately computers are not inherently reliable as they are 
made up of »«reliable components rtiich are combined in a complex manner. 
Component reliability is continually being improved but it is very unlikely 
that it will ever reach 100*, and even if it did, the extra complexity
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resulting from combining the components together would bring the computer’s 
reliability down to well below 100*. The alternative to producing a 
computer that never goes wrong is to produce a computer that can continue 
to operate normally despite component failures.
An early but still flourishing market for highly reliable computers 
is the aerospace industry. Here computers have been used to support the 
manned space flights and to pilot the deep space probes. More recently, 
on-board computers are assisting pilots to fly marginally stable aircraft 
by making the myriad minor alterations to the aircraft's control surfaces 
that are needed to keep the plane in the air and which are beyond the 
pilot’s capabilities to perform. Such applications require a computer 
whose probability of failing during the aircraft or spaceship's mission 
time is so small that it can be ignored. (In an aircraft, computer failure 
must be as vnlikely as the wings falling off.) In order to obtain these 
high reliabilities computers have been developed that are fault tolerant, 
that is they are able to continue executing their programs normally and 
without interruption despite component failures.
Fault tolerant aerospace computers are based on the incorporation 
of protective redmdancy into the computer’s design. Protective redundancy 
is comprised of the extra hardware components, processing power and 
programs that are not needed to execute the computer’s programs, but are 
there to provide fault tolerance either by masking component faults or by 
replacing components when they are detected to be faulty (Carter and 
Bouricius 1971). These computers do indeed achieve the high level of 
reliability demanded by the aerospace industry. For example, the Fault 
Tolerant Spaeebourne Computer has a 95* probability of remaining 
operational for five years (O'Brien 1976).
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Such computers can also withstand limited physical damage, but as 
they are physically centralised It is likely that any major physical 
damage, such as that resulting from a fire, would completely destroy them.
In fairness, It should be noted that these computers are not designed to 
cope with such contingencies, as such a situation would most likely doom 
the aircraft or spaceship anyway.
In the majority of applications the threat of physical damage must 
be taken Into consideration. Numerous examples of organisations being left 
computer-less after the complete destruction of their computers abound - an 
Interesting selection of such stories can be found In Berthelsen 1983. 
Lawrence 1983 and Wong 1983« These risks can be reduced by careful 
management and by codes of practice, but they can never be removed. For 
example, a recent UK survey showed that 47* of fires affecting computer 
Installations started outside of that Installation (Wong 1983). In fact, 
in certain applications It may be impossible not to place the computer in a 
hostile environment where such damage Is likely - a computer In a warship 
is one such example.
As the physical threat cannot be removed, the computer system must 
be built to tolerate physical damage. This can be done In the same way 
that component failure Is tolerated except this time the unit of hardware 
redtndancy within the system must be the computer Itself. By basing the 
system on more than one computer and by dispersing these computers, the 
system cannot be totally destroyed by a single disastrous event at one
site.
The invention of the local area network, the falling cost of 
processing power, and a growing demand for a system whose characteristics 
include tolerance to computer failure have led to the development of 
distributed computer systems. The title -distributed computer system* has 
many meanings, but In this thesis we use It to describe a collection of
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computerà that are physically Interconnected by a local area network, and 
Which are logically interconnected to form a single unified system.
When one of the constituent computers of a distributed computer 
system fails it does not prevent the remaining computers from operating 
normally. The overall computing power has been reduced but the majority of 
the power is still available. Furthermore, the physical dispersal that can 
be achieved using a local area network effectively removes the chance of 
all of the computers failing at the same time.
The crash of a computer results in the loss of the executive and 
application software that was running on that computer. If this software 
provided a service that is vital to the continued running of the surviving 
computers* software, then although the majority of the distributed computer 
system is intact it will no longer be able to fulfil its role. The 
distributed computer system as a whole is still vulnerable to computer
fail »ire.
Distributed databases have been developed as a partial solution to 
this problem, as by replicating the data they ensure that a computer 
failure does not prevent access to vital data. However, all the other 
software resources provided by that computer would be lost and these may be 
equally vital.
The aim of the research described in this thesis is to investigate 
how the vulnerability of a distributed computer system’s software can be 
removed so that the full potential of its distributed hardware can be 
exploited. The result of this research is process survivability.
Distributed computer systems can be used for real-time work, 
ranging from process control in a chemical works to on-line transaction 
processing in a bank. Distributed computer systems used for such 
applications are called distributed computer control systems. Process
*
survivability has been developed for Inclusion in a distributed computer 
control system because the cost of the control system failing, whether 
measured in money or lives, is greater than in any other application.
1 . 1  Distributed computer control systems
As we shall show in Chapter 2, a distributed computer control 
system consists of three levels: hardware, distributed kernel and 
application.
The hardware consists of a number of computers linked together by a 
local area network (Clark et al. 1978, Gee 1983). Devices are attached to 
the computers.
Each computer has a kernel. The kernels cooperate with each other 
to form the distributed kernel level. The distributed kernel level 
provides the logical unity that is a characteristic of distributed computer 
systems. This tnity is achieved by hiding the distributed nature of the 
hardware from the application level, thereby providing it with a single­
computer environment in which to operate.
The application level consists of a number of application processes 
that cooperate with each other to implement the control system's role. 
Cooperation is by an interprocess communication mechanism which is provided 
by the distributed kernel level.
When a computer crashes it ceases to work and the kernel and the 
application processes that are running on it are lost. If the control 
system is to continue then the distributed kernel level must be able to 
operate without the lost kernel, and the application level must be able to 
operate without the lost application processes.
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As we shall explain In Chapters 2 and 4, kernels generally operate 
autonomously and only cooperate with each other to support Interprocess 
communication between application processes on different computers. 
Because of this autonomy the loss of a kernel will not prevent the others 
from working normally.
Application processes are not normally autonomous. Some 
application processes provide unimportant services such as error logging, 
and the absence of these would not prevent the rest of the control system 
from operating. Other application processes however provide services that 
are vital, and without them the surviving application processes will not be 
able to operate properly.
Process survivability prevents an application process from being 
lost in a crash. By applying process survivability to every application 
process the application level is made crash tolerant. The application 
level will be unaffected by a computer crash.
Unfortunately, even with process survivability the control system 
as a whole is still not crash tolerant, as it is vulnerable to device loss 
as well. When a computer crashes the devices attached to it can no longer 
be used, and without these the control system's ability to fulfil its role 
is reduced. To remove this vulnerability the devices themselves would have 
to be replicated. Although this problem is outside of the scope of process 
survivability we return to it in several of the later chapters.
The control system is also vulnerable to the failure of its 
network. If the network fails the control system will be partitioned into 
small groups of computers. Again this vulnerability can be removed by
replication.
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1.2 Process survivability
Process survivability ensures that application processes survive 
the crash of their host computer by causing those processes to migrate to 
other computers. Process survivability effectively reconfigures the 
application level to avoid the crashed computer. This reconfiguration is 
transparent to the application processes.
Process survivability is achieved by incorporating non-running 
copies of all of the application processes into the application level. 
Non-running backup copies of each application process are placed on 
different computers. At intervals the backup copies are updated so that 
they form exact copies of their application process.
When an application process is lost in a crash, one of its backup 
copies is activated to replace it. In effect the application process has 
side-stepped the disaster, having been moved from the crashed computer to 
one of the survivors. The remaining backups ensure the survivability of 
the new generation of application process. By having multiple copies of 
each process the system can withstand the simultaneous destruction of a
number of computers.
By applying process survivability to every application process we 
ensure that in the event of a computer crash no application process is 
lost. Process survivability makes the application level crash tolerant.
Process survivability has been designed to have the following 
advantageous features:
a) Process survivability is transparent to the application programmer: 
process survivability does not involve any code in the application 
process, and so it will not fail due to programmer error.
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b) As long as the number of computers that have failed is within the level 
of process replication, crash tolerance can be maintained.
c) Multiple backups of each process ensure that crash tolerance is not 
affected by simultaneous computer failures.
d) Crash tolerance Is not affected by what a process is doing when Its host 
computer crashes. Process survivability coverage Is 100f (assuming that 
a backup copy of that process still exists).
e) Process survivability is automatic. There is no operator involvement 
other than specifying the level of redundancy required and the position 
of the backups.
This thesis describes how process survivability can be implemented 
for a 'paper* distributed computer control system called PROSUR (PROcess 
SURvivability). Part of the preliminary work for the research described 
involved designing PROSUR so as to create an environment in which process 
survivability could be developed. PROSUR is called a paper system because 
its characteristics have been specified on paper but it has not been 
implemented.
1 .3 The cost of process survivability
All fault tolerance is based on some form of protective redundancy 
- hardware, software or time (program execution). Process survivability is 
no exception.
In a number of distributed computer control system applications, 
maintaining the control system's response time to external events is 
important. After a computer crash backups will be activated to replace the 
lost application processes and the surviving computers will be running more 
application processes than before. If the control system's response time
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Is not to fall below acceptable levels, the computers must be configured 
with sufficient spare processing power to absorb the extra load. Once this 
spare power has been exhausted, further computer losses, although not 
causing the control system to fail, will cause the control system to start 
missing deadlines.
To be able to withstand n computer failures without its response 
time degrading, a distributed computer control system must contain time 
redundancy equivalent to the power of n computers. Thus the control system 
has n computers that are surplus to its normal requirements and these are 
the major cost of process survivability. (There are no designated standby 
computers in the system; the active application processes are partitioned 
between all of the computers.)
This expense can be spared if a degraded response time is 
acceptable after a computer failure. The distributed computer system can 
be configured without any computer redundancy, Just sufficient computers to 
fulfil its primary role and no more. (The absence of computer redwidaney 
does not mean that there is only one computer.) In the event of a computer 
failure the control system's response time would become slower.
Further protective reduidancy in the form of extra code, 
processing, and commwication network activity is needed to implement 
process survivability. All of this will either reduce the amount of 
profitable work that can be performed by the system, or will reduce the 
system's response time. A simulation study of a distributed computer 
control system incorporating process survivability has been performed in 
order to ascertain What these overheads are likely to be, and to what 
extent they might effect the control system's ability to perform useful 
work. The results of the simulation and the conclusions drawn from them 
are presented in a ^ater chapter.
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The Inclusion of protective redundancy In any form Increases the 
price of a system without Increasing Its through-put. Normally, a fault 
tolerant system will only be adopted when the cost of a system failure Is 
greater than the cost of preventing that failure.
1.U Possible applications
We believe that a distributed computer control system incorporating 
process survivability will be of greatest value In process control 
applications. Such applications require a crash tolerant service with a 
guaranteed response time which will not degrade even in the event of 
multiple failures. The cost of providing such a service should be 
justifiable on both financial and safety grounds.
A particularly extreme process control application Is that of a 
warship command and control system as the environment It operates in is 
hostile and the cost of a system failure is high. "Military command and 
control...systems must be able to operate fast, move fast or hide, and 
function in the presence of physical (as well as other) counter measures" 
(Licklider and Vezza 1978).
A naval command and control system controls the ship's weapons, 
sensors and displays in order to assist the command team in their decision 
making. The command and control system monitors the ship's environment 
using various sensors such as radar and sonar, and presents this 
information via displays to the command team. The decisions taken by the 
command team are in turn executed by the command and control system.
A warship and its crew are dependent on the warship's command and 
control system. If it fails in action the warship will quickly become 
untenable. Current command and control systems are based on a single 
computer thus making the ship vulnerable to a single hardware fault, and to 
light action damage that would not otherwise have affected the ship.
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By basing the command and control system around a distributed 
computer control system that incorporates process survivability, a lot of 
this vulnerability would be removed. Configuring the distributed computer 
control system to include a high level of computer (and time) redundancy 
should enable the command and control system to withstand action damage for 
as long as the ship remains a viable weapons platform. Dispersing the 
computers around the ship will reduce the chances of action damage 
destroying all of the computers in one go. If multiple crashes occur, 
process survivability's use of multiple backups for every application 
process ensures that the application processes survive.
Ideally the cost of the computer redundancy would be easily 
Justified by the need of a warship to remain operational. In practice 
however, the level of reduidaney would be based on the expected threat, the 
cost of providing that redundancy and the amount of space available to put
it in.
The value of basing a command and control system on a multi­
computer architecture has already been recognised. The Canadian navy has 
adopted such a system for use in their warships as a way of limiting the 
physical effects of action damage, but they do not attempt to achieve 
anything like process survivability (Carruthers 1979). In Britain, the 
Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment are currently developing a 
distributed computer control system for use in Royal Navy warships (Rowland 
1982). This system does Incorporate crash tolerant application processes, 
and it is the subject of later discussion in Chapters 2 and 4.
Any commercial institution that supports an on-line transaction 
processing system for its own use, or for the use of its customers, would 
benefit by adopting a crash tolerant computer system, as even a small 
interruption in the computer's service would lead to a loss of money and 
loss of customer goodwill. One of the earliest examples of an on-line
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database, the SABRE airline reservation system (Plugge and Perry 1961), was 
based on a fault tolerant computer system.
The threat of a major disaster completely destroying a computer is 
now being taken very seriously, and has led to a number of 'hot standby' 
sites (Harrington 1983, Berthelsen 1983) being set up as commercial 
ventures. Hot standby sites are computer suites that can be taken over by 
a client in the event of a disaster destroying his own computer system.
Basing an on-line transaction processing system on a distributed 
computer control system that incorporates process survivability would 
remove the threat of loss of service due to hardware faults or disasters. 
The amount of protective redundancy that needs to be incorporated in such a 
system is much less than in a command and control system, as the chance of 
more than one failure at a time is remote. Process survivability's ability 
to provide a crash tolerant service without any computer redundancy, albeit 
at the risk of a degraded response time in the event of a failure, makes it 
attractive for commercial applications.
This 'no extra cost' configuration also means that a crash tolerant 
service could be provided t*>ere the extra cost could not normally be 
Justified, for example as a University time-sharing system.
1 .5 Su"— arv of contents of thesis
Process survivability is based on the use of standby redundancy 
within the application level of a distributed computer control system. The 
first three chapters review the background to process survivability.
Chapter 2 describes the organisation of a number of existing 
distributed computer control systems and describes the three-level model 
outlined in Section 1.1. Chapter 3 reviews the theory of fault tolerance 
and gives two extended examples of the use of standby redundancy to achieve
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fault tolerance.
Chapter 4 describes the two ways In which redundant copies of 
application processes can be Incorporated into the application level. A 
major example of each Is given. The rest of the thesis describes process 
survivability.
Chapter 5 reintroduces process survivability. Its alms, 
characteristics, and relationship to previous work are described. The 
succeeding chapters then describe how process survivability can be added to 
a specific example of a distributed computer control system - PROSUR.
Chapter 6 describes PROSUR, the model distributed computer control 
system that has been used as an environment in which to develop process 
survivability. PROSUR complies with the three-level model presented in 
Chapter 2, except that It has a fourth level Interposed between the 
application level and the distributed kernel level. This level, the 
process survivability level, supports the process redundancy incorporated 
in the application level. The main emphasis in this chapter is on how 
red endant copies of application processes are organised, maintained and 
used.
An application process’s backups are updated at intervals to become 
exact copies of that application process. So, when a backup is activated 
it will be out of date, and any outstanding messages that have been sent to 
its previous generation will have been lost. The combination of these two 
effects means that the restarted application process's state will be 
inconsistent with the state of the rest of the application level. Chapter 
7 discusses these inconsistencies in detail.
Part of the process survivability level’s role is to remove these 
inconsistencies. Chapter 8 introduces the way in which consistency is 
restored. Finally, Chapter 9 presents full details of how the process
13
survivability level would be implemented.
He have developed a way of Implementing process survivability. But 
is it practical, or will the overheads caused by its inclusion reduce the 
level of work being done to a prohibitively low level? A simulation study 
of PROSUR has been performed in order to examine this question. The 
simulation's alms, implementation and results are described in Chapter 10.
Finally in the Conclusion (Chapter 11) we review the work presented 
in this thesis, and describe the possibilities for the further development 
and exploitation of process survivability.
1M
2. Distributed Computer Control System Organisation
2.0 Introduction
A real-time computer system monitors the state of Its environment 
and reacts to events that occur within Its environment. A real-time system 
can be divided Into the controlled system and the control system.
The controlled system comprises those devices that provide an 
interface between the control system and its environment. The actual 
composition of the controlled system will depend on the function of the 
real-time system. For example, In an on-line transaction processing system 
It may consist of disks, VDUs and line printers, and In an Industrial 
process control system it may consist of thermometers, valves and relays.
The control system Is the regulating element in a feedback loop. 
It consists of the computer programs that perform the regulating and the 
computer hardware that those programs run on.
A distributed computer control system Is a control system that Is 
based on a number of computers linked together by a communication network. 
The control software Is dispersed between the computers with the Individual 
software components cooperating with each other to fulfil the system's
overall role.
In this chapter we describe the software and hardware structure of 
distributed computer control systems. Unfortunately there are as many ways 
of organising a distributed computer control system as there are 
distributed computer control systems. So we first review a selection of 
existing and proposed systems, and then we present a generalised 
description of a distributed computer control system. First however, we 
review the potential advantage, that can be attributed to a distributed
system.
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2.1 The potential advantages
Being based on a number of Interconnected computers, a distributed 
computer control system's hardware has a number of extremely advantageous 
characteristics s
1) The computers can be placed close to (or even within) the devices they 
use, thus reducing the control system's response time to external 
events. This will be particularly useful in an Industrial complex where 
the controlled system is perforce widely dispersed.
2) Processing can be performed in parallel, again reducing response time. 
Large tasks can be divided into smaller concurrently running tasks, and 
events that occur in parallel in the system's environment can be handled 
in parallel. The latter ability may be crucial in an emergency when 
alarms are generated by a number of sources.
3) Such an architecture makes it possible to exploit the 'enough* principle 
(Brenner et al. 1980). The enough principle states that by reducing 
hardware resource restrictions it is possible to produce simpler 
software. Hardware costs are continually falling, especially where 
established technology is concerned, but software costs continue to 
rise and so it is now economical to use hardware to reduce software 
complexity and hence reduce the overall cost of a control system.
1») The architecture is very modular. The computers communicate via a 
common medium - the communication network. As long as a computer can 
use the network in the standard way, it can communicate with the other 
computers. This means that the type of computers used can be tailored 
exactly to the requirements of the system, and as these requirements 
change, the hardware can be easily extended by the addition of other 
computers. Thus the system's processing requirements are met very
economically.
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5) The final and possibly the most important advantage is the high 
availability of the system. When a computer suffers a hardware failure 
it cannot prevent any of the other computers from running. The overall 
system has suffered a reduction in its processing power, but the 
majority of the power is still available. It is this characteristic 
that is exploited by process survivability. (The system is however
reliant on the continued operation of the network.)
The first three of these advantages can be easily exploited by the 
designer of a distributed computer control system. However if the control 
system is to benefit from the last two of the advantages, then its software 
must be designed so as to exploit them to their full potential.
2.2 Exlstltg distributed computer control systems
2.2.0 Introduction
In this section we briefly review the hardware and software layout 
of a number of distributed computer control systems. From these 
descriptions it will be seen that although details vary between systems 
their overall structure is very similar.
In the following descriptions we have where possible standardised 
the terminology used rather than use the authors« original terminology.
2.2.1 CONIC
CONIC (Kramer et ml. 1982, Lister et al. 1980) is designed for use 
as an industrial process control system. Unfortunately, neither of these 
papers gives an explanation of what the acronym CONIC stands for.
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The envisaged hardware structure is that of a group of computers 
Interconnected by a mesh of subnetworks linked together by gateways (Sloman 
1982).
Software consists of a number of concurrently running processes. 
Processes that cooperate to perform a particular service are grouped into a 
structure called a module. The internal structure of a module is hidden 
from other modules. A module must be located on a single computer, but 
there may be more than one module on a computer.
Interprocess and intermodule commmleation is provided by 
asynchronous message passing and by a request-reply message pair similar in 
operation to a procedure call. Furthermore, interprocess communication 
within a module can be performed by shared data.
In CONIC the software is divided into a hierarchy of distinct 
levels: kernel, communication system, operating system, application 
software and management software. Other than the kernel level, all of 
these levels are implemented using modules, processes and message passing.
The kernels support multiprocessing and intra-computer message 
passing, and they provide the routines needed by the local operating 
system. Inter-computer message passing is performed by a commiailcation 
module on each computer. The distinction between inter-computer and 
intra-computer commuiicatlon is hidden from the higher levels.
The operating systems on each computer provide the services needed 
to configure and reconfigire the application software, and management 
software. The management software monitors the system’s activities and 
controls the system's installation.
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2.2.2 Distributed Senaor Network (DSN)
DSN (Rashid 1980) Is a fault tolerant system developed at 
Carnegie-Mellon University. It is based on Three Rivers Corporation PERQs 
connected together by a network similar to Ethernet (Metcalfe and Boggs
1976).
The basic software unit is the process which performs a computation 
and/or manages resources. Each computer has a kernel and a set of 
processes. It Is assumed that the processes will be organised into a 
hierarchy of levels.
Application processes may be written In a number of languages, each 
of which will have Its own Interprocess communication mechanism. All of 
these mechanisms are Implemented using asynchronous message passing.
The kernel provides virtual memory management, multiprocessing, 
local Interprocess communications, routines to control the devices, and 
routines to create and delete processes. Inter-computer communication Is 
provided by a network process resident on each computer. This partitioning 
of labour Is Invisible to the application processes.
2.2.3 A Signal Processing System
This system (Stepczyk 1978) Is a dedicated system designed to 
perform signal processing.
The hardware consists of three PDP-11*s linked together by 
unidirectional bus links to for. a ring. All of the software Is written In 
Concurrent Pascal (Brinch Hansen 1977). Each computer runs a virtual 
machine environment for supporting Concurrent Pascal, and a number of 
processes. Interprocess communication la by synchronous message passing 
and by shared data In the form of monitors.
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Message passing Is Implemented by two monitors on each computer. 
One performs Intra-computer message passing and the other Inter-computer 
message passing, with the partitioning being hidden from the user processes 
by the class that provides the message passing routines.
Shared data is stored in monitors. Only local processes can use a 
monitor’s procedures. Every process that requires remote access to a 
monitor has a ’ghost’ process local to that monitor. To use a monitor a 
remote process sends Its ghost a message which the ghost translates into a 
call to the monitor. The results of the monitor call are then returned by 
the ghost to the remote process In a message. In a later version remote 
access to monitors will be allowed.
2.2.1* Action Data Network (ADHET)
ADN1JT (Moulding 1980a and Moulding 1980b) Is an experimental 
warship command and control system developed by the Admiralty Surface 
Weapons Establishment (ASWE).
ADHET Is based on a number of Ferranti Argus minicomputers linked 
together by an ASHE Serial Highway (Ministry of Defence 1981, Hill and 
Stalnsby 1980). The software is Implemented in Coral 66, supported by
Mascot.
The application software consists of a set of processes partitioned 
between the computers. The processes cooperate with each other using 
asynchronous message passing. The application processes on each computer 
are supported by a local copy of the Mascot Operating System (Miles 1980) 
and a communication package.
The Mascot Operating System supports only a single-computer Mascot 
environment. All Interprocess communications, whether inter-computer or 
intra-computer, are handled by the communication package on each computer.
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Further details of ADNET are given in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.
2.2.5 Distributed Processes
'Distributed Processes' is a programming language concept proposed 
by Brinch Hansen (1978) for programming distributed real-time systems. 
Although he concentrates on language features there are sufficient details 
about the control system's configuration and implementation to justify its 
inclusion here.
Distributed Processes is designed for programming a network of 
microcomputers linked together by a communication network. The number of 
processes in the system is fixed and to ensure adequate response time there 
is only one application process per computer. Interprocess communication 
is by procedure calls.
Each computer runs a runtime environment for supporting distributed 
processes, a single application process and a number of 'ghost* processes. 
The ghosts are part of the remote procedure call implementation, and are 
similar to the ghost processes used in the Signal Processing System
described above.
A process's procedures are used by only a few processes. Each of 
these processes is represented by a ghost process resident on the server 
process's computer. When a user process executes a remote procedure call 
the parameters are passed to its ghost. The ghost performs the procedure 
call and then returns any results. Thus the remote procedure call is
actually based on message passing a t .  lower level. A similar scheme is
also used in Unix United (Brownbridge et al. 1982), although here the 
number of users is «known and so the ghost, are dynamically created a,
needed.
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Multiprogramming the application process and the ghosts Is simple. 
There Is no preemption and the processes simply execute until they perform 
an explicit wait on some condition.
2.3 A generalised distributed computer control system organisation
2.3.0 Introduction
Although the previous section is not an exhaustive survey of 
distributed computer control systems, It Is sufficient to show that 
although details vary between systems their basic organisation is similar. 
In this section we present a generalised distributed computer control 
system model which has each of the above examples as special cases.
Three main levels can be identified: application level, distributed 
kernel level, and hardware level. We will now describe each of these In
turn.
2.3.1 The application level
The application level is divided into a number of application 
processes, which cooperate with each other In order to fulfil the control 
system's role. An application process is a named and executable instance 
of a program. The application processes are dispersed between the 
computers. The location of some application processes will be determined 
by the location of particular hardware resources, for example an 
application process that controls a line printer must be hosted by a 
computer that Is connected to a line printer.
The application level may be structured Internally by organising 
the application processes Into a hierarchy of levels, and/or by grouping 
the application processes into modules.
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Often a group of application processes will cooperate with each 
other In order to provide a particular service. In CONIC and In the 
distributed programming language proposed by Llskov (1979)* application 
processes are grouped into modules, and the module is used as the standard 
unit of application software. In both examples, all of the module's 
constituent application processes must be on the same computer.
The application processes (and the modules, if they are used) may 
be logically organised into a hierarchy of levels. The number of levels in 
a real-time system is much fewer than in most general purpose computer 
systems, often as few as two (Boebert et al. 1978). Prince and Sloman 
(1981) identify four hierarchical levels in an industrial process control 
system: direct control of devices, subsystem control, site-wide control, 
and management control. In other distributed computer control systems, 
such as the signal processing example above, there is no obvious layering
at all.
In traditional computer systems there is an operating system level 
between the kernel level and the application level, which provides access 
to system resources. In a real-time system the distinction between system 
and application resources is negligible, and so the operating system and 
application software are indistinguishable.
Application processes will be written in a high level language such 
as BCPL (Richards and Whitby-Strevens 1980), C (Kernlghan and Ritchie 1978) 
or Pascal (Jensen and Wirth 1978). The language will incorporate commands 
for interprocess commmication and for interfacing the application process 
with the runtime clock. The latter commands include finding the current 
time, and suspending the caller for a period of time or until a certain
time.
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Interprocess communication can be performed in a number of ways. 
asynchronous message passing, synchronous message passing, asynchronous 
procedure calling and synchronous procedure calling. Numerous attempts 
have been made to show which of these is the best, and a selection of these 
arguments can be found in Lauer and Needham 1979, Staunstrup 1982 and 
Stroustrup 1982. The common result of these comparisons is that there is 
no difference and that a choice should be made on the efficiency of the 
primitive operations needed to support the mechanisms.
A more relevant survey into the Interprocess communication needs of 
a distributed computer control system was performed as part of the CONIC 
project by Kramer et al. (1981). They identified the various interactions 
that occur between application processes, and concluded that these could be 
accomplished by using synchronous procedure calling for command-reply and 
query-status transactions, and by using asynchronous message passing for 
sending alarms, status messages and delayed responses to procedure calls 
(thus emulating asynchronous procedure calls). In CONIC itself a request- 
reply message passing construct is used instead of a synchronous procedure
call.
Despite Kramer et al.'s considered arguments there is no apparent 
consensus of opinion between existing systems. In the examples given in 
Section 2.2 all of these mechanisms are represented.
A fifth way of performing interprocess communication is by using 
shared data. This is normally rejected as it would require some form of 
global virtual address space. However, it is used in CONIC for intra­
module communication, but as a module's processes are all located on the 
same machine, this problem is avoided.
24
For simplicity and precision in the following discussion, we assume 
that interprocess communication is by asynchronous message passing. All of 
the arguments presented below apply equally to the other interprocess 
communication mechanisms. Asynchronous message passing was chosen because 
the two major examples in Chapter 4 use it, and so does PROSUK, the 
distributed computer control system incorporating process survivability. 
First we describe asynchronous message passing.
For two application processes (the sender and receiver) to 
communicate by asynchronous message passing they must be connected by a 
channel. A channel is formed by joining together the sender's output 
channel to the receiver's input channel. The sender sends messages to its 
output channel and the receiver receives these messages from its input 
channel. Messages that have been sent but which have not been received are 
buffered within the channel. The number of messages that can be buffered 
within a channel is limited, and if the sender tries to send a message to a 
full channel then it is suspended until space is available. Similarly, if 
the receiver tries to receive a message from an empty channel then it will 
be suspended until a message arrives#
Following Kramer et al. (1981) an application process’s response 
time is defined to be the time taken by an application process to recognise 
that a message is waiting to be received plus the time it takes to service 
that message. For a lot of applications, maintaining the application 
processes' response time within some critical bounds is an important 
consideration.
From the time at which an application process issues a command to 
send or receive a message «til that command finishes, the application 
process is suspended. The application process may be delayed by the 
channel's flow control, or if it 1» a sender and the receiver is on a 
different computer it will be delayed by the time taken to transfer the
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message between computers. If an application process is to maintain its 
response it is Important that the time spent sending or receiving a message 
has an upper limit. To achieve this the send and the receive commands have 
a timeout period. If the command takes longer than the timeout period to 
complete, then the command is aborted.
An application process will normally have more than one input 
channel. The pattern of message arrival on these channels cannot normally 
be predetermined. Messages are equally likely to arrive on any input 
channel and so an application process must be able to wait for a message 
from any of its input channels. Kramer et al. (1981) suggest the use of 
guarded commands (Hoare 1978) which will allow receives to be issued on a 
number of input channels at the same time, and as soon as one of the 
receives terminates, all of the others are aborted.
Prince and Sloman (1981) have identified the following three 
patterns of Information flow between application processes:
1 ) one-to-one: a message is sent by one application process to another.
2) One-to-many: a message is broadcast by one application process to 
several others, each of which will receive a copy. This might be used 
for raising an alarm or for requesting a service from a number of
identical servers.
3) Many-to-one: an application process receives messages from more than one 
application process. A process that provides a service may receive 
requests fhom a number of users.
In COHIC for «xa.p l«, to«»« now p .tt .rn . o.n 0.
exp licitly  inoorporatod into to. appllo.tlon con fl.u r.tion . To
create a on .-to -.an , oonn.otlon a .1«*!« ««tpot oOann.l la Unkad to 
ao„.ral input oo .n n .l., «nd to.n - i .n  a . . » » « «  1« » « " t . ■ ««■» « '  toat
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message is placed in each of the input channels. Similarly, a many-to-one 
connection is created by connecting a number of output channels to a single 
input channel. Messages sent down any of the output channels will be 
buffered in the input channel from where they can be received.
Alternatively, these interconnections could be created by using 
one-to-one connections only. This would not be as elegant or as efficient. 
For example, in the Distributed Processes System, if a process has to 
communicate with several other processes, then it has to call procedures in 
each of the recipients in turn.
For a message to be delivered, the physical address of the 
recipient's input channel must be known. Using physical addresses within 
the application processes is impractical as the final address of the 
recipient may not be known when the processes are written. Instead the 
processes are identified by logical names.
Before a message can be sent the receiver's logical name must be 
translated into its physical address. This translation can be made at one 
of many points: compilation time, system creation time or every time a 
message is sent. For example, if application processes can migrate between 
computers, then the mapping from logical name to physical address must be 
made every time a message is sent.
The use of logical names in the writing of the processes disguises 
the distributed nature of the control system's hardware. The difference 
between inter-computer and intra-computer communication is removed and thus 
the distributed architecture of the control system is logically united.
27
2.3.2 The distributed kernel level
Each computer has Its own kernel, and these together form the 
distributed kernel level. A kernel provides the runtime environment needed 
to support local application processes. It provides routines for driving 
devices, and for creating and destroying processes, and it performs 
multiprogramming and virtual memory management.
All of these services effect local resources only and so they are 
performed autonomously by the individual kernels. Any access to the 
services provided by remote kernels, for example to create a process on a 
remote machine or to access a remote device, is coordinated by application 
level software.
It is common practice for lengthy kernel routines to be performed 
by 'executive processes' that are multiprogrammed along with the 
application processes. Lister (1979) suggests executive processes for 
performing I/O operations, and Brinch Hansen (1973) used them to perform 
process-creation commands. Allworth (1981) and Harper (1982) take this 
idea to its logical conclusion and suggest implementing every interrupt 
routine as an executive process.
A kernel is composed of a number of processes. One of these 
processes, the nucleus, is permanently locked in memory and runs in 
privileged mode. The other processes are the executive processes. The 
partition of labour between the kernel's nucleus and its executive 
processes is invisible to the application processes.
The nucleus provides such services as the first level interrupt 
handler, synchronisation primitives, and the dispatcher (Lister 1979). 
Communication between the nucleus and the executive processes, and 
comminication between executive processes, will be based on a mechanism 
more basic than that used for communication between application processes;
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for example, shared data with semaphores for synchronisation Is a common
choice.
Another service provided by a kernel Is that of Interprocess 
communication. In ADDAM and in the Signal Processing System, all 
Interprocess communication Is performed by an executive process. In CONIC, 
ESN and the Distributed Processes System, Interprocess communication 
between processes on different computers is performed by an executive 
process, while local Interprocess communication is performed by the 
kernel's nucleus. ESN can also be configured so that both local and remote 
Interprocess communication Is performed by the kernel's nucleus.
Remote Interprocess communication requires cooperation between the 
sending and the receiving kernel. This cooperation Is achieved by using 
the Inter-computer communication mechanism provided by the hardware level.
2.3.3 The hardware level
This level consists of the computers, and of the communication 
network that links them together. Each computer Is connected to the 
communication network by a network Interface. Input/output devices are 
attached to Individual computers.
Nearly all of a computer's operations are performed autonomously by 
that computer, for example reading and writing to local memory. However to 
transfer data from one computer to another requires the cooperation of both 
sender and receiver. This cooperation Is performed using a low-level 
protocol provided by the hardware/firmware In the network interface.
The composition of the hardware Is determined by a large number of 
factors, including the environmental requirements, the required 
performance, and to a large extent the concept of Its Inventors. In the 
above examples the trend is to use mini-computers or micro-computers linked 
together by some for. of local are. network (Clark et al. 1978, Gee 1983).
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2.4 Summary
The organisation outlined in the previous section is not limited to 
distributed computer control systems only. A number of so-called 
distributed computer systems exhibit this organisation, for example DCS 
(Rowe et al. 1973), SODS (Sincoskie and Farber 1980) and Roscoe (Solomon 
and Finkel 1979).
In Section 2.1 we presented a list of five advantages that result 
from basing a control system on a distributed architecture. If the full 
potential of all of these advantages is to be exploited then the software 
must be designed accordingly. This is particularly true of communication 
and availability.
In the same way that different types of computers can communicate 
with each other over a common commmication network, application processes 
written in different languages must be able to communicate with each other. 
In DSN application processes written in different languages with different 
intercommimication primitives can communicate with each other because all 
of the different interprocess communication mechanisms are implemented 
using asynchronous message passing. Similarly, if the computers are of 
different types then messages must be translated from one representation to 
another; for example, in DCLN (Liu and Reames 1977) all messages are 
translated into an intermediate format before being sent over the network.
As indicated in Section 2.1, possibly the greatest advantage of the 
distributed architecture is its high availability. This advantage is the 
rationale for the development of process survivability, and the rest of 
this thesis is dedicated to describing existing systems that exhibit 
process survivability and to developing process survivability for the 
distributed computer control system PROSUR.
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3. An Introduction to Fault Tolerance
3.0 Introduction
It la Impossible to build a computer system In which a fault does 
not exist and In which a fault cannot arise: Its hardware will degrade with 
time, and its software will probably be too complicated to be fault free. 
To achieve high reliability a computer system must be able to continue 
operating to specification despite the presence of a hardware or a software 
fault. Such a system Is called a fault tolerant computer system.
This chapter Introduces the principles of fault tolerance, and 
illustrates them with two extended examples: the recovery block scheme for 
implementing software fault tolerance, and the hardware fault tolerant STAR 
(Self Testing And Repair) computer.
3.1 A vocabulary for discussing fault tolerance
A computer system Is formed by superimposing a software system on a 
hardware system. In turn both systems are composed of sub-systems, and so 
on. To be able to discuss fault tolerance in computer systems we must 
first be able to describe the organisation of the systems themselves. The 
following system model reflects the structuring that should exist in all 
computer systems, both In their hardware and In their software. The model 
is based on those presented by Watson (1983) and by Anderson and Lee (1981 
and 1982). It is also similar to the model proposed by Jones (1978).
A system provides its environment with controlled access to Its 
resources. These resources may either be physical or logical; for example, 
disk blocks or files.
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The services provided by a system are defined by a set of data 
structures (its representation or external state) and by a set of 
operations that can be performed on the system’s external state. A 
system's behaviour is described by the effects that the operations have on 
its external state. The implementation of the services and the actual 
organisation of the resources are hidden from the environment.
Requests for operations to be performed by a system are made by the 
environment via the system’s interfaces. An Interface is simply the place 
of interaction between two systems. The system’s environment is also a 
system and may in turn be composed of a number of other sub-systems.
For an example we turn to the distributed computer control system 
model presented in the previous chapter. An application process is a 
system, and its input and output channels are its interfaces. An
application process’s representation and operations will depend on the
service it provides. If for example an application process provides access 
to a disk then its representation may be that of a set of files, and its
operations may include commands such as open file, close file, etc.
Requests for operations will be in the form of messages, and will be made 
via the application process’s channels; the results will be returned in a 
similar fashion. The way in which the filestore is organised ia hidden 
from the process's environment.
A system consists of a set of components and a design. The 
components provide the operations needed to implement the system’s own 
operations, and the design defines and controls the interactions between 
the components, and between the components and the interfaces. If a system
has no discernible internal structure, or if that structure is of no
consequence, then that system is said to be atomic.
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A component la Itself a system. It provides a set of operations 
and a representation of Its resources. To distinguish between the 
operations provided by a system and those provided by a component we call 
the latter actions. A system operation is Implemented by a set of actions 
instigated by the design. The set of components' representations comprises 
the system's Internal state. The system’s representation is an abstraction 
of its Internal state.
The design Is that part of the system that receives requests for 
operations from the environment and In turn Instigates the necessary 
actions to perform the operation. When necessary, the design also controls 
the interaction between components, and the Interactions between components 
and the Interfaces In order for the components to use services provided by 
the environment.
The design Is a system. The system's state does not Include the 
design's external state, as the system's state reflects the activity In the 
system and not Its organisation, which would normally be fixed. The design 
should not be confused with the plan that describes a system's 
organisation, nor with the process by which the system was designed.
A particularly classic example of the partition of labour between 
design and components is given in Chapter *». Section *».2.1, which describes 
how masking redmdancy can be Implemented within the application level of a 
distributed computer control system so as to make it crash tolerant. 
Returning to our earlier example of a system, an application process's code 
is the design and Its data structures are the components. The code 
receives requests for operations (messages) and Instigates the actions to 
manipulate the data structures. The Internal state of the application 
process will be the contents of the data structures. The state of the 
......... code (Its design) Is static and does not form a part of the
process's state.
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This system terminology can be used to describe a computer system 
recursively, or more conventionally, It can be used to describe the 
computer system In terms of a hierarchy of levels. Each hierarchical level 
consists of a number of systems. Each level provides the higher levels 
with a set of services, and In turn its systems are implemented using the 
services provided by the lower levels.
Since 1972 a project led by Professor B.Randell at the University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne has been investigating reliability in computer 
systems. As part of its wider research this project has been developing a 
vocabulary for discussing system reliability, with the aim of getting this 
vocabulary accepted as a standard. The final version of this vocabulary 
has been presented by Anderson and Lee (1981 and 1982). We have already 
drawn on this vocabulary for the description of a system and we now present 
those terms that describe reliability itself.
To be able to decide whether a system is reliable it is necessary 
to be able to recognise when it fails. In order to be able to do this it 
is necessary to assume the existence of an authoritative specification 
Which defines a system's acceptable behaviour. If the system's behaviour 
contradicts its authoritative specification it is said to have failed.
The reliability of a system is often measured by the probability 
that no failure will have occurred by a certain time. A common alternative 
measurement to this is the system's mean time between failures.
A system's behaviour is defined by the effect that a given 
operation has on the system's external state. The authoritative 
specification defines what constitutes a valid external state and defines 
how an operation will map the external state from one valid state to 
another. A system fails When an operation results in a transition fro. a 
valid external state to an invalid or erroneous one.
As the external state Is an abstraction of the system's internal 
state, an erroneous external state must mean that the internal state is 
erroneous as well. That part of the internal state that is actually
erroneous is called the error.
An erroneous internal state is the result of an erroneous 
transition that changed a valid internal state into an erroneous one. An
error need not cause the system to fail immediately, and a number of 
operations may be performed before the error manifests itself in the 
system's external state and causes it to fail.
The erroneous transition must be due to either the failure of one 
or more of the system's components or to the failure of the system's 
design. This is logical as a system consists only of its components and 
its design, and so its failure must be due to a failure in one of its
constituent parts.
As a component (or a design) is a system itself, its failure must 
be due to an error in its internal state. To distinguish between an error 
in a component/design from an error in the system, the former are referred 
to as component/design faults. Design faults and component faults are 
collectively called system faults.
A fault within a component or a design will eventually cause it to 
fall, and this will result in an erroneous transition (the manifestation of 
the fault) being performed on the system's Internal state, which will 
inject an error into the system's Internal state. Further valid
transitions will lead to the system failure.
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3.2 Fault tolerance and fault Intolerance
There are two complementary approaches to producing a highly 
reliable computer system: fault prevention and fault tolerance.
Fault prevention techniques attempt to produce a system In which 
there are no faults. Fault prevention Is performed in three stages. 
First, techniques such as quality control, formal specification, structured 
programming and top-down analysis are used in an attempt to avoid 
introducing faults In the first place. Unfortunately in a complicated 
system faults are bound to be Introduced, and so the second stage Is to 
detect these faults by testing and validation, and then to remove them. 
Finally, having hopefully removed all of the faults, the system must be 
¡screened from external stresses In order to prevent any faults from being 
introduced. The software and the hardware can be protected from malicious 
interference by a number of security mechanisms (Shanker 1977), although it 
is still vulnerable to enhancements.
Fault prevention Is not sufficient on its own to produce a highly 
reliable computer system. Hardware components deteriorate with time and 
they are vulnerable to external stresses that overwhelm the screening. 
Software Is too complicated to be tested exhaustively, and program 
validation Is still In Its Infancy. So despite the care taken faults will 
still occur and * e n  they do the system will fail, which is why a system 
that relies solely on fault prevention to achieve reliability is said to be
fault Intolerant.
As faults will always occur, the only way to achieve high 
reliability Is for a system to be designed to be fault tolerant. To 
achieve fault tolerance a syatem must Include mechanisms that can detect a 
component/design fault and intercede to correct that fault before it cause,
the system Itself to fall.
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Fault tolerance does not make fault prevention redundant, but It 
can be used to reduce the amount of effort that is put Into fault 
prevention, as any residual faults will be masked by the system’s fault 
tolerance mechanisms. However, this does not mean that fault tolerance can 
be used as a 'warm blanket', as without any attempt at fault prevention the 
system would most likely not work at all.
3.3 The four phases of fault tolerance
Fault tolerance mechanisms are Intended to prevent faults from 
causing system failures. The operation of fault tolerance mechanisms can 
be generalised Into the following four phases:
1 ) Error detection
To be able to tolerate a fault the system must first be able to 
detect it. By definition a fault Is part of a component• s/deslgn• s 
internal state and so cannot be detected by the system; neither can the 
resultant component/deslgn failure be detected as that is an event. 
However, the fault will manifest Itself as an error In the system’s 
Internal state and this can be detected. The first stage of fault 
tolerance Is to detect the error before It causes the system to fall.
2) Damage confinement and assessment
An error must be detected as soon as possible. Any delay may 
lead to erroneous Information being spread around the system. If 
immediate detection of an error cannot be guaranteed, then it Is 
necessary to discover the extent of the damage before dealing with the
error•
Damage confinement measures may be Incorporated Into the system 
in order to limit the amount of damage that can be caused. Damage 
confinement measures reduce the — » t  of work that must be done in 
damage assessment, thereby reducing the runtime overheads involved in
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fault tolerance.
3) Error recovery
Error recovery techniques are designed to transform the system's 
current erroneous internal state into an error free and well defined 
state from vdiich normal service can continue.
If the types of faults that can occur can be predicted, and if 
the limits of the resultant damage can be accurately assessed, then 
specific recovery routines can be provided that will correct only the 
damaged part of the system's state. This technique is called forward 
error recovery. The techniques such as Hamming codes used in computer 
communication to detect and correct errors in received data are an 
example of forward error recovery (Cole 1982).
Forward error recovery is very efficient as the minimum of 
adjustments are made to the system's state. Unfortunately its reliance 
on being able to predict both the fault and the resultant damage limits 
its general application as it means that it cannot cope with 
in predictable errors. However, it is very useful When conditions allow
its use.
If the faults and the resultant damage cannot be predicted then 
the only viable method of recovery is to restore the system to an 
error-free past state. This technique is called backward error
recovery.
The automatic repeat request techniques designed to provide 
error free computer communications are an example of backward error 
recovery. Here data is transmitted in block,. If the receiver detects 
an error in the current block it discards the block, and requests the 
sender to repeat it (Cole 1982).
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The two recovery techniques complement each other, and can be 
used together effectively. Two mechanisms for achieving software fault 
tolerance are exception handling (Goodenough 1975, HacLaren 1977, 
Cristian 1980) and recovery blocks (described in Section 3.6).
Exception handling is based on forward error recovery and recovery 
blocks are based on backward error recovery. Melliar-Smith and Randell 
(1977) propose that exception handling and recovery blocks can be used 
together: recovery blocks for coping with unexpected software faults, 
and exceptions for coping with predictable failures in input data and 
operators etc. Exception handling is not used for software faults as 
that would require the faults to be predictable, and if they are 
predictable they should be removed.
U) Fault treatment
If the error is not to occur again, then it is necessary to 
repair the fault. To do this the fault must first be located, and this 
may be difficult as it is often hard to diagnose the fault from the 
damage that it causes. Once located the fault can be repaired, or the 
system can be reconfigured to avoid it. If the fault was transient then 
there is no need to repair it, as it has already gone.
In practice certain stages can be reduced or removed altogether by 
decisions made during the system’s design stage; for example, the more
effective damage containment is, 
assessment phase to do.
It is also convenient to 
detected as 'normal running', and 
performed as 'continued running', 
running but it is often handy to be 
phases.
the less work there is for the damage
label the period before an error is 
the period after recovery has been 
Continued running is the same as normal 
able to distinguish between the two
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3.4 Protective redundancy
All fault tolerance techniques are based on the incorporation of 
protective redundancy into the system. Protective redundancy is the extra 
hardware, software and processing power that is needed solely to ensure 
fault tolerance, but which is not needed by the system to execute its 
normal programs.
Protective redvndaney can be categorised in two ways: as masking or 
standby redundancy, depending on how it is used; and as hardware, software 
or time redundancy, depending on what it is.
1 ) Masking and standby redundancy
In masking (or static) redundancy, redundant components operate 
in parallel to a component's operation in order to mask the effects of 
any failure that may occur in that component. As long as this 
redundancy remains effective any failure in the component will be hidden 
from the system's environment. Possibly the two best known examples of 
masking redundancy are Triple Modular Redundancy with voting (Mathur and 
Avlziensis 1970), and the forward error correction techniques mentioned
earlier.
In standby (or dynamic) redundancy, spare functionally identical 
components are incorporated into the system so that when an active 
component becomes faulty one of the standby components can be switched 
in to replace it. Such a scheme presupposes the existence of the 
necessary error detection and error recovery mechanisms. If this 
reconfiguration can be done automatically by the system then the system 
is said to be self-repairing. A special case of this is where there are 
no standbys, and the system is reconfigured into a degraded system. For 
example, in the event of a permanent processor failure, the
multiprocessor COPRA (Meraud et al. 1976, Maraud and Lloret 1978, Maraud 
et al. 1979) can reconfigure the software to run on the remaining
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processors.
Probably the first operational self-repairing computer was the 
hardware fault tolerant JPL-STAR computer described in Section 3.7. The 
software fault tolerant recovery block scheme is also self-repairing as 
in the event of a fault arising in the current software module, an 
alternative can be used to replace it.
A third option known as hybrid redundancy is a combination of 
masking redundancy and standby redundancy. Masking is used to provide 
fault tolerance and standby components are available to replace the 
masking redundancy components when they fail. The prime example of
hybrid redundancy is n-modular redundancy, which is triple modular 
redundancy with spares. N-modular redundancy is used in the Fault 
Tolerant Multiprocessor computer (Hopkins and Smith 1975).
Masking and standby redundancy both rely on the faults in their 
redundant components and in the components they are protecting being 
independent of each other, otherwise the fault could not be masked. For 
example, software fault tolerance can be provided by N-version 
programming which is based on masking (Chen and Aviziensis 1978, von 
Linde 1979), and by the recovery block scheme which is based on standby 
redundancy and self-repair. In both cases this protection would be 
nullified if the redundant software was identical to that being 
protected as any algorithmic fault would then be contained in the 
redundant and the protected software. Hence in these examples the 
redundant software is coded independently.
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2) Hardware, software and tine redundancy
Hardware redundancy ia primarily to provide hardware fault 
tolerance, although it can also be used to provide support for software 
fault tolerance. Software redundancy consists of the extra data and 
code needed to support the four phases of fault tolerance.
Time, or program execution, redundancy is the spare processing 
power that must be available if the extra processing required by the 
addition and performance of fault tolerance is not to result in a 
degraded response time.
3.5 The hardcore
In the final analysis all fault tolerant systems are totally 
dependent for their correct functioning on some critical components that 
are themselves fault intolerant. These components are known as the 
hardcore. If any confidence is to be placed in the system's ability to 
tolerate faults then the hardcore that supports the fault tolerance 
mechanisms must be extremely reliable as 'the chain is only as strong as 
its weakest link'.
To achieve high reliability in the hardcore the techniques of fault 
prevention must be applied to it. If these techniques are to be effective 
the hardcore must be kept as small and as simple as possible.
In a similar vein, efforts to produce secure systems have led to 
the development of 'security kernels' (Popek and Kline 1978). Security 
kernels are small minimal kernels that, in addition to the normal tasks of 
a kernel, are responsible for providing the security mechanism used by the 
whole system: hence their correct (and secure) operation is essential for 
the correct operation of the »diole system.
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MeDermld (1980) has suggested that this idea could be used to 
produce a 'reliability kernel'. Such a kernel would provide the recovery 
mechanisms used by the software mechanisms to provide software fault 
tolerance. By keeping the kernel small, the chances of it being 
implemented reliably are increased.
3.6 An example: the recovery block scheme
3.6.0 Introduction
In 1972 a project was established at the University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne, under the sponsorship of the Science and Engineering Research 
Council, in order to Investigate "the utility of computer architecture and 
programming techniques which will enable a system to have a very high 
probability of continuing to give a trustworthy service in the presence of 
hardware faults and/or software errors" (Randell 1975).
One of the major results of this project is the recovery block 
scheme for providing software fault tolerance. The recovery block scheme 
is a general purpose mechanism for incorporating software fault tolerance 
into a process so that it can operate reliably despite residual faults in 
its code. Current work includes Incorporating recovery blocks into a 
distributed naval command and control system based on Mascot (Anderson and 
Moulding 1982).
Descriptions of the recovery block scheme are given in numerous 
papers originating ft-om Newcastle. Two of the best known of these are 
Randell 1975 and Randell et al. 1978. Also, nearly all of the other papers 
referred to in this section contain a description. The most all-inclusive 
description is given in Anderson and Lee's book (1981).
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3.6.1 An overview
The reliability of a particular task within a process can be 
improved by implementing it as a recovery block. The syntax of a recovery 
block is given in Figure 3a, and an example of its use to sort an array A 
is given in Fig w e  3b.
Ensure Acceptance test>
By <prlmary module)
Elseby Alternative module 1> 
Elseby Alternative module 2>
Elseby <alternatlve module n> 
Else Error;
Figure 3a
Ensure A[i-1] <= A[i] For i=2, 3 • • n 
By Quicksort (A)
Elseby BubbleSort (A)
Elseby Straightlnsertion (A)
Else Error;
Figure 3b
A recovery block consists of a primary module and an ordered 
sequence of standby spares - the alternative modules. Each module performs 
the same task (sorts the array in our example) but in a different way.
When the recovery block is entered the primary module is executed. 
If the primary module fails then the process's state is reset to the state 
that existed prior to entering the recovery block and the first alternative 
module is executed. (The way in Which a failure is detected is described 
below in Section 3-6.2.) This is continued until either all of the modules 
have been tried «id have failed, or until one of the modules has been 
completed successfully.
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In our example Quicksort will be executed first. Then if Quicksort 
fails the process will be reset, thus undoing the effects of Quicksort, and 
BubbleSort will be tried. If BubbleSort fails then StraightInsertion will 
be tried.
The recovery block scheme provides software fault tolerance by 
incorporating redundant versions of a module into a program and then 
performing self-repair in the event of a module failure. This self-repair 
is supported by error detection and backward error recovery.
Various implementations of recovery blocks are described in Horning 
et al. 197U, Anderson and Kerr 1976 and Shrivastava 1978. In order to 
improve the efficiency of recovery blocks, hardware support for these 
implementations has been suggested. Two such proposals are presented in 
Lee et al. 1980 and Kant 1983 (the former of which has been implemented).
3.6.2 Error detection
After a module (primary or alternative) has been executed the user 
defined acceptance test is performed, to determine whether an error has
occurred. Normally an acceptance test will test the correctness of the
module's results, as more detailed testing of all of the process's 
variables would result in larger runtime overheads; in our example above 
the acceptance test checks that the array A has been sorted. If the 
acceptance test is passed then it is assumed that an error did not arise. 
The acceptance test is the embodiment of the authoritative specification.
The modules utilise the «denying operating system and hardware to 
perform their instructions. If «uch an instruction fails, for example due 
to division by zero, then an error has occurred, and the current module is 
aborted and recovery is performed.
Recovery blocks can be nested. If all of a recovery block's 
modules fall then the recovery block has failed, and the surrounding 
recovery block module is aborted #
3.6.3 Damage assessment and error recovery
Error recovery Is by backward error recovery: the process's state 
Is restored to the value it had Immediately prior to entering the recovery 
block. In doing this all of the effects of the faulty module are removed; 
it is as if the module had never been performed.
Because recovery consists of rolling back the state there is no 
need to perform damage assessment as all alterations performed by the 
faulty module have been undone.
3.6.4 Fault repair
After an error has been detected and recovered from, the next 
alternative module is tried. This replacement is not permanent as it is 
assumed that the program's residual faults will only manifest themselves 
rarely and then due to unusual circumstances.
All of a recovery block's modules are functionally identical as 
they are designed to perform the same task and must pass the same 
acceptance test. However, they cannot be copies of each other as this 
would mean that they all contained the same fault. A requirement for 
successful standby redindancy is that the copies have independent faults, 
and so each module must be independently implemented.
The primary module will be the most efficiently implemented 
(relative to some measurement) and hence the most complicated and error 
prone. The alternatives will normally be ordered by decreasing efficiency, 
and increasing simplicity and reliability. By only temporarily replacing 
the primary module it 1. ensured that the task is performed efficiently
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except for trtien an error Is detected.
Removing the fault from the module’s Implementation is left to a 
human operator. The recovery block scheme records the frequency with which 
each module fails so that the operator knows vdiich modules are faulty and 
which are worth repairing. If the frequency is low and the alternatives 
always mask the fault then it may not be worth repairing a faulty primary 
module.
3.7 Another example: the JPL-STAR computer
3.7.0 Introduction
The STAR (Self Testing And Repairing) computer is the result of an 
investigation into hardware fault tolerant computing conducted throughout 
the 1960’s at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) at Pasadena, California. 
STAR is an experimental general purpose computer that exploits standby 
redundancy and self-repair to achieve high reliability. It became 
operational in 1969.
The work on STAR was sponsored by NASA, and so its characteristics 
are those that would be required for an on-board computer of an unmanned 
spacecraft on a ten year flight. The reliability requirements for such a 
computer are obviously high because of the consequences of a computer 
failure combined with the long mission time and the impossibility of
maintenance.
Work on STAR was terminated in 1972 when JPL turned its attention 
to designing a second-generation fault tolerant spacecraft computer based 
on a distributed computer system (Kennels 1978). This progression was 
motivated by advances in digital circuit technology which nullified the 
need for some of the design restrictions that had shaped STAR, and which 
made this more attractive solution feasible.
STAR is designed to tolerate hardware faults, but not software 
faults. Fault tolerance is based on hardware-implemented error detection, 
hardware-implemented and software-implemented self-repair, and software- 
implemented backward error recovery. It is of particular interest as it 
supports a form of process survivability.
3.7 .1  Hardware and software organisation
STAR'S hardware (Aviziensis et al. 1971) consists of a standard 
configuration of functional units supplemented by spare units that can be 
used to replace failed operational units. The central processing unit's 
functions are partitioned into a number of special purpose processors 
(arithmetic, logical, input/output, etc.). Memory is composed of a number 
of read only memory units and a number of read/wrlte memory units. The 
processors and the read only memory units have dedicated spares and the 
read/write memory units have a pool of spares. All of the functional units 
are linked together by two data buses and a control bus. Figure 3e 
illustrates this layout.
ROM Processors Read/write memory and spares
Figure 3c
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The heart of STAR'S fault tolerance Is the Test And Repair 
Processor (TARP). The TARP is connected to all three buses and to each 
functional «lit separately (the latter Is not shown In the diagram). The 
TARP monitors the rest of the computer In order to detect any errors.
Software Is divided Into user processes and the STAREX executive 
which supports them (Rohr 1973). STAREX multiplexes the user processes and 
provides them with routines for performing input/output etc. It also 
provides the backward error recovery mechanism.
3.7.2 Error detection and fault repair
Error detection, and the majority of the fault repair, Is performed 
by the hardware; In particular, by the TARP.
The TARP detects errors by cheeking the validity of every word sent 
over the data buses (all data and instruction words are encoded in an error 
detection code), and by checking status messages sent from the functional 
«llts. The TARP is thus the embodiment of the authoritative specification
within the system.
When the TARP detects an error it stops the computer. The TARP 
assumes Initially that the fault Is transient and control is transferred to 
the STAREX recovery routines to perform backward error recovery. (In 
Meraud and Lloret 1978 It is reported that 90* of the faults arising In 
COPRA are transient.) If the fault does not respond to this treatment then 
the TARP classes It as a permanent fault. The TARP replaces the failed 
« I t  and then control Is again passed to the recovery routines.
The TARP is STAR'S hardcore. It must be reliable and so It Is 
Implemented using n-modular red«idanoy of TARP units.
3.7.3 Backward error recovery
As they run, both the user processes and STAREX establish recovery 
points. Backward error recovery restores the software component 
Interrupted by the fault to the state that It was in when it performed its 
last recovery point.
When a fault has been detected by the TARP, control is transferred 
to the STAREX recovery routines to perform backward error recovery. They 
first determine v*iich software component was interrupted and then restart 
it from its last recovery point. If the fault interrupted the execution of 
a STAREX routine then STAREX (and not the calling user process) is rolled
back to its last recovery point; STAREX is relied upon to complete the 
routine and so a recovery point is established at the start of every 
routine.
User processes establish recovery points using a STAREX routine 
which stores a copy of the process's state within STAREX. The stored state 
consists of specified variables, processor register contents and the 
process's start address. Process checkpoints are double buffered so that 
in the event of a fault occurring during the establishment of a checkpoint 
the previous checkpoint will be intact and can be used. Processes have 
only one outstanding recovery point each.
STAREX itself has a high frequency of establishing recovery points 
and so the task is made as efficient as possible. STAREX is stored in 
duplexed memory (reads and writes are performed in parallel) and 
establishing a recovery point is simply a case of storing the restart 
address. After a fault the processor registers are flushed and so STAREX 
is programmed using the convention that all register value, needed after a 
recovery point are stored prior to the recovery point and then reloaded
afterwards.
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When STAREX Is rolled back to its last recovery point its data is 
not re-set to the values it had v*ien the recovery point was established. 
STAREX will repeat code but the effects of performing that code the first 
time have not been undone. To prevent this resulting in unfortunate side- 
effects the recovery points are inserted so that the inter-recovery point 
code is ldempotent.
3.7.1» Process survivability in STAR
If a read/write memory unit fails permanently it is replaced by one 
of the spares. The software that had been resident in the failed unit must 
be recreated in its replacement. Again this is done by the STAREX recovery 
routines.
User processes use simplex memory. A process is recreated from its 
code and constants, which are stored in the read only memory units, and 
from the data stored for its last recovery point. Thus all of the user 
processes that were using the faulty unit will have been rolled back to 
their last recovery point (irrespective of rfiose execution was
interrupted).
The executive is duplexed. When one of a pair of duplicated memory 
units is replaced the contents of the survivor are copied into the 
replacement. Survivability is the prime reason for duplexing the executive 
as without the duplexing it would be necessary for full checkpoints of the 
executive to be stored on backing store.
We return to process survivability in STAR in Chapter 4, Section
3.8 Fault toleranoe and process survivability
When a computer in a distributed computer control system crashes 
the application processes that were running on that computer are lost. 
These application processes may be vital to the correct running of the 
application level and without them the control system will fail. Process 
survivability ensures that no application processes are lost in a crash 
thereby making the application level crash tolerant.
Process survivability is achieved by introducing redundant copies 
of the application processes into the application level. Inactive backup 
copies of every application process are dispersed amongst the computers. 
At intervals the active copy of an application process will establish a 
recovery point. When an application process establishes a recovery point 
all of its backups are updated to become exact copies of the active 
process. When an application process's host computer crashes one of its 
backups will be activated to replace it. The backup will be started in the 
state that its previous generation was in When it performed its last 
recovery point. This is similar, in general but not in detail, to the way 
that user processes are recreated in STAR after a permanent memory unit 
failure. Another similarity with STAR is that process survivability does 
not support software fault tolerance.
Process survivability is achieved by Incorporating redmdant, 
standby spares of every application process into the application level and 
by performing self-repair by activating the appropriate standby copies in 
the event of a crash. This self-repair is supported by error detection in 
order to detect the crashes, damage assessment to determine Which 
application processes were lost in the crash, and finally by backward error 
recovery to restart these application processes from their last recovery
point.
52
The software redundancy is supported by time (program execution) 
redundancy, and ultimately by hardware redundancy. Time redundancy is 
necessary if the control system is to maintain its response time. Time 
redundancy is needed during:
a) Normal running, to support the work that is performed to implement 
process survivability, for example establishing the recovery points.
b) Continued running, so that after a crash the extra work being performed 
by a computer due to activated backups does not affect the response time 
of all of its resident application processes.
Ultimately this time redundancy must be paid for by extra computers 
that would not be needed if the application level was not crash tolerant. 
Adding extra computers to support process survivability is an aspect of the 
’enough' principle mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
All but one of the following chapters in this thesis describe 
process survivability. First however, in the next chapter we review 
existing mechanisms for making the application level of a distributed 
computer control system crash tolerant.
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4. Crash Tolerance In Distributed Computer Control Syatema
4.0 Introduction
When a computer crashes It results In the Instantaneous and 
permanent loss of that computer. Such a crash may be caused by an external 
stress such as a fire or by the spontaneous failure of an Internal hardware 
component. In later chapters we will discuss partial computer failures 
with respect to process survivability.
The loss of a computer will not prevent the other computers from 
operating normally. Interconnecting the computers by a local area network 
allows the computers to be physically dispersed thereby providing passive 
protection from external stresses by limiting the number of computers that 
are likely to be affected.
A computer crash will also result in the loss of components from 
the two software levels of a distributed computer control system: the 
distributed kernel level and the application level. The ability of the 
control system to tolerate a crash will depend on how vital the lost kernel 
is to the distributed kernel level and how vital the lost application 
processes are to the rest of the application level.
In the examples presented in Chapter 2 the individual kernels 
operate completely autonomously except when performing interprocess 
communication between processes on different computers. As long as none of 
the kernels provide the other kernels with a unique service then the 
distributed kernel level will be able to continue operating normally 
despite the loss of one or more kernels.
The application level will contain some application processes whose 
loss would not prevent the control system fhom fulfilling its role, or 
whose loss would have only a marginal effect. An example of the former is
an error logger. On the other hand if the crashed computer hosted 
application processes that are vital for the continued operation of the 
surviving application processes then, despite the fact that the majority of 
the control system is intact, the control system will no longer be able to 
fulfil its role. Despite its multi-computer architecture the control 
system is still vulnerable to the loss of a single computer.
Process survivability makes the application level crash tolerant by 
ensuring that no application processes are lost in the crash. As was 
described in Chapter 3, Section 3.8, process survivability is achieved by 
incorporating redundant standby copies of every application process into 
the application level. In this chapter we review established methods of 
Implementing process redundancy in a distributed computer control system.
A prerequisite for making the application level crash tolerant is 
that the two lower levels that support it are also crash tolerant. 
Fortunately, the distributed kernel level can be made so, and the computer 
components of the hardware level are so naturally. Unfortunately, the 
network, which is arguably the most important hardware component, is often 
the most vulnerable. If the network fails, the control system will be 
partitioned into a number of small isolated groups of computers, with each 
group acting as if it were the only survivor. We will return to the 
problem in a later chapter, but for the present we assume that the network
is un-partitlonable.
4.1 Process redundancy, an introduction
By introducing redmdant copies of the application processes into 
the application level and by placing these copies on different computers, 
the application level can be made crash tolerant. There are two ways of 
organising process redundancy:
55
1) Masking redundancy
All of the copies of the application process are active. 
Requests are issued to any of the copies and are performed by all of 
them. When one copy is lost the others continue to provide the service.
2) Standby redundancy
Only one copy of the application process is active; the others 
are inactive backups. At Intervals the backups are updated so that 
their states are the same as that of the active application process. 
When the active copy is lost one of its backups is activated to replace 
it.
As a third alternative Casey and Shelness (1977) suggest that their 
Domain Structure could be used to "exploit the inherent redundancy of the 
system in case of failure". However, no further details are given, and 
this aspect of the Domain Structure does not seem to have been developed.
In the next two sections we describe in detail how masking and 
standby redundancy are performed. Examples of existing systems that use 
these mechanisms are given.
In most of the examples we see masking and standby redundancy being
applied to application processes, but there is an example of masking
redundancy being applied to executive processes as well. In the
introduction to this chapter we stated that if the distributed kernel level 
is to be crash tolerant then it is necessary that none of the kernels 
should provide a unique service to the other kernels. This is not always 
possible and an alternative is to implement the executive processes
redundantly so that the unique service is not lost in a crash.
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4.2 Masking redundancy
4.2.0 Introduction
Masking redundancy can be applied to systems of processes as well 
as to Individual processes. In practice It appears that masking redundancy 
has only been used to Implement server systems that Interact with their 
users by requests and replies.
4.2.1 Masking redundancy In theory
A crash tolerant server consists of a set of replicate servers each 
of which Is running on a separate computer. Each replicate server provides 
the same services, which In turn are the same as the services provided by 
the crash tolerant server as a whole. Requests for operations to be 
performed can be made to any of the replicates. In the event of a computer 
crash the surviving replicates continue to provide the services.
Some crash tolerant servers provide a time invariant service In 
that past operations do not affect future ones, for example, reading from a
file. In this case each replicate can receive and perform requests for
operations independently of the others. In the event of a replicate being 
lost in a crash Its users can use one of the surviving replicates Instead; 
It does not matter that the Internal states of the replicates are
different.
However, most services will be time dependent and past operations 
will affect future ones, for example If writing as well as reading from 
files is supported. If after a crash the lost replicate's users are to be 
able to use one of the surviving replicates Instead, it is necessary that 
the external states of all of the replicates are Identical to each other. 
The rest of this sub-section, and the examples In the next, are concerned
with how a crash tolerant server that provides a time dependent service can
be implemented.
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Using Le Lann's terminology (Le Lann 1979) a crash tolerant server 
can be described as a system consisting of a set of producers and a set of 
consumers (see Figure 4a). Each producer and consumer pair would 
constitute a non-redwidant server. Producers and consumers are each 
systems in their own right and are each composed of one or more processes. 
In many examples the roles of producer and consumer are combined.
Requests
Producers
Consumers
A crash tolerant server (henceforth simply called a server) is a 
system as defined in Chapter 3. The server’s service is defined by a set 
of operations and by its external state on which the operations are defined 
to operate. The server’s internal state is the set of the external states 
of its consumers. The producers are part of the server’s design and so 
their states do not form part of the server’s state. Every consumer 
implements the same set of actions, and these actions are identical to the 
operations provided by the server: there is a 1-to-1 mapping from operation 
to action.
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Requests for operstlons can be issued to any of the producers. For 
the server to be able to continue after a crash the external state of each 
of its consumers must be identical (their internal states need not be 
identical as they may be implemented differently). To achieve this, when a 
producer receives a request for an operation it 'broadcasts' a request for 
the corresponding action to all of the consumers.
An operation will only produce a valid result if it is performed on 
a consistent internal state. Consistency in a crash tolerant server is
composed of:
a) Internal consistency
Each consumer's external state satisfies a meaningful predicate known as 
the system invariant.
b) Mutual consistency
Each consumer's external state is identical.
An operation maps the server's internal state from one consistent 
state to another. To prevent Invalid results being produced by an
operation being performed on an inconsistent state, the operations must be 
performed atomically. Following Le Lann 1983 we define an operation to be
atomic if:
a) The actions that implement an operation are either all performed 
successfully or none of them are. Any results produced by the actions 
do not survive the failure of an operation.
b) Operations must not interfere with each other. The partial or potential 
output fro. one operation must not be used a, input to another operation
at the same time.
These two aspects of atomicity are known as failure atomicity and
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seriallsability respectively (Spector and Schwarz 1983)•
Requests for operations may be received by different producers 
concurrently. If the producers were to Implement requests In parallel then 
the consumers' states would no longer be mutually consistent. If two or 
more producers were to broadcast requests for actions at the same time, 
then due to variations In Interprocess communication delays, the consumers 
would receive and obey these requests in a different order from each other. 
This would result In a breakdown In mutual consistency. For example, the 
same lock may be allocated to a different user by different consumers.
To prevent this, the requests for operations must be serialised. 
The serialisation of concurrent requests to a server Is called 
synchronisation (Kohler 1981). In a crash tolerant server the aim of 
synchronisation Is to ensure that the order in which actions are performed 
by each consumer is the same (Le Lann 1983).
Synchronisation can be achieved in a number of ways:
a) Event ordering
The operations (events) are time stamped by the producers, and 
the consumers perform the actions In that order. The time base can be 
provided by physical clocks, logical clocks and sequences (Le Lann
1983).
b) Voting
The producers communicate with each other to decide upon which 
request Is to be performed next. Voting schemes include synchronous 
voting and majority consensus (Holler 1983).
e) Executive privilege
One producer at a time has exclusive access to all of the 
controllers. This privilege may be assigned permanently, In *>loh case 
all requests are filtered through the privileged producer by the other
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producers. Alternatively the privilege can be assigned to the producers 
In turn, for example by using circulating tokens or shared variables 
(Holler 1983, Le Lann 1983).
When synchronisation Is achieved by cooperation between a group of 
peer processes It Is called decentralised synchronisation, and control of 
the server Is said to be decentralised. If synchronisation Is based on a 
unique component, for example a single physical clock, then synchronisation 
is centralised, and control of the server is also centralised. A 
centralised synchronisation component with backups Is not classed as 
decentralised (Jensen 1983, Le Lann 1979).
Masking redundancy can be based on either type of synchronisation 
as long as the synchronisation mechanism Is implemented so that crashes do 
not cause It to fall. If for example a circulating token is used, then It 
must be possible to regenerate the token If It is lost. Furthermore this 
recovery must be achieved In a decentralised way that does not depend on a 
tnique arbitrator. The synchronisation mechanism must be as resilient as
the servers that use It.
It Is not sufficient simply to broadcast the actions. If Internal 
and mutual consistency Is to be maintained the operations must also be 
failure atomic. At the start of the action each consumer establishes a 
recovery point. At the end of the operation If every consumer ha, 
completed Its action successfully then all of the consumers discard their 
recovery points, but If one or more of the consumers failed to complete 
their action then all of the consumers roll back to their recovery points. 
Synchronising the rolling back of all of the consumers or synchronising the 
discarding of the recovery points by all of the consumers would be achieved 
by using a mechanism such as the two-phase commit protocol (Gray 1978).
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If a consumer falls to complete an action because Its host computer 
crashes then the other consumers will still be able to complete the 
operation. Were a missing consumer to result In operations being aborted 
then each consumer would constitute a single point of failure, which is the 
opposite of what is required.
When one or more components of a server are lost In a crash It Is 
possible that the request will be lost and not be performed, or 
alternatively it is possible that the request will have been performed but 
the reply was lost. The user will have sent the request and be waiting for 
a reply. These two situations are inconsistent. The normal approach to 
restoring consistency Is for the user to detect the failure of its request 
by a time-out on the reply, and for It to repeat the request. If the 
producer to which the failed request was addressed has been lost then the 
user must locate another producer.
If the previous request failed because the reply was lost, then 
repeating the request will lead to the operation being repeated. To 
prevent this either the operations are implemented idempotently so that 
they can be repeated, or the producers must be able to detect repeated 
requests and act accordingly.
4.2.2 Masking redundancy In practice
As mentioned In the introduction to this thesis, the current 
generation of command and control system used in Royal Navy warships is 
based on a single computer. This makes the warship dangerously vulnerable 
to computer loss. In 1975, In an attempt to remove this weakness, the 
Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment (ASWE) instigated the DIAS 
(Distributed Information Architecture for Ships) programme. The aim of 
this ongoing programme Is to develop a crash tolerant distributed computer 
system for use as a warship command and control system. The results of the 
first two phases of the DIAS programme - ADNET - were described briefly In
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.M. He now present a more detailed description of 
ADNET and a description of the work that has been done for the third phase.
ADNET is configured as a number of Ferranti Argus 700 military 
computers linked together by an ASHE Serial Highway. The peripheral 
devices such as weapons, sensors and Interactive consoles are connected 
directly to the computers.
Each computer's software is comprised of a Mascot Operating System, 
a commmications package and a number of application processes. The 
commixiieatlon package provides interprocess communication in the form of 
message passing. Two types of message passing are supported: broadcast and 
point-to-point.
The application processes on a computer can be divided into those 
that support local device handling, and those that contribute to the global 
resources of the system. The latter consist of those processes that form 
part of the overall system database, and those that provide some service 
used by the system as a vdiole.
The failure of a computer must not prevent the rest of the system 
from functioning. It is acceptable that those application processes that 
are concerned with handling devices will be lost. However, those
application processes that support global services must be preserved, and 
this is done by masking redundancy.
In ADNET application processes are classed as users, servers, 
producers and consumers with the usual meanings. To use a service the user 
first locates the server by broadcasting a 'request for service' message to 
each computer. The server will reply with its address, and then the user 
and server enter into a conversation conducted in terms of requests and
replies.
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Masking redundancy is only applied to application processes that 
are servers. So far it is only being used to Implement a partitioned and 
replicated database called ADDAM (ASHE Distributed DAtabase Management 
system, Tillman 1982). Previously it had been used to implement another 
server (a track designator) but that server's function was later merged 
with that of ADDAM. The following description is based on masking 
redundancy as used in ADDAM.
Synchronisation is achieved by organising the server replicates 
into a master-si ave relationship. Requests are sent to the master who 
performs the operation and then broadcasts the request to the slaves. The 
master then replies to the user. The master prevents concurrent access by 
mutual exclusion. (The roles of producer and consumer are combined in a 
server.)
Failure atomicity is omitted in order to reduce overheads. Instead 
each request is numbered by the master and when a slave detects that it has 
missed a request it asks the master for an update to its state.
The master and slave servers monitor each others' health. If the 
master is lost then the slaves vote amongst themselves to elect a new 
master. There also appears to be a facility for creating new slaves in 
order to maintain the level of redundancy.
The loss of a master may result in the loss of a request or a 
reply. The user detects a failure when a reply is not returned after a 
certain period. The user locates the new master by again broadcasting a 
request for service; on being sent the address of the new master it repeats 
the request. The literature does not explain how the servers avoid
repeating requests.
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Alsberg and Day (1976) propose a master-slave organisation for 
providing resilient access to resources. The master and slave replicates 
are organised into an ordered chain with the master at its head. A request 
can be issued to the master or a slave, but if it is issued to a slave it 
will be forwarded to the master for processing. Synchronisation is 
achieved by passing the requests down the chain with each replicate 
performing them in the same order. There is no mention of failure 
atomicity.
The master and slaves monitor each others' health by regularly 
passing messages up and down the chain. If the master is lost, the first 
slave in the chain takes over. If a slave is lost then the chain is
reconfigtred to avoid it. Recovery from lost requests or replies is 
performed by the user repeating the request.
In Saphir (Gaude et al. 1980) masking redundancy is implemented at 
the computer level. The computers are paired. Each pair consists of a 
master and a slave computer, both of which run the same software. All of 
the network traffic that is directed to a pair of computers is received by 
the master computer who then passes it on to its slave so that it is 
processed by both of them. All output produced by a slave computer, 
whether to the network or to the devices, is discarded by the hardware. 
When a master computer fails, its slave computer is able to use both the 
network and its devices nomally, and it continues to provide the pair's 
services.
The Honeywell Experimental Distributed Processor (HXDP, Jensen 
1978, Jensen et al. 1977) 1» another experimental warship command and
control system. From the details given in Boebert et al. 1978 it appears 
that HXDP is also implemented using masking redundancy, although in this 
example it is the executive processes and not the application processes 
that are implemented in this way. The distributed kernel level 1. crash
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tolerant, and application processes are simply lost.
I*.3 Standby redundancy
4.3.0 Introduction
Standby reduidancy is applied to individual processes. It does not 
matter whether they are users, servers, producers or consumers.
4.3.1 Standby redundancy in theory
A process is redundantly implemented as an active running replicate 
and a number of inactive backup replicates. All requests for operations 
are sent to the active replicate which performs them. Each replicate is 
located on a different computer. When the active replicate is lost in a 
crash one of its backups is activated to replace it. The decision as to 
Which backup to activate can be based on some fixed ordering between the 
backups, or on voting between the backups. However this decision is made 
its implementation must be crash tolerant, for example if an ordering is 
used then it must be resilient to backup loss. After a crash, those 
processes that were commuiicating with the lost replicate must be able to
locate its reincarnation.
Again it is possible to distinguish between processes that provide 
time dependent and time invariant processes.
When the service provided is time invariant it would be acceptable 
for the backups' Internal states to be left in their initial states. This 
would be very economical, although in this situation it would be even more 
economical to use masking redmdancy instead as then the work load could be 
shared between the replicates.
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Where the service Is time dependent however, the backups' Internal 
states must be the same as the Internal state of the active replicate so 
that the activated backup can carry on Where the previous Incarnation of 
the process left off. As In the previous section on masking redundancy we 
will concentrate on how processes that provide a time dependent service can 
be implemented using standby redundancy.
To update the backup replicates' Internal states a copy of the 
active replicate's Internal state must be used. It is impossible to 
continually update the backups' internal states and so they are updated at 
intervals When the active replicate establishes a recovery point.
When a backup Is activated It will be In exactly the same state as 
its previous Incarnation was udien it performed its last recovery point. 
The backup replicate will start to execute its code from immediately after 
that recovery point. Because recovery points are only performed at 
intervals, the Internal state of an activated backup will be out of date.
Restarting processes from a past state can lead to inconsistencies 
arising between the internal states of communicating processes. The 
precise details will depend on the interprocess communication mechanism 
used. (A full description of the effect that it has on asynchronous 
message passing is given in Chapter 7.) In general however, having rolled 
back one or both processes of a commuilcating pair the following 
inconsistencies may arise:
a) Data will have been received that has not yet been sent
An example of this is shown in Figure 4b which shows two 
processes at the time of a crash. (In this and later figures process 
execution is represented by a directed vertical line, recovery points 
are represented by a horizontal character, and the horizontal
directed lines each represent the passing of a message from one process 
to another.) Prior to the crash, and after its last recovery point,
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Process-A aent Proceaa-B a measage. After the oraah Proceaa-A la 
restarted from lta laat recovery point, and Proeeaa-B contlnuea 
normally. The recovery point waa eatabliahed before the meaaage waa
aent and ao Proceaa-B haa received a meaaage trtilch, with reapeet to 
Process-A’s current state, has not yet been sent.
CRASH
-»RECEIVE 
l_______ I
Proceas-A Process-B
Figure Mb
b) Data that haa been sent has been loat
Figure 4c below shows another two processes at the time of a 
crash. Prior to the crash, and after lta last recovery point, Proceas-C 
received a message aent to It by Process-D. After the crash Proceas-D 
contlnuea normally but Process-C is restarted from Its last recovery 
point. The recovery point was established before the message was 
received and so after being restarted Process-C’s Internal state does 
not contain the message. The message sent by Process-D has been lost.
SEND-
Recovery
Point
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Point
Process-C
■SEND
Process-D
Figure 4c
These inconsistencies must be removed. The consequences of not 
removing them could be disastrous. For example, if an alarm message is 
lost the control system may not react quickly enough to a critical 
situation in its environment. Similarly, if a message exists that was not 
sent then no matter how the sender acts when it is restarted, the receiver 
will perform an action that it was not asked to do. Two ways of restoring 
consistency are available. One attempts to roll back the processes to a 
set of checkpoints Where the processes' states are consistent with each 
other, and the other turns the inconsistent state into a consistent one 
without further rollbacks. Process survivability employs the latter.
Standby redundancy is applied to individual processes rather than 
to systems of processes because performing a recovery point that spans more 
than one process is technically difficult especially if those processes are 
on different computers.
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H,3.2 Standby redundancy In practice
Possibly the most famous commercially available crash tolerant 
computer is the Tandem 16 NonStop System. The Tandem 16 was developed to 
provide commercial firms such as publishers and financiers with a hardware 
fault tolerant computer for on-line transaction processing. The prime aim 
of the Tandem 16 is to provide a guaranteed continuous operation despite a 
single hardware fault.
The following description of the Tandem 16 is based on those given 
in Bartlett 1978, Katzman 1978, Mackie 1978, Bartlett 1981 and Paker 1983-
A Tandem 16 can consist of up to 16 computers loosely linked by a 
duplicated external bus. Devices are attached to I/O Controllers. Each 
device can be connected to two I/O Controllers which in turn are each 
connected to two computers. Figure 4d shows a Tandem 16 consisting of two 
computers and a single multi-homed device.
Figure Md
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This hardware arrangement removes all single points of failure from 
the hardware. Unfortunately the use of a bus for inter-computer 
commixiicatlons, while providing a very high data rate of 13M bytes/second, 
limits the dispersal of the computers (in fact they are mounted all 
together in a single cabinet) thus making the entire system vulnerable to 
external stresses, for example a fire would easily disable the whole 
system. In fairness it should be noted that it was not designed to cope 
with such calamities as they would result in more than a single hardware 
fault.
The software is divided into processes. Interprocess communication 
is by message passing, where a message consists of a request and a reply. 
To provide a non-stop service the Tandem 16's software, like the hardware, 
must not contain any single points of failure. Ibis is achieved by standby 
redundancy of processes.
Any process can be implemented redundantly as a process-pair 
consisting of a primary process and a single backup process. (The large 
number of computers in a Tandem 16 is to ensure a high through-put rather 
than to support low vulnerability.) At intervals the primary process 
establishes a recovery point which updates the backup process's internal 
state. When the primary process is lost in a crash the backup process will 
be activated and it will start processing from the point at which the last 
recovery point was performed.
To ensure that consistency is restored after a crash, the following 
protocol is used by the processes to control process interactions. This 
protocol is shown diagrammatieally in Figure He.
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recovery
point
Figure Me
Before Issuing a request the user process performs a recovery 
point. It then sends Its request to the server primary process and waits 
for a reply. The server receives the request, performs a recovery point 
and then performs the requested operation. All requests are sequence 
numbered, and once the operation is performed the server stores the 
request's sequence number and the reply. A recovery point is performed and 
then the reply is returned to the user.
In the event of either or both processes being lost before the 
transaction is completed the request will be repeated thereby ensuring that 
the operation is performed at least once.
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If the server crashes after a request has been sent to its primary 
process then the message system automatically resends the request. This 
time the message is sent to the server's now active backup process. 
Depending on vrtiether the server had established its first recovery point or 
not, this request may or may not be a repeat. (Even if the server had 
received the original request and performed the recovery point its backup 
would not have been able to return the reply.)
Some operations are idempotent but the majority are not. The 
server uses the request's sequence number to detect repeated requests. If 
a request is a repeat, then instead of performing the operation the server 
returns the stored reply. Thus the request is not repeated but the results 
are still obtained.
If the user process crashes after sending its request, then its 
backup will restart from its last recovery point and will repeat the 
request. The server may have performed the original request but not been 
able to return the reply, or alternatively it may not have received the 
request. In the former case the server will return the stored results as 
described above, and in the latter case it will handle the request 
normally.
Thus each process has only one outstanding recovery point, and 
consistency is recovered by the above protocol implemented by the user and 
server processes' programmers. When a recovery point is created the 
process (and hence the programmer) must specify which part of the data 
segment is to be backed up. Obviously, if recovery from crashes is to 
restore consistency then this protocol must be implemented correctly.
A similar problem arises in the JPL-STAR computer *»ich uses 
standby redundancy to ensure that its user processes can survive the 
permanent failure of their host memory units. A description of process 
survivability in the JPL-STAR computer was given in Chapter 3, Section
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3. 7 .*».
The user processes in STAR communicate with each other via shared 
data stored within the STAREX executive. Access to the shared data is 
provided by routines supplied by STAREX. As STAREX is housed in duplex 
memory the permanent failure of one of its memory units will not affect its 
data. Alterations made to the shared data are permanent and are not 
affected by memory unit failures.
If after establishing its last recovery point, and prior to a 
crash, a user process performed a STAREX routine, then on restarting it 
will repeat that routine. Some STAREX routines are idempotent and can be 
repeated, but others are not and these must not be repeated. To overcome 
the latter problem STAREX provides a number of mechanisms that enable user 
processes to either undo the effects of an executive routine before 
repeating it or to skip the repeated call altogether.
DEMOS M/P (Powell and Presotto 1983) takes the same approach to 
crash tolerance as process survivability does (although the 
implementational details are very different). Both are based on the fact 
that application processes are deterministic and so, by giving a restarted 
process the same input as it had prior to the crash it will recover itself 
to a consistent state. This approach has the great advantage that crash 
tolerance is transparent to the application programmer. This lack of 
transparency is a positive drawback to the Tandem approach to crash
tolerance.
DEMOS M/P consists of a broadcast network, a number of computers 
and a computer called the -recorder*. The recorder plays a similar role to 
that played by STAR’S TARP in that it acts a, a repository for recovery 
data and it controls recovery after a crash. When a process performs a 
recovery point a copy of its internal state is recorded within the 
recorder. Every message sent over the network is copied and that copy is
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stored within the recorder (all Interprocess communication Is Inter­
computer) .
When a process Is lost In a crash the recorder causes It to be 
moved to a different computer and then restarted from its last recovery 
point. The recorder then sends the restarted process, copies of all of the 
messages that had been sent to the restarted process's previous generation 
after the last recovery point had been established. Any message produced 
by the restarted process and which was also sent prior to the crash by the 
restarted process’s previous generation is discarded in order to prevent 
side-effects.
The recorder is DEMOS M/P's hardcore. Although it is claimed that 
by centralising the recovery function its implementation is simpler and 
hence more reliable, it does make the entire control system vulnerable to
the loss of the recorder.
In the Auragen computer (Borg et al. 1983) this vulnerability is 
removed. As in Tandem, processes in the Auragen are implemented as 
process-pairs. Every time a primary process executes a recovery point its 
inactive backup process is updated so that both primary and backup process 
have the same internal states. When a primary process sends a message, 
copies of that message are sent to the receiver’s primary process, the 
receiver's backup process and the sender’s backup process.
When a backup process is activated it has copies of the messages 
that were sent to its primary process prior to the crash, and it has copies 
of the messages that were sent by its primary process prior to the crash. 
The former enable it to recover itself to a consistent state, and the later 
allows the operating system to detect when the backup process repeats a 
message that was sent prior to the crash; such messages are discarded.
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The Auragen approach ia a combination of the beat faceta of Tandem 
and DEMOS M/P: it la invulnerable to a aingle hardware failure and craah 
tolerance ia tranaparent to the application programmer.
Project Little (Brenner et al.1980) waa an experimental ultra 
reliable diatributed computer ayatem. Although not a diatributed computer 
control ayatem lta hardware and software organisation conforms to the 
three-layer model presented in Chapter 2. Each computer runs a control 
program which ia either an EXEC which supports one user process, or an SVOL 
which provides access to one storage device.
Little also employs a form of standby redundancy. As a user 
process executes, its host EXEC records information about the process’s 
state (although not actual checkpoints) in a file called the Tasklist which 
is stored on more than two SVOLs. In the event of a computer crash an idle 
EXEC will continue the interrupted process. No further details are given 
in the literature, and the project was terminated before this aspect of 
Little could be developed (Burton 1982).
Crash tolerance by standby redundancy is very similar to software 
fault tolerance by standby redundancy as both require the storing of past 
states. Inconsistencies similar to the two described in Section 4.3.1 also 
arise *>en backward error recovery is performed by one or more processes 
within a group of comm^icating processes. It is possible that the 
solutions used there could be applied to crash recovery as well. Most of 
the work that has been done on backward error recovery amongst
commmicatlng processes has been as a result of interest in the recovery 
block scheme described in Chapter 3, Section 3-6.
A process’s active and backup replicates would each maintain a
sequence of recovery points. After a crash backups would be activated to
replace the processes that were lost. Then the active processes would be 
rolled back to older recovery points in order to place the system into a
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consistent state. The set of recovery points that satisfy the criteria 
constitutes the recovery line. For example, referring back to the two 
examples shown In Figures Mb and He, consistency would be restored by 
rolling back Process-B to Its previous recovery point, and by rolling back 
Process-D to Its last recovery point. Thus crash recovery would result in 
the need to roll back processes being propagated from one process to 
another mtll a consistent state is achieved. Rolling back an active 
process would necessitate that Its backup replicates also discard the same 
recovery points.
Unfortunately there are two major drawbacks to this solution:
1 ) Data and processing overheads
Each process would consist of a number of replicates, each of 
which would have to maintain and store a possibly large sequence of 
recovery points. This sequence would Increase as the process runs. 
However, It Is possible to calculate which recovery points will never be 
needed and thereby delete the data that supports them. Of course this 
would In turn increase the processing load.
2) The domino effect
The propagation of rolling back can result In the so called 
•domino effect' where a crash can result In a group of processes having 
to «,11 back over many If not all of their recovery points. Figure 4f
below Illustrates this effect.
If in our example the computer hosting Process-A crashes, then 
one of Process-A's backup replicates is activated to replace it. In 
effect Process-A has been rolled back to Its most recent recovery point. 
To achieve consistency Proc.ss-B is rolled back to its third recovery 
point, Which in turn means that Process-C must be rolled back to Its 
second recovery point and so on. The eventual outcome will be that all 
of the processes will have been rolled back to their Initial state.
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Also, all of their backup replicates will have discarded all of their
recovery points as well.
Process-A Process-B Process-C
Figure Uf
The domino effect Is obviously very unsatisfactory especially in a 
real-time system. The use of standby redundancy for ADNET was rejected 
because of the "Immense backward error recovery problems" (Moulding 1980a), 
although as we have seen In Tandem and as we shall see for process 
survivability this Is not necessarily the case.
Examples of using the domino effect for backward error recovery in 
multi-computer systems can be found in Merlin and Randell 1978, Menasce 
1978, and McDermld 1981a and 1981b. McDermld suggests that crash recovery 
could be performed in this way. It has also been suggested that It could 
be used to provide crash tolerance in the LOCOS distributed operating 
system (Popek et al. 1981) «id In the related UCLA-Net (Rudisin 1980).
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Russell (1977 and 1980) describes a technique known as 'Directed 
commmlcatlons' that guarantees that a recovery line can be found without 
having to roll back the processes too far, thereby limiting the worst of 
the domino effect. (It also limits the number of outstanding recovery 
points that are needed, thereby reducing the data storage overheads.) 
Russell's solution is complicated when used for error recovery because of 
the need to verify that the messages do not contain errors, but for crash 
recovery this would be unnecessary.
Propagating recovery between processes and 'Directed 
communications' both try to find a recovery line (which may not exist) when 
it is needed. The alternative approach is to ensure that one always 
exists, and that the minimum amount of rolling back is performed. Horning 
et al. (197*0 describe the 'conversation' for use in multiprocess error 
recovery, and it is possible that it could be used for crash recovery as 
well, although the requirement that all of the processes involved in a 
conversation must leave it at the same time may, as Russell and Tiedeman 
(1979) suggest, "cause an unnecessary loss of efficiency in parallel
processing".
Unfortunately all of theae aohaaea involv. process., that asra not 
on th. crashed acput.r haring to roll hack. Ideally only thus, proc.ss.s 
that »era on the crashed ocaputer shculd have to roll back. On the 
posltl,. side, tha, nay b. abl. to support crash tolar.no. and softuar. 
fault tolerance at the same time.
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U.U Sunn ary
In this chapter we have described two ways of organising process 
redwdancy so that the application level (or the distributed kernel level) 
can be made crash tolerant. In the following chapter we introduce process 
survivability itself, and relate it to the two major examples - ADNET and 
Tandem - that were given in this chapter.
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5. An Introduction to Process Survivability
5.0 Introduction
The multi-computer architecture of a distributed computer control 
system has two characteristics that make it a suitable base for a crash 
tolerant computer system. Firstly, and most importantly, the loss of one 
computer does not prevent the other computers from working normally. The 
loss of a computer will reduce the control system's overall processing 
power, but the majority of the power will still be available. Secondly, by 
basing the control system around a network the computers can be physically 
dispersed, thus providing passive protection against external stresses by 
limiting the damage that can be caused. For example, by placing the 
computers in different buildings, the number of computers that can be 
damaged in a fire is reduced.
Unfortunately, these characteristics are not sufficient on their 
own to make the distributed computer control system invulnerable to 
computer crashes. The loss of an application process may result in the 
control system's application software failing to meet its specifications. 
Despite the architectural advantages of a distributed computer control 
system it is still vulnerable to a single computer crash.
Process survivability removes this vulnerability. Process 
survivability is the implementation of an application process using standby 
redundancy so that in the event of its host computer crashing an 
application process will survive and will continue to run on a different
computer.
Process .ur.lv.blHW support. out of or..h tolershce. Io * 
distributed o o w t . r  oootrol sy.te. of . oo.put.rs, .ppllo.tlon
proo«.. he. n backups, lb. .ppllo.tlo. 1...1 ■»» tol.r.t. n c p u t . r
crashes; sft.r tbst sny further ors.be. -Ill r..»lt 1. sppll.stlos
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processes being lost and in process survivability for the other application 
processes breaking down. The size of n will depend on a number of factors: 
the size of m, the magnitude of the envisaged threat to the control system, 
the cost of having what is in effect n redundant computers, and the level 
of acceptable performance because the overheads of process survivability 
increase along with the size of n.
Unfortunately, while process survivability is in our opinion a 
necessary requirement for a crash tolerant computer system, it is not a 
sufficient one. When a computer crashes those devices that are attached to 
it are no longer accessible. Without these devices the control system will 
not be able to exert full control over its environment. Providing a crash 
tolerant input/output service is outside of process survivability's brief, 
and so we have adopted the approach taken in ADNET where it is accepted 
that a crash will result in the loss of devices as well. We shall return
to this topic in later chapters.
5.1 The alms of process survivability
A number of requirements concerning the way that process 
survivability relates to the application programmer and how it should be 
implemented were defined. These requirements then guided the development 
of process survivability.
TO. primary r w l r m m t  la that procaaa survivability ahould b. 
complet.ly trmapar.pt to th. application programmer: application proo.aa.n 
ar. written a. th., mold b. If non-r.di.dmt. pmondanoy 1. only a p p m m t  
m m  th. control ayatm «  oonfliorm «  t h m  th. number and location of 
th. application proc.as.s- haohup. m .  .pmlflad. ».r. P ™ « . .
survivability to b. Irnplmmtm 1» m r t  h, application proo... cod. < m  1. 
th. c a m  in Tandem and ADEET) th.n It would b. Impo.alhl. to gu a r m t m  
auco.aaful oraah tol.rmoa. m  my alat.m »« th. part of th. progra-ar
82
could result in process survivability failing. By making process 
survivability transparent we can guarantee that once the process
survivability code is debugged it will always work correctly.
Process survivability is based on standby redundancy rather than on 
masking redimdancy because we believed that it would constitute the best 
basis for achieving transparency. Although we cannot categorically state 
that standby redundancy is the best basis, we can state that it has been 
possible to make process survivability transparent to the application 
programmer, and we do not believe that this would have been possible had 
masking redundancy been used.
Transparency would also be advantageous were it possible for 
process survivability to be added to an existing distributed computer 
control system, as transparency would mean that it would not be necessary 
to retrain programmers nor would it be necessary to rewrite application 
process code. Both of these are financially attractive, and could tip the 
balance in favour of adopting process survivability for an existing control
system.
The drawback to process survivability being transparent is that it 
is impossible to take advantage of any optimisations that might arise in a 
particular application. However we believe that the value of such 
optimisations is far outweighed by the consequences of faulty crash
tolerance.
The secondary requirements were guidelines as to how process 
survivability was to be implemented:
a) If the control system is to be effective it must be able to maintain its 
response time to external events. This is particularly important when 
an external stress has destroyed a computer. For example, a chemical 
works may become critical after an explcsicn and prompt action by the
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control system would be needed to prevent a catastrophe. In order to 
maintain the response time we require that:
- The processing overheads of supporting process survivability during 
normal running should be kept as low as possible.
- The interruption to an application process’s service caused by a 
crash should be as short as possible.
- The disruption caused to application processes that have not crashed 
should also be as small as possible. In particular, there should be 
no domino effect - application processes that are not on a crashed 
computer are not rolled back.
b) Each application process should have only one outstanding checkpoint. 
More are not needed because of our determination not to use dominoing to
restore consistency.
c) Crashed application processes are recovered independently of each other. 
There is no coordination between the recovery of two application 
processes even if they normally communicate with each other.
d) Process survivability must be able to cope with multiple computer 
crashes even if they occur simultaneously.
e) Assuming that an application process’s redundancy has not been 
exhausted, a process must be able to recover from a crash no matter what 
it is doing at the time. In particular, application processes that are 
currently recovering fro. one crash must be able to recover from another
crash.
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The implementation has adhered to the last four requirements, and 
has attempted to minimise those overheads specified in the first one.
5,2 An Introduction to the Implementation of process survivability
Rather than trying to make process survivability completely general 
and suitable for all distributed computer control systems, we have 
developed it for a specially devised 'paper* distributed computer control 
system called PROSUR (PROcess SURvivability). PROSUR conforms to the 
layered model of a distributed computer control system outlined in Chapter 
2. Full details of PROSUR are given in the next chapter, Chapter 6.
All application processes are implemented as a process-set, where a 
process-set consists of an active primary replicate and a linearly ordered 
set of backup replicates. By having a number of backups per process-set we 
ensure that an application process can survive multiple crashes even when 
they occur simultaneously (for as long as its redundancy is not exhausted).
At intervals the primary replicate performs a recovery point which 
causes each of its backup replicates to be updated so that they are exact 
copies. When a primary replicate is lost in a crash the first of its 
backup replicates is activated to replace it. The activated backup 
replicate will start to execute from the place at which the last recovery 
point was performed - there is only one outstanding recovery point per
process•
Chapter 6 contains a high-level description of how process-sets are 
organised. Full implementations! details of the process-set, including how 
computer crashes are detected, are given in the first half of Chapter 9.
In Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, we briefly described the type of 
inconsistencies that can arise between two application processes after on. 
or both of the. have been restarted after a crash. In Chapter 7. w.
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describe these inconsistencies in the form in which they arise in PROSUR.
In process survivability consistency is restored by replacing lost 
messages, and by forcing the restarted processes to act in exactly the same 
way as they did prior to the crash, with any repeated messages being 
discarded. The crux of this solution is that the process must act in the 
same way, and this is guaranteed by executing recovery points in the 
correct place. In this way consistency is restored without the need to 
roll back processes that were not on a crashed computer.
Chapter 8 outlines how consistency is achieved, and Chapter 9 gives 
full details of how it could be Implemented in PROSUR.
5 . 3  Comparisons with existing crash tolerant systems
Of the crash tolerant systems described in detail in the previous 
chapter, process survivability is most similar to crash tolerance in 
Tandem. Both are based on standby redundancy with a single outstanding 
checkpoint per process and both achieve consistency without the need to 
'domino' processes.
Minor implementational differences occur because of differing 
design alms and because Tandem is a finished product whereas process 
survivability and PROSUR are experimental. For example, Tandem is designed 
to withstand only a single component failure and so each process has only a 
single backup, but process survivability is designed to withstand multiple 
computer failures and so every process has a number of backups.
The major difference between the two is the way that consistency is 
restored after a backup is activated. In Tandem consistency is restored by 
a protocol implemented by application process code. If consistency is to 
be achieved then the protocol must be correctly implemented by the
application progr«m.er. In process survivability consistency is restored
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by the underlying process survivability mechanism and not by application 
process code. Once debugged, process survivability can be guaranteed to 
work always, whereas crash recovery in Tandem is vulnerable to programmer 
error. As Bartlett (1981) says, "Many [programmers] do [write application 
process-pairs], and if the design has been done carefully, they will 
recover correctly".
ADNET's crash tolerance is based on masking redundancy and so 
comparing its implementation with that of process survivability is of 
little value. However a comparison of the services provided by each of 
them is worthwhile.
Both provide crash tolerance to multiple computer failures. 
However, in ADNET crash tolerance is only implemented for server processes 
(all other classes of process are lost in a crash), but process 
survivability is applied to all of the application processes. Thus with 
process survivability all of the control system's application processes 
survive a crash, but in ADNET only the server processes do. Finally, crash 
tolerance in ADNET is achieved solely by application process code which 
must be correct if crash tolerance is to work correctly.
The major difference between process survivability and crash 
tolerance as provided in ADNET and Tandem is that process survivability is 
transparent to the application programmer. He believe that this is the 
major advantage that process survivability has over these systems, as it 
ensures that crash tolerance is not vulnerable to application programmer 
error. That this approach is also taken by two recent systems - Auragen 
and DEMOS M/P - is encouraging, as it implies that transparency is 
important in a crash tolerant system, and that it valued by others.
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5.1» Sunn ary
Process survivability is a way of implementing an application 
process so that it can survive the crash of its host computer. Each 
process has a number of backups so that it can withstand multiple computer 
crashes even if they occur simultaneously. By implementing all of the 
control system's application processes in this way, the control system's 
software can survive a number of computer crashes and still fulfil its 
specifications.
Unlike ADNET and Tandem, process survivability is transparent to 
the application programmer. This ensures that programmer errors cannot 
prevent process survivability from being performed correctly. Transparency 
also makes process survivability suitable for adding to existing 
distributed computer control systems, as there would be no need to retrain 
programmers and it would not be necessary to alter existing software.
Moulding (1980a, page 9) states that using standby redundancy 
"introduces immense backward error recovery problems and in practice no 
such automatic reconfiguration has been achieved". Process survivability 
removes these "inmense backward error recovery problems" by achieving 
consistency without recourse to 'dominoing'.
The rest of this thesis describes how process survivability could 
be implemented for the paper distributed computer control system PROSUR.
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6. PROSUB and the Foundations of Process Survivability
6.0 Introduotlon
PROSUR (PROcess SURvivability) is the distributed computer control 
system that was designed as an environment in which to develop process 
survivability. PROSUR is a 'paper* distributed computer control system, 
that is, it exists on paper but it has never been implemented.
PROSUR conforms to the three-level model of a distributed computer 
control system described in Chapter 2, consisting of a hardware level, 
distributed kernel level and application level. Process survivability is 
provided by a fourth level interposed between the distributed kernel level 
and the application level.
This chapter describes PROSUR's three standard levels and
introduces the implementation of the process survivability level. Then in 
the following three chapters the implementation of the process
survivability level is developed.
To facilitate the development of process survivability, PROSUR has 
been kept simple. While it has not been simplified to the extent that the 
value of process survivability has been nullified, it has resulted in 
PROSUR having a number of limitations as a distributed computer control 
system. The final section of this chapter outlines these shortcomings.
6.1 Application level
The application level is organised as a static configuration of 
processes co«m«ic.tlng with each other by asynchronous message passing.
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A process is a named running instance of a program. All programs 
are written in PROSUR's P/L which has been adapted from Pascal (Jensen and 
Wirth 1978) by removing the file handling facilities (Including READ and 
WRITE etc.) and by adding message passing and device driving commands.
Processes are connected together by uni-directional 1-to-1 typed 
channels, where a channel is a queue of messages. Each channel has only a 
single sender process and a single receiver process: there is no facility 
for many-to-1 or 1-to-many connections. The sender places messages into 
the channel using a SEND command and the receiver removes these messages in 
the order in which they were sent using a RECEIVE command. Messages that 
have been sent but which have not yet been received are buffered within the
channel.
The application level is created at system initialisation time by 
commands issued to the system manager. Application processes are created, 
named and allocated to computers, and the pattern of interconnecting 
channels that bind these processes together is specified. PROSUR is a 
static system, and so the configuration specified at system initialisation 
time remains constant throughout the control system's life. If the control 
system has to be altered in any way, for example to add or replace a 
process, then it must be turned off and then recreated. The only exception 
to this is the migration of processes between computers as a result of the 
actions of process survivability after a crash. After system 
initialisation the system manager has no further role.
A channel is formed by linking together the sender's output channel 
and the receiver's input channel. Input channels and output channels are 
declared within the programs by statements of the form:
To : OutputChannel [10] Of letter;
From : InputChannel [10] Of letter;
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where ’letter' is the base type of the channel and 10 is the maximum number 
of messages that can be buffered within the channel. Only input channels 
and output channels of the same base type and size can be linked together 
to form a channel. This linking is performed by the system manager at 
system initialisation time.
'To' and 'From' are the local names of the output and input 
channels. All interprocess communication is with respect to the local 
names of a channel. Hence the physical location of the processes is hidden 
from the processes. Such addressing is said to be 'location independent', 
and it is a vital feature in a system that incorporates process 
survivability. With process survivability a computer crash results in 
application processes being 'moved about', and location independent 
addressing (assuming adequate support from the kernel) ensures that the 
application processes will still be able to communicate with each other 
despite the changes in their physical locations. (Without location 
independent addressing it would be necessary to recompile the processes in 
order to adapt them to the altered configuration.)
The SEND and RECEIVE commands are of the form:
SEND (to, data, status, timeout) 
and
RECEIVE (from, data, status, timeout).
SEND places the message 'data' into the channel whose local name is 
'to*. RECEIVE takes the first message in the channel 'from' and places it 
into 'data*. Channels are typed and so in both commands the channel's base 
type must be the same as that of the 'data' parameter.
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If a process issues a RECEIVE on an empty channel then that process 
will be suspended until a message is available. If a process issues a SEND 
on a full channel, that is a channel in which all of the buffering is taken 
up by outstanding messages, then that process will be suspended until space 
is available in the channel.
The 'timeout' parameter in both commands allows a process to 
maintain its responsiveness. If a SEND/RECEIVE takes longer than the 
period specified by timeout, perhaps because of the above flow control 
reasons or in the case of a SEND because the network is busy, then the 
command is aborted with the 'status' parameter set to ' failed'. If a 
SEND/RECEIVE terminates normally 'status' is set to 'succeeded'.
PROSUR suffers from the generic problem associated with 
asynchronous message passing: if a SEND fails due to the timeout expiring 
it is possible that the message has in fact been successfully delivered. 
(The reason for this is explained in Section 6.3 of this chapter.) It is 
left to the application processes to cope with this problem, possibly by 
implementing some higher protocol amongst themselves.
The final interprocess communication command is the boolean 
function:
PENDING (from) : Boolean;
which returns true if there is a message in the input channel 'ft-om', and
false otherwise. PENDING allows a receiver to check whether there is a 
message ready to be received before actually Issuing a RECEIVE.
An input/output device is controlled by a process known as its 
•handler'. Other processes can only access a device indirectly by
comminicating with that device's handler by message passing. The device 
handlers provide the rest of the application level with a high level, 
message-based interface to their devices.
Like channels, devices are declared within their device handlers by
declarations of the form:
lp : LINEPRINTER;
where the type can be any of the system defined device types. The handler 
refers to its device by the local name. The device that is actually 
controlled is not specified until system initialisation time.
Device handlers control their devices using the DOIO procedure, 
Which is based on the 10 command in Concurrent Pascal (Brinch Hansen 1977). 
DOIO is of the form:
DOIO (dev, oper, data, stat, arg).
DOIO causes the device * dev* to perform the operation 'oper' (where oper 
can be INPUT, OUTPUT, MOVE or CONTROL), with any further information
concerning the operation being supplied by 'arg'. In the case of an
input/output operation the value input/output will be read from/placed into
'data'. The outcome of the operation, for example COMPLETED or
INTERVENTION, is returned by the parameter 'stat'.
The system manager ensures that the configuration specified is
correct, as error checking at system initialisation time ensures that 
expensive runtime error checking need not be performed. In particular it 
ensures that each device has only one handler and that both are on the same 
computer, and that each input/output channel is bound to only one
output/input channel and that they are of the same size and type.
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6.2 Process survivability level
Process survivability is based on standby redundancy of application 
processes. An application process and its redundant backup copies together 
constitute a process-set. Every application process (and that includes 
device handlers) is implemented as a process-set.
The process survivability level fulfils two roles:
1) It provides the process-set.
2) It ensures that any Inconsistencies that arise between processes after a 
crash are removed.
In this section we describe how a process-set is organised and what 
it does, but the details of how a process-set is implemented are left until 
Chapter 9. Neither does this section describe how consistency is restored. 
The next two chapters describe the inconsistencies and explain how they are 
removed. The implementational details of restoring consistency are 
presented in Chapter 9.
A process-set consists of the primary replicate which is the 
running copy of the process, and of a set of non-running copies of the 
primary replicate called backup replicates (see Figure 6a below). Each 
replicate is hosted by a different computer. When the primary replicate is 
lost due to the crashing of its host computer one of its backup replicates 
is activated to replace it. The remaining backup replicates provide 
standby redundancy for this new generation of the application process.
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Application process
process-set
The organisation of a process-set 
Figure 6a
A primary replicate is the running copy of the application process. 
It consists of a code segment and a data segment. The code segment 
contains the compiled PROSUR’s P/L program that defines the process, and 
the data segment contains the process’s global variables, runtime stack and
heap storage.
Each backup replicate also consists of two segments: the code 
segment, which is a copy of the primary replicate’s code segment, and the 
data segment, which is a copy of the primary replicate’s data segment.
A primary replicate’s code segment is constant and so copies of it 
can be placed into its backup replicates’ code segments at system 
initialisation time. The primary replicate’s data segment alters all the
time and so the backup replicates’ data segments must be updated as the 
primary replicate runs. It would be impossible for the backup replicates’
data segments to be continuously updated. Instead they are updated at
intervals when the primary replicate performs a secure point. A secure
data being sent to each of the backuppoint results in secure point
replicates. Secure point data contains sufficient information for each 
backup replicate's data segment to be updated so that it is an exact copy 
of the primary replicate's data segment.
Secure point placement is decided upon at runtime. There is no 
coordination of secure pointing between primary replicates. The insertion 
algorithm is a fundamental part of the implementation of process
survivability. The development of the insertion algorithm and its 
implementation are described in Chapters 8 and 9.
When a primary replicate is lost one of its backup replicates is 
activated to replace it. The 'reincarnated' primary replicate will start 
to execute its code from the instruction immediately after the last secure 
point that was successfully executed by the previous generation of primary 
replicate.
A process-set's backup replicates are ordered linearly. This 
ordering defines the sequence in vrtjich the backup replicates will be 
activated in the event of the primary replicate being lost. A backup 
replicate's predecessors consist of the current primary replicate and of 
those backup replicates that are before it in the sequence. When a backup
replicate's predecessors have all been lost it will be activated to become 
the new primary replicate. For convenience, we refer to the first backup 
replicate in the sequence as the senior backup replicate and the others as 
the Junior backup replicates.
When a computer crashes a number of primary replicates are lost and 
their senior backup replicates will be activated to replace them. At the 
same time a number of Junior and senior backup replicates are lost as well. 
The order of backup replicate activation is resilient to the loss of backup 
replicates: as a backup replicate is simply activated when its predecessors 
have all been lost, it does not matter that some of them were lost before 
they were activated.
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Process survivability provides 'n out of m' crash tolerance: the 
control system can withstand the loss of n of its m computers. As we shall 
explain in Chapter 8, application processes play an active role in 
recovering each other after a crash. For a control system to withstand n 
crashes it is necessary that every application process has n backup 
replicates as otherwise processes would be lost and would not be able to 
assist each others' recovery.
The position of the primary replicates is specified to the system 
manager at system initialisation time along with the level of redundancy 
required for all application processes. The position of the backup 
replicates is decided upon by the system manager. The system manager also 
initialises the backup replicates' code and data segments.
PROSUR is a static system, and the configuration cannot be altered 
(other than by process survivability) while it is on-line. The only way 
that a crashed computer can be reintegrated into the system is by re­
initialising the entire control system. For the same reason, when a 
primary or backup replicate is lost in a crash there is no attempt to 
maintain the level of redundancy by generating another replicate. The 
system has an initial level of redundancy. Once that many computers have 
crashed the redtndancy for some processes will have been exhausted, and any 
further crashes will cause the control system to fail.
He have adopted the same approach to device redundancy as used in 
ADNET where the "failure of a peripheral computer will result in the loss 
of that peripheral fhom the system" (Moulding 1980b, page 8). Devices are 
single-homed: each device is only attached to a single computer. The 
result of this is that when a computer crashes any devices that are 
connected to it can no longer be used.
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Although the devices In PROSUR ere single-homed the device handlers 
are still implemented as a process-set. The original primary replicate is 
hosted by the computer to Which the device is connected. The backup 
replicates will be hosted by computers that are not attached to the device, 
and so when a backup replicate is activated it will not be able to control 
its device. Device handlers are implemented as process-sets for two 
reasons:
1) As we shall explain later, processes assist in each others' recovery, 
and so if a device handler were lost it could not assist in the recovery 
of other processes.
2) The backup replicates can provide an intelligent response to further 
requests for services.
Does the loss of control over the devices nullify the advantages of 
process survivability? Obviously the designers of ADNET do not think so, 
but the opposite view is taken by the designers of HXDP who think that 
"processors in distributed real-time control systems are typically located 
near the sensors and actuators they serve; reconfiguration is rendered 
ineffective by the inability to move the function of the external devices" 
(Boebert et al. 1978, page 255). This difference in view is probably due 
to the fact that HXDP tends towards a process to computer ratio of 1:1, 
whereas ADNET and PROSUR have a much higher ratio and so computers are not 
concerned solely with controlling devices.
If a particular device is vital then it will be replicated, and 
each replicate will be connected to a seperate computer. Such an 
arrangement would be necessary anyway, as otherwise the control system 
would be extremely vulnerable to device failure. Each device will have its 
own device handler. In the event of a device handler crashing, its 
activated backup replicate would advise its users that it can no longer
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control Its device, and then the users could use one of the alternative 
device handlers instead. (Unfortunately the absence of dynamic channel 
linking in PROSUR makes this Inelegant as it requires a process to be 
permanently connected to each of the alternative device handlers.)
Farber (1978, page 387) states that "peripherals have to be 
connected not only to one but to several processors". Then If one computer 
crashes one of the other computers could control the device instead, 
thereby maintaining the service.
Unfortunately the connection between the computer and the device is 
vulnerable to failure. Were multi-homing to be adopted in PROSUR then it 
would be possible for the primary replicate's host to become disconeoted 
from the device, leading to the situation where the primary replicate can 
no longer control its device but its backup replicates oould.
The Tandem 16 uses multi-homed disks. Tandem is not troubled by 
the above problem as it is possible for a primary replicate and its single 
backup replicate (processes in Tandem have only one backup) to swop roles, 
thereby ensuring that the primary replicate is always controlling the 
device. In PROSUR the primary replicate cannot swop roles with one of its 
backups.
A possible solution to this problem would be to replicate the 
computer-device connection, thereby making it effectively invulnerable. 
However in a widely dispersed configuration this would lead to a 
prohibitively large amount of wiring. In Chapter 8, Section 8.3» we 
suggest a way, based on the Tandem approach, in which multi-homed devioes 
and process-sets can be Integrated so that a restarted backup replicate can 
control its devices.
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To sumaarise, devices ape single-homed and their device handlers 
are replicated. In the event of either the device falling, or the computer 
it is attached to crashing, the service provided will be lost. If a 
redundant I/O service is required then it would have to be implemented 
within the application level.
6 . 3  Distributed kernel level
Each computer runs a functionally identical kernel. These kernels 
together constitute the distributed kernel level. The distributed kernel 
level, along with the hardware level below it, provides the services that 
are used to implement the application level and the process survivability 
level.
In general the kernels operate independently of each other. Each 
kernel supports its local processes by providing time-sharing, virtual 
memory management, asynchronous message passing and low-level device 
control. The kernels cooperate with each other to transfer messages from 
one computer to another.
Each primary replicate hosted by a kernel is described within that 
kernel by a data structure known as its •descriptor'. A primary 
replicate's descriptor contains its status ('runnable', 'unrunnable'), a 
copy of its volatile environment and its page table.
Primary replicates on the same computer are time-shared by their 
host kernel. The descriptors of those primary replicates that are runnable 
are organised into the ready-queue, from trfiieh the kernel chooses the next 
primary replicate to be run.
While a primary replicate is being run it will make use of a number 
of registers such as the program counter. The values contained in these 
registers are the primary replicate's volatile environment. When a primary
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replicate relinquishes the processor, either because it has become 
mrunnable or because it has been pre-empted, its volatile environment is 
stored in its descriptor. When the primary replicate is next chosen to be 
run its stored volatile environment is reloaded into the registers and the 
primary replicate continues where it left off. If the volatile environment 
was not saved it would be overwritten by the next primary replicate to be 
executed.
Virtual memory is in the form of paging. Program addresses consist 
of a page number and a word number pair. The physical location of a 
particular page in main memory or on backing store is defined by the 
primary replicate's page table which is stored in its descriptor.
The distributed kernel level provides a reliable asynchronous 
message passing service that is used by the process survivability level to 
implement the interprocess communication mechanism used by the application 
processes. This service, which is very similar to the application level's 
communication mechanism, comprises 1-to-1 buffered channels for linking 
primary replicates together and a suite of kernel procedures for using 
them.
These channels are called pipes so as to distinguish them from 
interprocess channels. * pipe consists of an input pipe and an output 
pipe, which are linked together at initialisation time *»en the 
Interprocess channels which they implement are linked together. Input 
pipes, like input channels, have a type and a size, but output pipes only 
have a type. The buffering needed for a pipe is provided by the receiver's 
kernel and forms pmrt of the receiver's descriptor. In effect outstanding 
messages are buffered within the input pipe and the input pipe’s size is 
the number of messages that can be buffered within it.
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The kernel procedures for supporting Interprocess communication
are:
a) ksend (op: output pipe; m: message; Var s: status; t: timeout)
The message 'm' is sent down the output pipe ’op*. If the 
timeout period 't' expires or if the receiving primary replloate crashes 
then the ksend will fall and ’s' will be set to 'failed'; otherwise 's' 
is set to 'succeeded'.
b) kread (lp: input pipe; Var m: message; Var s: status; t: timeout)
A message is copied from the Input pipe 'ip' Into 'm'. The
message is not removed from the Input pipe but It oannot be re-kread.
If a message does not exist the caller will be delayed until a message 
arrives or tntil the timeout period 't' expires. If the kread was 
successful 's' is set to 'succeeded'; otherwise It Is set to 'failed'.
c) kfree (ip: input pipe)
Kfree removes from 'ip' the messages that have been kread in
since the last call of kfree. The space they occupied oan now be used
again.
d) krecelve (ip: input pipe; Var m: message; Var s: status; t: timeout)
This is identical to kread except that the message is removed 
rather than copied.
e) kpeeklast (lp: input pipe; Var m: message; Var s: status; t: timeout)
This returns a copy of the newest message in 'ip'. The message
is not removed from the channel and it can still be input by a kread or
a krecelve. The space occupied is not released by a kfree.
In all of these kernel procedures a timeout of minus one (-1) means 
for ever, and a aero (0) timeout means that the command will only succeed
if it oan be performed successfully Immediately. These two values oan only
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be used sensibly with certain of these procedures and then only under 
certain circumstances.
Within the distributed kernel level all of the computers, 
application processes and pipes are identified by numbers. Computers and 
application processes are uniquely numbered, although all replicates within 
a process-set have the same identity. Input and output pipes are uniquely 
numbered within their host replicate.
Channel addressing within the application level is by local name, 
and similarly pipes are addressed by local input pipe and output pipe 
numbers. In order for a kernel to deliver a message sent by a local 
process it must know the address of the recipient input pipe. An input 
pipe's address has three components: process number, input pipe number, and 
the number of the computer that hosts the receiver's primary replicate.
The computer component of an input pipe's address will alter as the 
application process moves around the control system as a result of crashes. 
Because of this, the mapping from output pipe number to input pipe address 
is done at the time the message is sent and not during compilation or at 
system initialisation time. The mapping is defined by a table contained 
within the sender's descriptor. For every output pipe number the table 
contains the recipient input pipe's address. For example, in Figure 6b 
below, the primary replicate's first output pipe is linked to the first 
input pipe of process number 6, whose primary replicate is resident on 
computer number 2. When a primary replicate calls ksend the kernel uses 
the 'op' parameter to look up in the caller's descriptor the address of the 
recipient input channel.
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computer
input pipe address 
process input pipe
1 2 6 1
output pipe 2 3 3 9
number 3
e
n
Figure 6b
All of the figures needed to fill these tables are provided by the 
system manager at initialisation time. After a crash it is necessary for 
some of these mapping tables to be altered to reflect the current location 
of the application processes. This is done by the affected application 
processes themselves using the kernel procedure:
kconnect (ops output pipe; c: computer number);
which tells the kernel to alter the caller's mapping table to reflect the 
fact that the receiver connected to the caller by output pipe 'op' is now 
on computer 'c'. How kconnect is used is described in Chapter 9» Sections
9.3.2 and 9.3.1».
Any ksend performed on an output pipe that needs to be reconnected, 
but which has not yet been reconnected, will fail as the recipient computer 
specified in the mapping table no longer exists.
A reliable interprocess communication mechanism is one in which 
messages are neither lost nor corrupted. To achieve this the kernels 
employ a fault tolerant protocol such as Byte Stream protocol (Johnson 
1980) to transfer messages between computers.
Byte Stream protocol provides reliable virtual circuits It uses
checksums and positive acknowledgements to detect errors, and uses 
repetition after a timeout period to recover from the loss. In order that 
this recovery does not result in messages being replicated, both messages 
and acknowledgements carry a sequence number. These virtual circuits are 
created at system initialisation time, and they are reset in order to re­
initialise the sequence numbers after a crash of either the sender or the 
receiver.
Unfortunately such protocols suffer from a generic problem. If the 
timeout specified by the sender expires before an acknowledgement is 
successfully received then the ksend will return with its status parameter 
set to failed, but the message may have been delivered successfully and the 
acknowledgement lost. As mentioned in Section 6.1, coping with this 
problem is left to the application processes.
There is a limit to the size of message that can be sent at one
time. If the message specified in a ksend is larger than this maximum
size, then it is split up and the constituent parts are sent separately.
When all of the parts have been received by the receiver’s kernel the 
message is reconstituted and placed into the input pipe. All of this is
transparent to the application level.
The kernels provide a procedure for controlling devices called 
kdoio which is used by the process survivability level to implement DOIO. 
Kdoio has the same parameters as DOIO except that the device is identified 
by a number rather than a variable name.
Every device attached to a kernel’s host computer is described 
within the kernel by a data structure called its descriptor. A device's 
descriptor contains the information concerning the device that is needed to 
Implement a call of kdoio on that device. A primary replicate’s descriptor 
contains a table of pointers to the device descriptors of the devices it
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handles. The device's identity specified in a call of kdoio is the index 
to that device's descriptor contained within this table.
Devices have only one handler and so there is no complicated 
sharing. The possible exceptions to this rule are those disks which are 
partly used for paging and tdiieh are also controlled by a device handler. 
In this ease the disk would be controlled by an executive process that 
handles requests from both the paging system and the disk's handler.
A backup replicate is organised in exactly the same way as a 
primary replicate. It has a descriptor and it is allocated pages for its 
data and code segments. The descriptor includes the buffering for the 
backup replicate's input pipes; even though the backup replicate may never 
be used this buffering must be available in case it is. If there is not 
sufficient storage in the kernel for the backup replicates' input pipes 
then either the level of redundancy is too high or the number of computers 
is too low. Minor differences of a backup replicate from a primary 
replicate are:
1) its status is 'unrunnable';
2) in its output-pipe mapping table the computer address column is full of 
zeros;
3) the table of pointers to device descriptors is empty as the devices are 
not attached to the backup replicate's host computer;
M) all of its pages are held on backing store.
Although we have described the services provided by a kernel as if 
it were a single entity, it would be Implemented as a 'core-resident' 
nucleus and a number of executive processes. The executive processes would 
be handled by the nucleus in the same way as a primary replicate is. To 
call a kernel procedure such as ksend, the primary replicate plaoes the
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parameters in a location known to the kernel and then raises a software 
Interrupt.
For PROSUR to support process survivability the distributed kernel 
level must be able to continue normally despite the loss of one or more of 
the kernels. To do this none of the kernels must contain data or provide 
services that are needed by any of the other kernels. This is the case in 
PROSUR, as the kernels have their own copies of the necessary tables and 
none of them exports a service to the others. Also, if while a message is 
being transferred between computers, one of the kernels crashes, the other 
must be able to abort the transfer without waiting for the user specified 
timeout to expire.
There are two characteristics of the message passing system that 
are needed for process survivability. One of these, the late addressing of 
messages by the kernel, has already been discussed. The second is 
reliability.
Secure point data is transferred between computers using the 
message passing system. Were secure point data to be corrupted during 
transmission and were that corruption not noticed, then the backup 
replicate that is updated using that corrupted secure point data would 
itself be corrupted. Were the corrupted backup replicate to be activated 
it would fail, and this could cause the control system to fail as well.
Fortunately, even if the message passing service is less than 100* 
reliable, the probability of a corrupted backup being activated is still 
very small. As we shall describe later, when a secure point is executed 
the secure point data is sent to each backup replicate in turn, and also it 
is sent to each of them as a sequence of smaller messages. Hence, any 
corruption will most likely be limited to a small part of a single backup 
replicate. Furthermore, prior to a corrupted backup replicate being 
activated, the corrupted part may have been overwritten and corrected as a
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result of a later secure point.
The network overheads Involved In providing a 100J reliable message 
passing service are likely to be very high because of the level of 
redmdant data that would have to be transmitted. A less than 100f 
reliable service would be more practicable, and as long as the probability 
of a corrupted backup replicate being activated is sufficiently small then 
it would be an acceptable economy. Whether or not a 100> reliable service 
could ever be provided is an arguable point, and so the risk of corruption 
is probably unavoidable anyway.
6.1* Hardware level
PROSUR's hardware, which is illustrated in Figure 6c, consists of a 
number of identical computers joined together by a local area network. 
Each computer has sufficient local backing store to support virtual memory 
requirements.
devices
computers
network
PROSUR's hardware
Figure 6c
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i^ ach input/output device Is attached to a single computer. This 
computer will host the device handler's original primary replicate. The 
device is not attached to those computers that host the device handler's 
backup replicates. In certain situations some of the computers will be 
on-board computers, that is, they will be an integral part of the devices 
they control.
If the computers were not homogeneous, messages and secure point 
data originating from one computer would have to be translated before they 
could be used by another type of computer. This would necessitate the use 
of an intermediate format for data being sent between computers, as is the 
case for parameter and message passing in DLCN (Liu and Reames 1977). 
Furthermore, "the clarity that homogeneity provides in allowing one to see 
a single research problem at a time is very appealing" (Saltzer 1978, page 
49).
The computers are physically dispersed in order to reduce the 
chances of multiple computer crashes. The distances involved would depend 
on the perceived threats to the system. Even in a civilian application 
some level of dispersal would be desirable as a protection against such 
events as fires and floods.
Were the network to be broken then, depending on the network's 
type, the control system would by partitioned into two or more isolated 
groups of computers. Each group would consider themselves to be the only 
surviving computers and backup replicates would be activated in order to 
recover from the loss of those computers not in the partition. 
Partitioning leads to a number of problems:
a) some partitions would be too small to support the full control system;
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b) the separate partitions, whether complete or not, would compete with 
each other to fulfil the overall task;
c) when the network is repaired it would be necessary to close down the 
control system and reinitialise it in order to remove duplicate copies 
of processes.
Tandem (Katzman 1978) avoids this problem by having a duplicated 
network and by only guaranteeing the system to tolerate a single hardware 
failure, and so by definition Tandem need not be concerned with
partitioning. The network used in ADNET incorporates three or more 
redundant highways (Tillman et al. 1981) connected to the computers by 
spurs, and it is believed that in practice ADNET cannot be broken even in 
the hostile environment of a warship in action (Lakin 1982).
To avoid partitioning in PROSUR it is assumed that the network 
incorporates a high level of redundancy, and we amend our claims for 
process survivability to include the proviso that PROSUR will survive the 
failure of n computers (where n is the level of process redundancy) or the 
exhaustion of the network's redundancy.
In a commercial environment where the threat of physical damage is 
lower a network such as Planet (Gee 1983) which is basically a duplicated 
Cambridge Ring would provide sufficient redundancy. Interestingly, a 
military version of Planet has recently been developed for use on warships 
(Computing 1983) and it is probable that the level of redundancy in this 
version is even higher.
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6.5 PROSPR's shortcomings
PROSUR has been deliberately kept simple so as not to hinder or 
divert the development of process survivability. This simplification means 
that PROSUR is not a 100< practical distributed computer control system, 
but it does form a good basis for one. In this sub-section we outline 
those facilities that have been removed in the cause of simplicity.
There are two major omissions from the programming language 
PROSUR's P/L. Firstly, in Chapter 2 we explained the need for a process to 
be able to wait for a message from any one of a group of channels, but in 
PROSUR's P/L this can only be accomplished by the unsatisfactory use of a 
busy loop incorporating a lot of PENDING calls. The second amission is the 
group of commands that enable a process to suspend itself for a period of 
time or until a specific time.
PROSUR only supports 1-to-1 linking of input channels to output 
channels. A practical system would also support many-to-1 and 1-to-many 
linkages.
PROSUR is a static system. In order to alter the application level 
it is necessary to re-create the system. Although there are process 
control applications where this would be acceptable, the majority of 
applications require a dynamic system so that the application level can be 
altered without having to turn off the control system.
Shortcomings in process survivability itself are discussed in the 
concluding chapter.
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter we have outlined the organisation of the four 
levels of PROSUR, and we have described in general terms the way in which 
process redmdancy is implemented. In the following two chapters we 
describe the inconsistencies that arise after a crash (these are similar to 
those already described in Chapter 4) and how they can be removed. Then in 
Chapter 9 we present the implementational details of the distributed kernel 
level and of the process survivability level in order to describe how 
process survivability can be implemented in PROSUR.
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7. The Inconsistencies That Can Arise After A Craah
7.0 Introduction
In this chapter and in subsequent chapters, application processes 
are simply referred to as processes. Where this might lead to confusion 
with executive processes they are given their full title.
A process's state is defined by the values contained in its primary 
replicate's data segment and volatile environment. A process's state 
records its past actions in that the value of its state is the result of 
those past actions. When a process's primary replicate performs a secure 
point its backup replicates are updated so that their data segments and 
volatile environment are exact copies of those of the primary replicate.
Each channel links two processes together: the sender and the 
receiver. A channel is created at system initialisation time by linking 
together an output channel in the sender and an input channel in the 
receiver. Those outstanding messages that have been sent but which have 
not yet been received from a channel are buffered within the input channel 
half of that channel. A channel's state is defined by the messages 
currently buffered within its input channel half.
The controlled environment, which is the real world outside the I/O 
devices, also has a state. It is sufficient for our purposes to define the 
value of the environment's state as being solely the result of the control 
system's past actions.
The sequence of instructions that are executed by a process's 
primary replicate between two consecutive secure points is called a 'task . 
The task that was being executed by a process's primary replicate trtien its 
host computer crashed is, for descriptive purposes, referred to as the 
process's 'interrupted-task'. (The primary replicate of course does not
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know when It is executing an interrupted-task.)
When a computer crashes all of the primary replicates that were 
running on it are lost. The process-set mechanism activates the senior 
backup replicates of these primary replicates in order to replace them. In 
the following descriptions we will refer to a process's primary replicate 
simply as the process, and refer to the process’s activated senior backup 
replicate as the restarted process.
When a process is restarted it will start to execute its code from 
the instruction immediately after the last secure point that has been 
completed prior to the crash, and its state will be the same as it was when 
that secure point was performed. The process loses all knowledge of the 
actions that it performed during its interrupted-task.
As was explained in Section 6.3 of the previous chapter, all of the 
outstanding messages in a channel are buffered within the channel's input 
channel half. When a process is restarted it has the necessary buffering 
for its input channels, but the pre-crash contents will have been lost.
CRASH
time
Channel
ABC
Secure point
Aa an example of the effects of a crash, Figure 7a above shows the 
execution of a process prior to a crash. It has established a secure point 
(represented by a horizontal '[' character) and its single input channel 
contains three outstanding messages (A, B and C).
After the crash, messages A, B and C will have been lost and the 
application process's state will have been reset to that which existed when 
the last secure point was established. The restarted process will start to 
execute its code from that secure point.
The resetting of processes' states and the loss of outstanding 
messages leads to a number of inconsistencies arising between the 
processes' states, the channels' states and the controlled environment's 
state.
If all of the commands executed by a process simply manipulate its 
own state then there will be no relationship between that process's state 
and the channels' states, the control environment's state, and the other 
processes' states. When such a process is restarted there can be no 
inconsi stenc ies.
Inconsistencies arise when a process uses those commands that 
either affect states other than its own, or return values that are based on 
states other than its own. In PROSOR's P/L these commands are SEND, 
RECEIVE, PENDING and DO 10.
This chapter describes the inconsistencies that can arise after a 
crash, and it explains the combinations of circumstances that cause each of 
them to arise.
The first section of this chapter describes the inconsistencies 
that arise when two processes are linked together by a single channel and 
the host of one or both of the processes crashes. The second section 
describes the inconsistencies that arise between the state of a devioe
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handler (with a single device) and the state of the controlled environment 
when the device handler's computer crashes.
A process may have several channels connecting It to several other 
different processes, and a device handler may control one or more devices 
as well as having several channels. In the final section of this chapter we 
describe the cumulative effects of the Inconsistencies that arise on every 
channel and every device.
7.1 Inconsistencies between two comnunlcatlng processes
7.1.0 Introduction
A channel connects a sender to a receiver. In a crash the sender 
may be restarted, or the receiver may be restarted and the channel contents 
lost, or both of these may occur. The following three sub-sections 
describe the inconsistencies that can arise in each of these three cases.
7.1.1 Sender restarted
The sender and receiver processes are on different computers, and 
the sender's host computer crashes, but the receiver's host does not. As a 
result of this:
a) The sender is restarted from its last successfully completed secure 
point, that is from the start of its interrupted-task. (If a secure 
point was being performed at the time of the crash then that secure 
point will be discarded and the previous one used.)
b) The receiver process is unaffected and it continues to execute its code
uninterrupted by the crash.
c) The channel Is also unaffected as Its outstanding messages are buffered 
within Its Input channel end which is stored on the receiver's computer 
and that computer did not crash. None of the outstanding messages in
that channel are lost.
Were the sender to have sent any messages during its interrupted- 
task then these messages will have survived the crash, either within the 
channel if they are still outstanding, or as part of the receiver's state 
if they have been RECEIVEd. (If a message was being sent at the time of 
the crash then any part of that message that had been received by the 
receiver's kernel will be discarded - messages are either received 
completely or not at all.) However, the sender has been reset to the state 
that it was in at the start of its interrupted-task (which is before those 
messages were sent), and that state does not record that these messages 
have been sent. With respect to the sender's current state those messages 
that were sent by its interrupted-task have not yet been sent, but they 
already exist.
CRASH
time
Secure point
Sender Receiver
Figure 7b
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An example Is shown above in Figure 7b of two processes at the time 
of a crash. Prior to the crash two messages (A and B) were sent by the 
sender during Its Interrupted-task. After the crash the sender will be 
restarted from Its last secure point and the two mess.ges will survive, 
which is an Inconsistency.
7.1.2 Receiver restarted and channel contents lost
The sender and the receiver are on different computers, and the 
receiver's host computer crashes but the sender's host does not. As a 
result of this:
a) The receiver Is restarted from its last successfully completed secure 
point, that Is at the start of Its interrupted-task.
b) Any outstanding messages within the channel will be lost as they were 
buffered within the channel's input channel end which was stored on the 
receiver's computer.
c) The sender is unaffected and it continues to execute its code 
uninterrupted by the crash.
Any message that was outstanding at the time of the crash, or which 
had been RECEIVEd during the receiver's interrupted-task, will be lost. 
The only messages to have survived the crash are those that were RECEIVEd 
prior to the receiver's last secure point. The sender's state however will 
record the sending of every message that it has sent, including those that 
were lost in the crash. With respect to the sender's current state those 
messages that it has sent and which were not RECEIVEd prior to the 
receiver's last secure point have been lost.
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A further inconsistency can arise from using the PENDING function. 
If prior to its last secure point the receiver detects the presence of a 
message using PENDING but does not RECEIVE the message until after the 
secure point, then after the crash the receiver's state will still record 
that message's presence but the message will have been lost.
An example is shown below in Figure 7c of two processes at the 
time of a crash: messages A and B were sent by the sender; A was detected 
prior to the receiver's last secure point and then RECEIVEd after the 
secure point. After the crash the sender's state records that A and B have 
been sent, and the receiver's state records the presence of message A, but 
both A and B are lost.
CRASH
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Figure 7c
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7.1.3 Sender and receiver restarted, and channel contents lost
The sender and the receiver are on the same computer, and that 
computer crashes. As a result of this:
a) The sender is restarted from its last secure point.
b) Any outstanding messages within the channel are lost.
c) The receiver is restarted from its last secure point.
The sender’s state will only record the sending of those messages 
that it sent prior to its interrupted-task, and the only messages to 
survive are those that were RECEIVEd by the receiver prior to its last 
secure point. The resultant inconsistencies will be one of the two cases 
described in the previous two sub-sections depending on whether, with 
respect to the sender's and receiver's current states, more messages have 
been sent than have survived or whether more messages have survived than 
have been sent.
Inconsistencies may also arise from the use of PENDING. Firstly, 
if a message's presence was detected prior to the receiver's last secure 
point (but the message was not RECEIVEd) then after the crash the record of 
the message’s presence will survive but the message itself will have been 
lost. Secondly, were that message to have been sent after the sender's 
last secure point then no record of it being sent would survive the crash 
either. The receiver's state would record the presence of a non-existent 
message that has not been sent.
Any message that was sent after the sender's last secure point and 
which was neither received nor detected prior to the receiver's last secure 
point does not result in an inconsistency, as the message and all record of 
its sending have gone. (Message B in Figure 7d below is such a message.)
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In the first of the above two diagrams (Figures 7d and 7e) we 
Illustrate the situation that results In more messages being sent than 
survive, and In the second we Illustrate the situation that leads to more 
surviving than were sent. In both cases the Inconsistency arising from the 
use of PENDING occurs. In the first diagram, the loss of message B does 
not lead to any inconsistency as after the crash it has neither been sent 
nor has It survived.
7.1.4 Summary
When a receiver crashes, all of the outstanding messages and all of 
the messages that It has RECEIVEd during Its Interrupted-task are lost. If 
_ message Is lost but the record of its sending survives then It Is called 
a 'missing' message. It is the missing messages that cause the 
inconsistencies. Those messages that are lost but not missing do not cause 
inconsistencies. For example, in Figure 7d messages A and B are both lost 
but only A is missing.
When a sender crashes, it forgets that it has sent those messages 
that it sent during its interrupted-task. Of these messages, it is only 
those which survive the crash that cause inconsistencies, as they are 
messages that should not yet exist. These messages are called 'premature' 
messages. Those messages that are forgotten but not premature do not cause 
inconsistencies. For example, in Figure 7e messages A and B are forgotten, 
but only A is premature.
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7.2 Inconsistenclea between a device handler and the environment
When a device handler's computer crashes, the device handler will 
be restarted from its last successfully completed secure point. All 
knowledge of the actions performed by its interrupted-task is lost.
For our purposes the environment's state is determined by the past 
actions of the input/output devices and so xrtxen a computer crashes the 
environment's state is unaffected.
If the device handler had performed any DO10 commands during its 
interrupted-task then the environment's state will have been altered by 
them. However, as the device handler has been reset to a state that 
existed prior to the execution of these commands, its state will not record 
the performing of these commands. Also any results such as status and data 
values input by these DOIOs will have been lost.
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Figure 7f above illxistrates this problem. A device handler 
controls a light which it turns on during its interrupted-task. After the 
crash the light will still be on, but the device handler will have been
restarted from Its last secure point and its state will not record that the 
light has been turned on.
These inconsistencies are similar to those .hat arise when only a 
sender is restarted (see Section 7.1.1) as the results of the DOIO (turning 
the light on) have survived but with respect to the device handler's 
current state the DOIO has not yet been performed. At the same time it is 
also similar to the case where only the receiver is restarted (see Section 
7.1.2) as the value returned by the DOIO's status parameter has been lost.
The values output by DOIOs (or the actions they perform) during an 
interrupted-task are called premature output-data, and the values input by 
DOIOs during an interrupted-task are called missing input-data. A single 
DOIO may input and output at the same time.
7.3 Process-wide and system-wide inconsistencies
So far the inconsistencies that arise after a crash have been 
described on a per-channel and on a per-device basis. We now describe them 
on a per-process basis and then on a system-wide basis.
In general an application process will be linked by channels to a 
number of other application processes. Some of these channels will be 
declared within the application process to be input channels and the others 
will be declared to be output channels, and so an application process is 
both a sender and a receiver.
Figtre 7g shows an application process as the hub of a circle of 
other application processes with which it commiaiicates. The channels that 
connect the hub application process to its communicants are shown as lines. 
The lines are directed to indicate the direction of the message flow in the 
channels. (The communicants' other channels are omitted.)
Figure 7g
These application processes may be located on one or more 
computers. A computer crash may result in one or more of the processes 
being restarted, and in the loss of messages from those processes' input 
channels. Henceforth a process that was on a crashed computer will be 
described as being crashed itself, implying that it has been restarted, and 
that the contents of its input channels have been lost.
We will first look at the inconsistencies that arise when the hub 
application process does not crash but all or some of its communicants do.
The overall inconsistencies that arise are simply the concatenation 
of the Inconsistencies that occur relative to each channel. On every 
output channel where the receiver has crashed messages may be missing, and 
on the input channels where the sender has crashed there may be premature 
messages.
As an example Figure 7h below shows the hub application process H, 
communicating with two other application processes C1 and C2 prior to the 
crash of C1 and C2. After the crash message A will be premature and
messages B and C will be missing.
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If the hub application process crashed along with some of its 
commmicants then again the overall inconsistencies would be the
concatenation of the inconsistencies that arise on each channel. For 
example, if in Figure 7h process H alone crashed then message A would be 
missing, and messages B and C premature.
A device handler will have devices as well as channels. Again the 
overall inconsistencies that arise after a crash would be the concatenation 
of those arising on each channel along with those arising on each device.
The system-wide inconsistencies are simply the concatenation of the 
inconsistencies that arise with respect to each process.
7.i| Summary
In this chapter we have described the inconsistencies that may 
arise after a crash. One of the tasks of the process survivability level 
Is to remove these inconsistencies after a crash. In the following chapter 
we outline how the process survivability level achieves this, and then in 
Chapter 9 full details of its implementation are given.
In this chapter we have only discussed the inconsistencies that 
arise after a single computer crash. We leave the discussion of multiple 
computer crashes in til Chapter 9, as it is more sensible to discuss them 
after we have described how process survivability is implemented.
8. An Introduction to Consistency Restoration after a Crash
8.0 Introduction
Prior to a crash all of the processes will be in a consistent state 
- they will not be subject to any of the inconsistencies described in the 
previous chapter. After a crash a restarted process's state may be 
inconsistent due to:
1) Missing messages: those messages which, with respect to their senders' 
current states, have been sent to the restarted process but have been 
lost in the crash.
2) Premature messages: those messages that were sent by the restarted 
process's interrupted-task and which survived the crash.
3) A record of the presence of a message in an input channel (the result of 
a PENDING) survives the crash but the message trtiose presence is recorded 
is lost in the crash.
4) Missing input-data: the input-data that was input from the controlled 
environment by DOIOs executed during a device handler's interrupted-task 
and hence lost in the crash.
5) Premature output-data: the output-data contained in the controlled 
environment's state which was produced by DOIOs executed during a device 
handler's interrupted-task.
The restarted processes are recovered to consistent states by the 
process survivability level.
In this chapter we introduce the way in which the process 
survivability level performs process recovery, and we present arguments to 
show that this recovery achieves its alms. The implementations! details of
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process recovery are given in the second half of the next chapter.
As we shall explain in the first section of this chapter restarted 
processes are restored to a consistent state by the following:
1) The process survivability level causes the missing messages to be 
replaced by copies of the originals.
2) The PENDING related inconsistencies are prevented completely by 
implementing RECEIVE and PENDING so that detected messages are actually 
input as well.
3) Processes written in PROSUR's P/L are invariant: if a process, or part 
of a process, is repeated with the same input it will act in exactly the 
same way and produce exactly the same results every time. We shall argue 
that by restarting a process from its last secure point and by replacing 
any messages that are missing from that process's input channels, then 
that process will, by simply re-executing its interrupted-task, recover 
itself to a state that is consistent with any premature messages that it 
produced prior to the crash.
Unfortunately, time-dependencies in PROSUR's P/L prevent some of 
the inputs needed by a restarted process from being replaced in time. In 
order to ensure that these time-dependencies do not prevent correct 
recovery the process survivability level inserts a secure point prior to 
every SEND. Section 8.2 of this chapter describes these time-dependencies, 
explains how these can prevent a restarted process from recovering to a 
consistent state, and finally explains how, by Inserting a secure point 
prior to every SEND, correct recovery can be achieved despite the time- 
dependencies.
129
The rest of the chapter is concerned with restoring consistency 
between device handlers and the controlled environment (which unfortunately 
cannot be achieved in'PROSUR), and with the way that secure points must be 
executed.
8.1 Restoring consistency in an application process
8.1.0 Introduction
This section describes how the process survivability level recovers 
an ordinary application process (not a device driver) to a consistent 
state. Such a process is susceptible to the first three of the 
inconsistencies itemised in the introduction to this chapter.
As soon as a process is restarted it begins to execute its code; it 
is not held up while recovery is performed. Recovery is performed in 
parallel to the continued running of both the restarted processes and the 
unaffected processes (that is those processes that were not on a crashed 
computer).
Figure 8a below shows three processes at the time of a crash. 
Process-1 is unaffected by the crash, but Process-2 and Process-3 are both 
restarted from their last secure points. Process-1's input channel is not 
affected by the crash and continues to hold message D. The contents of 
Process-2's input channels are lost. This example will be used to 
illustrate the following descriptions.
8.1.1 Replacing the missing messages
Every time a process successfully SENDs a message, a copy of that 
message is stored within the sender's data segment. After a crash copies 
of the missing messages are re-sent so as to replace the missing messages. 
By storing the copies within the sender's data segment it is ensured that 
they will survive any crash as they will be backed up along with the rest
130
of the sender's data segment every time the sender performs a secure point.
Referring to Figure 8a, messages A and B are missing after the 
crash. (Message C is not classed as being missing as its sender has been 
restarted from a secure point prior to the SEND that produced message C.) 
Process-1 's data segment contains a copy of message A and so this can be 
re-sent. Process-3 sent message B prior to its last secure point and so 
the copy of message B will have been backed up along with the rest of 
Process-3's data segment by Process-3's last secure point, and so message B 
can be re-sent.
CRASH
.SEND
!
CRASH
RECEIVE
SEND
RECEIVE\
SEND
secure
point
b l
\ SEND
time
secure
point
Process-1 Process-2 Process-3
Figure 8a
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The way in which the processes are stimulated to re-send the 
missing messages, and how they determine which messages are missing, is 
described in Chapter 9, Section 9.3.
8.1.2 Preventing the PENDING related Inconsistencies
In Chapter 7, Section 7.1.2, we described an inconsistency that can 
arise from the use of the PENDING command. If prior to its last secure 
point a receiver detected the presence of a message using PENDING but did 
not RECEIVE that message, then when the process is restarted its state will 
record the message's presence but the message will be missing.
As such a message is a missing message it will be replaced by a 
copy. However, replacing messages is done in parallel to the restarted 
process's continued running. This means that if the restarted process 
tries to RECEIVE the detected message then the RECEIVE's timeout may expire 
before the message is replaced. This is itself an inconsistency as the 
process 'knows' that there is a message in its input channel and its 
RECEIVE should not fail.
This problem is completely removed by extending each input channel 
to include a single-message buffer which is stored as part of the 
receiver's data segment, and by implementing PENDING and RECEIVE in the 
following way:
a) PENDING (from : InputChannel) : Boolean
If both the input channel 'from' and its single-message buffer 
are empty then PENDING returns a value of false. If the buffer is empty 
and the input channel is not empty, then the first message in the input 
channel is placed into the buffer and PENDING returns a value of true. 
If the buffer is not empty then PENDING returns a value of true.
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b) RECEIVE (from : InputChannel, ... )
If there la a message in from'a buffer then that meaaage la 
Input and the buffer la emptied. If the buffer la already empty then a 
message la input In the normal way.
Aa the detected meaaage la stored in the receiver's data segment at 
the same time as its presence is assimilated it is Impossible for the 
record of a message's presence to survive a crash and not the message 
itself. This solution also removes the possibility of the PENDING related 
inconsistency described in Section 7.1.3 that arises when both the sender 
and the receiver of a channel crash.
Implementing PENDING and RECEIVE in this way is an example of the 
use of fault avoidance.
When a receiver crashes, any messages that were detected by 
PENDINGs prior to the receiver's last secure point will survive the crash 
even if the messages were not subsequently RECEIVEd prior to the receiver's 
last secure point. This must be taken into consideration when calculating 
which messages are missing and which are premature. We return to this again 
in Chapter 9, Section 9.3«
8.1.3 Premature messages
The restarted processes must be recovered so that their states are 
consistent with any premature messages. In our example, Process-2 and 
Process-3 must be restored to states that are consistent with the presence 
of message D.
Processes written in PROSUR's P/L are invariant. This means that 
if a process, or part of a process, is re-executed with the same input 
(data segment, volatile environment and messages) it will act in exactly 
the same way and will produce exactly the same results every time.
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By ensuring that when a process is restarted It initially has the 
same data segment and volatile environment as it had at the start of its 
interrupted-task, and by ensuring that the restarted process RECEIVES the 
same messages as it did during its interrupted-task, we guarantee that:
a) The restarted process will repeat those SENDs which, when executed 
during its interrupted-task, produced the premature messages. (In our 
example, this is Process-2's only SEND.)
b) Not only are those SENDs repeated, but they also produce exactly the 
same messages as they did when executed prior to the crash.
Hence a restarted process's state becomes consistent with both the presence 
of the premature messages and with the contents of those messages, and the 
existence of the premature messages is no longer an inconsistency.
Those instructions that form the interrupted-task are called the 
restarted-task when re-executed after a crash. By ensuring that a 
restarted process has the same input as its interrupted-task, we guarantee 
that the process's restarted-task will be executed, and that the restarted 
process will act in exactly the same way and produce exactly the same 
output as it did during its interrupted-task.
Executing the restarted-task includes re-executing all of the SENDs 
that were performed during the interrupted-task. If the result of such a 
SEND has survived the crash then the repeated SEND is called a late-SEND, 
but if the resultant message did not survive the crash then the repeated 
SEND is called a normal-SEND. In our example Process-3's second SEND is a 
normal-SEND as message C did not survive the crash, and Process-2's SEND is 
a late-SEND because message D did survive the crash.
If executed normally the late-SENDa would result in the premature 
messages being duplicated, which would introduce further inconsistencies. 
To avoid this the late-SENDs are 'gagged'. When a SEND is gagged, the 
message is not actually sent but the SEND's status parameter is set to 
•succeeded’. Hence after a late-SEND the message exists (it survived the 
crash) and the sender 'knows' that the message exists (because the late- 
SEND returned a status of succeeded), and so the process's state is 
consistent with that premature message. By repeating and gagging all of 
its late-SENDs a restarted process is restored to a consistent state.
The normal-SENDs are executed normally. A description of how 
normal-SENDs and late-SENDs are distinguished is given in Chapter 9.
He now return to the example shown in Figure 8a. On restarting, 
Process-3 is consistent with its surviving messages as all of them were 
sent prior to its interrupted-task (the only message sent during its 
interrupted-task did not survive the crash). By ensuring that Process-2 
RECEIVES the same two messages (A and B) as its interrupted-task, it is 
gmranteed that Proeess-2 will repeat the SEND that originally produced 
message D. This late-SEND will be gagged so as to prevent D being 
duplicated. Process-2 will now be in a consistent state.
If a restarted process is to execute its restarted-task then its 
volatile environment and data segment must initially have the same value as 
they did at the start of the process's interrupted-task, and the restarted 
process must RECEIVE the same messages as it did during its interrupted- 
task. The implementation of the process-set ensures that the first of 
these requirements is met.
The messages that were RECEIVEd during a restarted process's 
interrupted-task will consist of:
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a) Messages that were sent by unaffected processes (for example, message A 
In Figure 8a), and messages that were sent by restarted processes prior 
to their Interrupted-task (for example, message B In Figure 8a).
b) Messages that were sent by restarted processes during their 
Interrupted-tasks (for example, message C in Figure 8a).
The first group of messages, described In (a), is a sub-group of 
the missing messages. After a process is restarted all of its missing 
messages are replaced by copies of the originals. If during its 
interrupted-task a process RECEIVES a message that will be missing after 
the crash (for example, both of Proeess-2's RECEIVES in Figure 8a) then 
when that RECEIVE is repeated as part of the process's restarted-task it 
will input a copy of the message that it originally input. Hence, if a 
process's interrupted-task only RECEIVEd messages from group (a) (or if it 
did not RECEIVE any messages at all), then on restarting the process would 
execute its restarted-task and produce exactly the same messages as its 
interrupted-task. For example, in Figure 8a both Process-2 and Process-3 
will act in exactly the same way as they did prior to the crash, as 
Process-3 does not input any messages at all, and Process-2 inputs two 
missing messages.
We come now to the second type of message that can be input during 
an interrupted-task: those messages that are sent to it by other restarted 
processes during their interrupted-tasks. If repeated RECEIVES, that 
originally input a message from this group, can be shown to input the same 
message after a crash as before, then we will have shown that a restarted 
process will have exactly the same input as it did during its interrupted- 
task, and so will act in exactly the same way as it did during its 
interrupted-task. To show this, we present the following algorithmic 
argument (a worked example is given in Section 8.1.4) to show that the 
messages produoed by a process's restarted-task are the same as those
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produced by ita Interrupted-task.
1) As has been explained before, if a restarted process has only RECEIVEd 
replaced messages, or if it has not RECEIVEd any messages at all, then 
when it repeats a SEND that SEND will produce exactly the same message 
as when it was executed by the interrupted-task.
2) On restarting, each restarted process will execute until either it waits 
to RECEIVE a message that will be (or has been) sent by another 
restarted process, or until it reaches the end of its restarted-task. 
By (1) above, any SEND executed by these restarted processes prior to 
this will produce exactly the same message as it did when executed prior 
to the crash.
3) If a restarted process has finished its restarted-task then, by our 
previous arguments, the messages that it has produced will be the same 
as those it sent during its interrupted-task.
U) of those application processes that issued a RECEIVE, one or more of 
them will RECEIVE a message ft’om one of the other restarted processes.
One of these RECEIVES must be satisfied unless the processes are 
dead-locked. Inserting secure points does not cause dead-locking, and 
so if the restarted processes are dead-locked it is because they were 
dead-locked prior to the crash and so they have been recovered.
5) The processes whose RECEIVES were satisfied will continue to execute 
their code uitll they again either reach the end of their restarted- 
tasks or they wait to RECEIVE a message that will be sent by another 
restarted process. Any SEND re-executed by a restarted process since 
its previous RECEIVE will have produoed the same message as it did 
during the interrupted-task as the restarted process's input has 
consisted of replaced messages and messages sent by other restarted 
processes which so far have been shown to be the same.
6) Continue from step 3 until all of the restarted processes have completed 
their restarted-tasks.
Hence every SEND performed by a process's restarted-task will 
produce the same message as it did when it was first executed during the 
process's interrupted-task. The late-SENDs will be gagged, and the 
normal-SENDs will be executed normally.
To summarise, in this sub-section we have shown that by restarting 
a process from its last secure point and by replacing the messages that are 
missing from its input channels, the restarted process will recover to a 
state that is consistent with its premature messages.
8.1.4 Summary and example
The way that PENDING and RECEIVE are implemented prevents the 
PENDING-related inconsistencies from ever arising.
Every time ta application process SENDs a message the process 
survivability level stores a copy of that message in the sender's data 
segment. These copies are used to replace those messages that are missing 
after a crash.
After a crash the process survivability level replaces the missing 
messages by sending copies of the originals. The restarted processes, 
being invariant, will recover themselves to states that are consistent with 
their premature messages. Any late-SENDs are gagged by the process 
survivability level in order to prevent further inconsistencies from 
arising.
We now present a worked example of how consistency is restored 
after a crash. Figure 8b shows three processes at the time of a crash. 
Process-1 is «»affected by the crash and its channel will continue to hold 
message D. Process-2 and Prooess-3 are both restarted from their last
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6 ) Continue from step 3 until all of the restarted processes have completed 
their restarted-tasks.
Hence every SEND performed by a process’s restarted-task will 
produce the same message as it did when it was first executed during the 
process's interrupted-task. The late-SENDs will be gagged, and the 
normal-SENDs will be executed normally.
To summarise, in this sub-section we have shown that by restarting 
a process from its last secure point and by replacing the messages that are 
missing from its input channels, the restarted process will recover to a 
state that is consistent with its premature messages.
8.1.4 Sunn ary and example
The way that PENDING and RECEIVE are implemented prevents the 
PENDING-related inconsistencies from ever arising.
Every time an application process SENDs a message the process 
survivability level stores a copy of that message in the sender's data 
segment. These copies are used to replace those messages that are missing 
after a crash.
After a crash the process survivability level replaces the missing 
messages by sending copies of the originals. The restarted processes, 
being invariant, will recover themselves to states that are consistent with 
their premature messages. Any late-SENDs are gagged by the process 
survivability level in order to prevent further inconsistencies from 
arising.
We now present a worked example of how consistency is restored 
after a crash. Figure 8b shows three processes at the time of a crash. 
Process-1 is waffected by the crash and its channel will continue to hold 
message D. Process-2 and Prooess-3 are both restarted from their last
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secure points and messages A, C and B will be lost from their input 
channels. Message D is a premature message.
CRASH CRASH
Process-1 Process-2 Process-3
Figure 8b
Recovery would proceed in the following ways
1) A and B are missing messages and so will be replaced. We will 
distinguish between those messages that exist before and after the crash 
by appending suffixes of i and r respectively.
We can state that AixAr and Bi=Br, as they are copies of each other.
139
2) Process-1 continues to run normally.
3) Process-2 RECEIVES the replaced message Ar. Proeess-2 then executes 
another RECEIVE, and as that input channel is empty it waits for 
Process-3's restarted-task to SEND a message.
4) Process-3 RECEIVES the replaced message Br, and then SENDs the message 
Cr to Process-2. Process-3 then completes its restarted-task.
Process-3’s input consists of the message Br, and as Br=Bi - from (1) 
above - we can state that Cr=Ci.
5) Process-2’s RECEIVE will terminate successfully, and Cr will be input. 
Process-2 will then perform the late-SEND which is gagged.
Process-2’s input consists of messages Ar and Cr. From (1) we know that 
ArsAi, and from (4) we know that Cr=Ci, and so Dr=Di, which is what we 
need for Process-2 to become consistent with its premature message Di.
6) All of the restarted application processes have finished their, 
restarted-tasks and they are all consistent again.
8.2 Time-dependent functions and secure point Insertion
8.2.0 Introduction
Figure 8c shows two processes at the time of a crash. During its 
interrupted-task Process-1 had detected the presence of message A and 
because of that it has sent message B to Process-2. Due to the crash 
Process-1 is restarted from its last secure point and the contents of its 
single input channel are lost. Process-2 is unaffected. After the crash 
message A is missing and message B is premature.
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Message A will be replaced by the process survivability level which 
will cause the message to be re-sent. However the message may not have 
arrived by the time the PENDING is re-executed. If it has not arrived, 
then the PENDING will return a value of false and Process-1 will not re- 
execute its SEND. Because the PENDING returned a different value Process-1 
has not recovered itself to a consistent state as message B exists but 
Process-1 does not know that it has sent it.
CRASH
Process-1 Process-2
l
time
Figure 8c
PENDING is an example of a time-dependent function. A time- 
dependent function is a function or a procedure that when repeated by a 
restarted process may return a different value to the one that was returned 
when the command was executed during the restarted process's interrupted- 
task.
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Restoring a restarted process to a state that Is consistent with 
Its premature messages relies on the restarted process getting the same 
Input as its Interrupted-task. Time-dependent functions input values that 
cannot be guaranteed to be the same when that command is re-executed after 
a crash.
There are a number of time-dependent functions in PROSUR's P/L. 
The rest of Section 8.2 identifies these commands and describes the secure 
point insertion strategy employed by the process survivability level in 
order to ensure that consistency is restored despite the existence of these 
time-dependent functions.
8.2.1 Time-dependent functions
There are four time-dependent functions in PROSUR's P/L. Three of 
these are the interprocess commtnication commands (SEND, RECEIVE and 
PENDING) and the fourth is DOIO.
a) SEND (OutputChannel, message, status, timeout)
The success or failure of a SEND depends on the length of the 
timeout period specified, and on how busy the network is and on how 
quickly the receiver is removing the messages. The network's and the 
receiver's activity before and after the crash will most likely be 
different, and so the value returned by the status parameter of a SEND 
that is repeated by a restarted process is likely to be different to the 
value that was returned when the SEND was executed during the process's 
interrupted-task.
b) RECEIVE (InputChannel, message, status, timeout)
The success or failure of a RECEIVE, and hence the value 
returned by its status parameter, depends on whether a message arrives 
within the timeout period or not. The message input by a repeated 
RECEIVE will either have been replaced by the process survivability
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level, or have been re-sent by another restarted process. Even if a 
RECEIVE succeeded when executed prior to the crash, it is possible that 
when the RECEIVE is repeated the replaced or re-sent message will not 
arrive in time and the RECEIVE will fail. (The repeated message may 
never arrive as the SEND's timeout might expire.) Alternatively, if the 
RECEIVE first failed it may succeed when repeated.
c) PENDING (InputChannel) : Boolean
We have already shown that PENDING is a time-dependent function. 
The fact that PENDING actually inputs the message that it detects has no 
bearing on this problem.
d) DO10 (device, operation, data, status, arguments)
All DOIOs, no matter what the operation, result in some value 
being input either by the data or the status parameter. Devices are 
only connected to a single computer, and so a repeated D0I0 will always 
fail. Assuming that the device had been working prior to the crash then 
this failure will be a different result to that obtained prior to the 
crash, and so DOIO is a time-dependent function.
Time-dependent functions may return the same value v*>en repeated 
but it is not possible to rely on this, and so they must be treated as 
though they will always return a different result when repeated.
8.2.2 The secure point insertion strategy
Under certain circumstances it is possible for consistency to be 
restored despite the presence of time-dependent functions in the restarted 
process’s interrupted-task. The following example illustrates these 
circumstances.
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Figure 8d shows two processes at the time of a crash. Process-1 is 
restarted. Process-2 Is unaffected and message A survives the crash. On 
restarting Process-1 must become consistent with its premature message A.
CRASH
secure point
time
Process-1 Process-2
Figure 8d
Process-1 ’s interrupted-task contained two time-dependent 
functions: PENDING and the SEND itself. Fortunately, the decision to 
perform the SEND and the composition of the message are determined before 
the time-dependent values of the SEND and the PENDING are available. No 
matter what value PENDING returns or vAiat status the SEND returns, that 
SEND will be re-executed and the same message will be sent. As the SEND is 
a late-SEND it will be gagged. Process-1 will have recovered itself to a 
consistent state.
This example shows that as long as consistency has been restored 
prior to the re-execution of any time-dependent functions then a restarted 
process will recover itself to a consistent state despite the presence of 
time-dependent functions in its interrupted-task.
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The process survivability level ensures that this is always the 
case by executing a secure point prior to the execution of the SEND that 
follows one or more time-dependent functions. As SENDS are themselves 
time-dependent functions, every SEND is preceded by a secure point and so a 
task can only contain a single SEND, and that SEND will be at the start of 
the task.
The secure point insertion strategy ensures that a restarted 
process will become consistent, but the presence of the time-dependent 
functions in the interrupted-task prevents the interrupted-task being 
completely re-executed. This does not matter, but it is necessary to 
redefine a restarted process’s restarted-task to be those instructions of 
the interrupted-task that must be repeated in order for the process to 
become consistent. As tasks can have only one SEND in them and as that 
SEND is always the first instruction, a restarted-task will either consist 
of a single SEND or be empty.
8.2.3 Summary
Despite the replacement of missing messages it is not possible to 
guarantee that a restarted process will input the same values as did its 
interrupted-task. In order to ensure that consistency can still be 
restored, the process survivability level inserts a secure point before 
every SEND.
Performing a secure point every time a SEND is executed is a heavy 
overhead. A way of reducing this overhead by reducing the number of secure 
points that are performed is described in the next chapter.
As all tasks begin with a SEND, RECEIVES will never be executed 
prior to consistency being restored and so all of our arguments presented 
in the later half of Section 8.1.3 appear to be unnecessary. However, in 
Chapter 9 we present a way of reducing the heavy secure point insertion
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load by allowing a task to contain several SENDS. This optimisation also 
prevents a certain type of RECEIVE counting as a time-dependent function, 
and so these RECEIVES may be re-executed prior to consistency being 
recovered and so our earlier arguments are not wasted.
8.3 Restoring consistency In a device handler
A device handler is treated by the process survivability level In 
exactly the same way as any other application process: a secure point is 
executed prior to every SEND, and when It Is restarted its missing messages 
are replaced and its late-SENDs are gagged.
A device handler also has to be made consistent with the controlled 
environment's state. This requires that any input-data input by the device 
handler's interrupted-task be made available again so that it can be re­
input, and that the DOIOs that produced the premature output-data be 
repeated and gagged. Unfortunately neither of these are possible.
Devices in PROSUR are only connected to single computer, and so it 
is impossible for a restarted device handler to control its device as its 
new host computer will not be connected to that device. When a restarted 
device handler repeats a DOIO, that DOIO always fails. Missing input-data 
cannot be re-input, and it is impossible to know which DOIOs to gag, and so 
it is impossible for a restarted device handler to become consistent with 
the controlled environment.
Furthermore it is not possible for a device handler to advise the 
rest of the control system of its device's current state as the device 
handler does not know what happened during its interrupted-task. The 
device handler only knows the state that its device was in at the time of 
the device handler's last secure point.
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None of these problems can be removed by the process survivability 
level. Instead it is left to the application level to cope with them.
All of these problems could be removed by extending process 
survivability and PROSUR in the following ways:
1) Multi-homing the devices so that all of the host computers of a device 
handler’s replicates are connected to its device. This ensures that a 
restarted device handler would still be able to control its device.
2) Enabling primary and backup replicates to exchange roles. Then if a 
primary replicate is unable to control its device because the computer- 
device link that it is using has failed, then one of its backup 
replicates would be activated to replace it, thereby maintaining control 
of the device.
3) Implementing the devices so that they can recognise repeated commands; 
if they receive a repeated command, the devices return the response that 
they returned when the command was first issued and do not execute the 
command. Then when a backup replicate repeats a DOIO, the DOIO would 
return the same data and status values as it did when it was executed 
prior to the crash.
A device handler's service would still be vulnerable to the failure 
of the device itself. The only way to remove this vulnerability is to 
duplicate both the device and its handler. The way in which these 
duplicates could be integrated into the control system was discussed 
earlier in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.
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8.U Time-dependent functions and secure point establishment
The presence of time-dependent functions In PHOSUR's P/L dictates 
two restrictions on the way that secure points are executed.
Figire 8e shows two processes at the time of a crash. Prior to the 
crash, Process-1 sent message A to Process-2, and then it detected a 
message In its input channel and because of that it sent a second message 
(B) to Process-2. This set of actions could be the result of executing:
SEND (out, A, ... ),
If PENDING (in) Then SEND (out, B, ... );
Both SENDs were preceded by secure points (SP1 and SP2).
CRASH
t
S P 1 ----
Process-1 Process-2
Figure 8e
After the crash Process-1 will be restarted from its last secure 
point (SP2) and its input channel will be empty. Process-2 is unaffected 
by the crash, and messages A and B will remain in its input channel. 
Process-1's missing message (C) is replaoed and Process-1 repeats its last
148
SEND (which is gagged) and becomes consistent again.
However, were for some reason Process-1 to be restarted from the 
older of the two secure points (SP1) instead of from SP2, then it would be 
necessary for message C to be replaced and Process-1's two SENDS to be 
repeated and gagged. Unfortunately it is possible that this would not 
happen and Process-1 would not become consistent. For example, when 
Process-1 repeats the PENDING it might, for the reasons described in 
Section 8.2.1, return 'false' this time, and so the second SEND would not 
be repeated and Process-1 would not become consistent.
A description of how a secure point is established was given in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2. Briefly, when a primary replicate executes a 
secure point, secure point data is gathered and sent by the primary 
replicate's host kernel to the kernels that host its backup replicates. 
The secure point data is then used to update the backup replicate's data 
segment and volatile environment.
The situation illustrated above could only arise if the last secure 
point had not been successfully established at the time of the crash, thus 
forcing the process to restart from the older, out of date, secure point. 
In order to prevent this from ever happening it is necessary that:
1) The primary replicate be suspended until the secure point data has been 
delivered to each of its backup replicate's host kernels. It is not 
necessary to delay the primary replicate until the secure point data has 
been merged with all of its backup replicates, but as a consequence of 
this a backup replicate must not be activated until all outstanding 
secure point data has been merged with its data segment and volatile 
environment.
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2) Secure point establishment must be atomic with respect to the crashing 
of the primary replicate that instigated the secure point. The secure 
point data must either be merged with all of the backup replicates or 
with none of them. In the latter case, the application process will be 
restarted from its previous secure point, but the problem Illustrated 
earlier will not arise as the primary replicate had not started the next 
task.
The two-stage protocol used to ensure that secure points are atomic 
is described in detail in the first half of the next chapter.
8.5 Summary
The inconsistencies that can arise due to the use of PENDING have 
been removed. PENDING inputs the message that it detects and stores it in 
the receiver's data segment from where it can be later RECEIVEd. If the 
record of a message's presence survives a crash so does the message.
Process recovery is supported by two actions during normal running. 
Firstly, every time a message is successfully sent a copy of that message 
is stored within the sender’s data segment. Secondly, a secure point is 
executed prior to every SEND - this is because of the presence of the 
time-dependent commands (SEND, RECEIVE, PENDING and DOIO) in PROSUR's P/L.
A restarted process may have messages missing from a number of its 
input channels, and a single premature message may be present in one of its 
output channels or within the data segment of one of its receivers. The 
missing messages are replaced by copies of the originals. The SEND that 
produced the premature message during the process's interrupted-task is 
repeated and gagged.
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Process survivability cannot restore a device handler to a state 
that is consistent with the results of the DOIOs performed during the 
device handler's interrupted-task. Furthermore, a device handler cannot 
report to the rest of the control system on the results of those DOIOs, or 
even advise the rest of the control system as to whether It performed those 
DOIOs or not. A way of removing both problems was presented.
The presence of time-dependent functions in PROSUR's P/L has the 
following implications for secure point creation:
a) The primary replicate is held up until the secure point data has been 
delivered to the backup replicates' host kernels.
b) Sending the secure point data to the backup replicates must be an 
atomic action despite the crashing of the primary replicate.
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9. Implementing Propesa Survivability In PROS UR
9.0 Introduction
This chapter describes how the process-set organisation is
implemented by the distributed kernel level, and how process recovery is 
implemented by the process survivability level. Process survivability's 
ability to provide recovery despite multiple computer crashes is also 
discussed.
Process survivability relies on the hardware level and the 
distributed kernel level exhibiting certain characteristics. The first 
section of this chapter recalls these characteristics.
The presence of time—dependent functions in PROSUR's P/L has 
resulted in a secure point being performed prior to every SEND. This 
appears to be a heavy overhead, and Section 9.5 describes a way in which 
the number of secure points can be reduced.
9.1 Hardware and distributed kernel level characteristics
In Chapter 6 we described, and rationalised, a number of
characteristics that it is necessary for the hardware level and distributed 
kernel level to exhibit if process survivability is to be feasible. In 
this section we briefly recall these characteristics.
1) The network that links the computers together cannot be broken.
2) The computers are homogeneous.
B) The individual kernels are designed so that the loss of one or more 
kernels will not prevent the other kernels from operating normally.
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it) The Inter-computer communication mechanism provided by the kernels is 
very reliable. This mechanism is used to transmit secure point data as 
well as application-level messages.
5) The mapping from local pipe name to physical address of the recipient 
input channel is done by the sender's kernel when the message is sent.
6) Any partly sent or partly received message is discarded if the sender or 
receiver kernel crashes.
9.2 Process set implementation
9.2.1 Normal running
A backup replicate, like a primary replicate, has a process 
descriptor, an allocation of pages in which its code and data segments are 
stored, and has sufficient buffering for its input channels. In fact a 
backup replicate is managed in exactly the same way as a primary replicate, 
except that its status is 'unrunnable' and all of its pages are stored on 
the backing store.
All program addresses consist of a page number and a word-offset 
number pair. The primary and backup replicates' page tables define the 
mapping from page number to physical location and so it does not matter 
that the code and data segments of a primary replicate, and the code and 
data segments of its backup replicates, are stored in different physical 
locations.
A primary replicate performs a secure point by executing the kernel 
procedure ' ksecurepoint •. The secure point is executed by the primary 
replicate's host kernel which collects and sends the secure point data to 
the backup replicates' host kernels. Secure point data consists of:
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a) a copy of the primary replicate’s volatile environment;
b) the numbers of those of the primary replicate's pages which have been 
written to since the last secure point;
c) a copy of those pages.
Once the primary replicate has called ksecurepoint it is suspended 
until the secure point is completed, and so an up to date copy of its 
volatile environment will be contained in its process descriptor. The 
primary replicate program counter (part of its volatile environment) will 
index the instruction following the ksecurepoint and so a restarted backup 
replicate will be restarted from after the secure point.
When the space occupied by a page in main memory is to be reclaimed 
for further use, that page must first be copied onto the backing store. If 
that page has not been altered since it was copied into main memory, then 
there is no need to do this. To detect this situation page tables often 
Include a boolean variable for each page, which is set to false when the 
page is copied into main memory, and is set to true when the page is 
written to. By extending the page table to include a similar boolean 
variable that is set to false for all pages when a secure point is 
performed and then set to true when a particular page is written to, it can 
be determined which pages have been written to since the last secure point.
As an alternative, tagged memory (Feustel 1973) could be used so 
that the secure point data would consist of those words that have been 
updated since the last secure point. In a similar vein Kant (1983) 
proposed that tagged memory could be used as an efficient way of supporting 
recovery blocks.
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A backup replicate'a code Is stored in its pages at system 
initialisation time. There is no need for a kernel to distinguish between 
those pages that contain a primary replicate's code and those that contain 
its data, as the code pages are never written to and so will never be 
included in secure point data.
Once the primary replicate's host kernel has ascertained which 
pages have been altered, it can assemble and send the secure point data. 
The secure point data will be too large to be transmitted as a single 
block, and so it is transmitted as a sequence of smaller blocks: the 
volatile environment and the numbers of the altered pages are sent first, 
followed, one at a time, by the altered pages themselves which are first 
copied from where they are stored in either main memory or secondary 
memory.
For the reasons described in Section 8.U establishing a secure 
point is atomic despite the crashing of the primary replicate's host 
computer: the secure point must either be completed by the senior backup 
replicate's host kernel or it must be aborted so that in effect it has 
never been executed. To achieve this the following two-stage protocol 
incorporating recovery is employed. (This protocol is presented as a 
finite state table in Figure 9a below.)
In order to simplify the following description, the primary 
replicate's host kernel will be called the primary-kernel, and the senior 
backup replicate's host kernel and the junior backup replicates' host 
kernels will be called the senior-kernel and the junior-kernels 
respectively. The senior-kernel and the junior-kernels are collectively 
called the backup-kernels.
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The primary-kernel sends the secure point data, In a secure point 
message, to each of the backup-kernels In turn. The backup-kernels are 
ordered by the order In which the backup replicates are designated to be 
activated, and the secure point message Is sent to them In that order. 
Having done that the primary-kernel sends a commit message to each of the 
backup-kernels, again In the same order.
A secure point may have to be aborted, and so a backup-kernel does 
not use the secure point data to update the backup replicate until it 
receives a commit message. Each kernel has a list of the free pages on its 
local backing store. As a backup-kernel receives pages they are written to 
a free page, but the backup replicate's page table is not altered. Once 
the commit message is received the backup replicate's volatile environment 
and page table are updated and the superceded pages are freed.
If a computer crashes while a secure point message or a commit 
message is being sent to it, the primary-kernel aborts the transmission to 
that computer. The crashed computer will not be included in any further
secure point.
The above is the two-stage protocol. The following is the recovery
that is performed by the senior-kernel when the primary-kernel crashes. 
Before activating the senior backup replicate the current secure point must 
be completed or aborted in order to establish the same recovery point in 
every replicate.
First the senior-kernel discards any partially received commit 
message or secure point message, and then any outstanding messages are 
processed as normal. Once this has been done the senior-kernel completes 
the secure point.
Due to the secure point and the commit messages being sent to the 
backup-kernels in order, the senior-kernel may have received a secure point 
message which the Junior-kernels have not, or it may have received a commit 
message that the others have not. Figure 9b above illustrates the former 
case: a secure point message (SPM) had been sent to the senior-kernel and 
to one other backup-kernel prior to the crash. Figure 9c below illustrates 
the latter case: a secure point message (SPM) has been sent to all of the 
backup-kernels, but the commit message (04) has only been sent to the 
senior-kernel and one Junior-kernel.
senior-kernel
SPM
primary-kernel - junior-kernels
Figure 9b
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senior-kernel
Figure 9c
If the senior-kernel has received a secure point message but not a 
commit, it cannot assume that the junior-kernels have all received the 
secure point message# The senior-kernel will discard the secure point 
data: the secure point has been aborted. The senior backup replicate is 
restarted from the previous secure point. Some of the Junior-kernels may 
have received the secure point message, but they will discard it when they 
receive the next secure point message to be sent to them.
If the senior-kernel has received a commit it knows that the 
Junior-kernels must have received the last secure point message, but it 
does not know whether they received a commit message, and so it sends a 
commit to each of the junior-kernels. This completes the secure point. 
The senior backup replicate is then activated. Some of the junior-kernels 
may have already received the commit message and they will discard the 
repeated one.
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If the primary-kernel were to be lost between secure points, the 
senior-kernel would still send the commit message to all of the Junior- 
kernels.
If the senior-kernel were to crash while finishing 
(completing/aborting) the secure point, then the most senior of the 
Junior-kernels would finish it and so on, until either the secure point is 
finished or all of the backup replicates have been lost.
9.2.2 Error detection
Every computer has a heartbeat. A heartbeat is a small message 
sent at regular intervals by a computer's kernel to every other kernel. 
The heartbeats are monitored by the kernels. When a kernel detects that a 
particular computer's heartbeat has stopped it knows that that computer has 
crashed. The decision that a computer has crashed must be taken over 
several heartbeat intervals in order to prevent computers being prematurely 
diagnosed as having crashed just because a heartbeat was lost during 
transmission.
Computer crashes cannot be relied upon to be instantaneous. Often a 
crash will be preceded by a phase during which the computer is simply 
malfunctioning. If a computer malfunctions it is most likely that process 
survivability will be compromised and will not be able to cope with the 
eventual crash. To remove this threat the computers' hardware must be able 
to detect permanent hardware faults immediately. Having detected a fault 
the computer is crashed either by halting the processor or by isolating the 
computer from the network and its peripherals, both of which will stop the 
computer's heartbeat.
Ideally, the hardware should be able to recover itself from 
transient errors. Otherwise process survivability would have to be used to 
recover from a transient fault that oould have been recovered from by a
simple retry mechanism.
Carter et al. (1977) have shown that the cost of producing a
computer that can detect hardware faults and which has a simple retry 
mechanism is relatively Inexpensive compared to the cost of a computer 
without these facilities.
9.2.3 Damage assessment
A backup replicate's predecessors consist of its process-set's 
current primary replicate and of those backup replicates that are 
designated to be activated before it. Once a backup replicate's 
predecessors have all crashed it is activated.
When a kernel has detected that a computer has crashed it must 
decide Which, if any, of the backup replicates that it hosts must be 
activated. The information on vdiich it makes its decision is kept in two 
tables.
One table records for every computer (other than the kernel's host) 
which of the kernel's local backup replicates has a predecessor on that 
computer. A second table contains a count of the number of predecessors 
that each of its local backup replicates has left.
When a kernel detects a computer crash it decrements the 
predecessor count for each of its local backup replicates that had a 
predecessor on that computer. If any of these counts falls to zero that 
backup replicate is activated.
As an example Figure 9d shows these two tables (partially 
completed) for a particular kernel. If computer 1 were to crash then 
predecessors of backup replicates 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 would be lost. After 
decrementing the predecessor counts for these five backup replicates, 
backup replicates 1 and 4 would be activated.
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9.2.4 Recovery
Having decided which of Its local backup replicates are to be 
activated, the kernel must activate them. First however the recovery phase 
of the two-stage protocol described In Section 9.2.1 Is performed for each 
of the backup replicates that are to be activated. Once that is completed 
the backup replicate can be activated.
A backup replicate is Just a process whose state is 'unrunnable'. 
It can be activated by setting Its status to 'runnable* and by placing its 
process descriptor onto the ready-queue. As the activated backup
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replicate, now a primary replicate, atarta to run, the reaultant memory 
faulta will enaure that ita pages are loaded into the main atore aa 
necessary.
9.2.5 Fault repair and continued running
There ia no fault repair. The computer that crashed cannot be re­
integrated back into the control system without turning the control system 
off and then recreating it.
Continued running is exactly the same as normal running.
9.3 Process recovery
9.3.0 Introduction
The process survivability level defines three class types: 
Ichannel, Ochannel and IOdevice. (The general syntax of the class 
structure is given in Appendix A.) All input channels, output channels and 
devices defined in an application program are objects of the classes 
Ichannel, Ochannel and IOdeviee, respectively.
When for example, an application program defines an input channel 
aa:
From : Inputchannel [10] of letter; 
this is translated into the declaration:
From : Ichannel
and into the call:
INIT From (10, letter);
The declaration declares »From' to be an object of the class type Ichannel,
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and the INIT statement creates and customises From to be an Input channel 
of ten letters. Output channel and device declarations are translated In a 
similar way.
Fig ire 9e presents an outline of the Internal structure of 
Ichannel, Ochannel and IOdevlce. All three classes have parameters of type 
'Type', which means that a single class definition can be used for all 
types of channel and device; for example In the Ochannel class the 
'basetype' parameter defines the Input channel's type. This use of a 
'Type' parameter makes classes similar to generic packages In Ada (Wegner 
1980) .
Class Ichannel (size : Integer; basetype : Type);
Export RECEIVE, PENDING;
Procedure RECEIVE (Var message : basetype; Var status : IPCstatus;
timeout : Integer);
Begin
End;
Function PENDING : Boolean;
Begin
e
End;
Begin {main body}
End;
Class Ochannel (size : Integer; basetype : Type);
Export SEND;
Procedure SEND (message s basetype; Var status : IPCstatus;
timeout : Integer);
Begin
End;
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Begin {main body)
End;
Class IOdevice (device : IOdevice; basetype, argtype : Type);
Export DOIO;
Procedure DOIO (oper : IOoperatlon; Var data : basetype;
Var status : IOstatus; Var arg : argtype);
Begin
End;
Begin {main body)
End;
Figure 9e
Ichannel exports the two procedures, RECEIVE and PENDING, that can 
be applied to an input channel. Similarly Oehannel exports SEND and 
IOdevice exports DOIO. When SEND, RECEIVE, PENDING and DOIO are used in 
application programs, the first parameter specifies the name of the channel 
or device on Which they are applied. As these commands are exported by 
classes, commands of the form:
RECEIVE (from, ... )
are translated into:
From.RECEIVE ( ... )
The internal details of these three classes are developed in the 
rest of Section 9.3. A program listing of the three classes (written in a 
Pascal-like language) is given in Appendix C.
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A restarted process will have messages missing from some, if not 
all, of its input channels, and it may also have a single premature message 
within one of its output channels or within one of its receivers. To 
recover a restarted process the missing messages must be replaced and any 
late-SEND must be gagged. This recovery is performed on a per-channel 
basis by the input channel and the output channel at either end. There is 
no co-ordination between the recovery of different channels.
Recovery is performed when a channel is ’broken' by the crashing of 
the sender and/or the receiver process. Recovery is instigated by the 
input channel and performed by the output channel. Recovery is performed 
in this way no matter which end of the channel crashes. When a process 
crashes, each of its channels is recovered in this way thereby recovering 
the process as a whole.
The following four sub-sections describe the four stages of channel 
recovery.
9.3.1 Normal running
Ichannel is based around a kernel-supplied input pipe called 
Dataln, and Ochannel is based around a kernel-supplied output pipe called 
DataOut. An interprocess channel is created by linking Dataln and DataOut 
together at system initialisation time, and the interface to this pips is 
provided by the input channel and output channel class object at either 
end. The rest of Iehannel’s and Ochannel's attributes are concerned with 
the provision of process recovery after a crash.
A class object is part of its host process. When a process 
executes a secure point the private data of all of its objects are also 
backed up. Thus the information on which recovery is based survives the 
crash, and this information will be consistent with the rest of the 
restarted process's state as it was backed up at the same time.
165
Aa explained In Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2, the PENDING-related 
Inconsistencies are prevented by Implementing both PENDING and RECEIVE In a 
particular way and by extending the input channel to Include a single­
message buffer. This buffer is called 'Pstore', and the boolean 'Pflag' is 
used to indicate Whether it is full or not. Both Pstore and Pflag are 
declared within Ichannel.
When PENDING is called it checks whether there is a message in 
Pstore; if there is, PENDING returns true as there is a message in the 
input channel; if on the other hand Pstore is empty, PENDING attempts to 
input a message from Dataln using the procedure ‘Read’ with a zero timeout. 
Because of the zero timeout a message will only be input if it is already 
present in the pipe (Chapter 6, Section 6.3 discusses zero timeouts). If 
the Read succeeds, then the message is placed in Pstore, Pflag is set to 
true and PENDING returns true, but if Read fails, then Pflag is set to 
false and PENDING returns false. When RECEIVE is called it will return 
Pstore's contents if Pstore is full (and it will set Pflag to false), but 
if Pstore is empty, then a message is input normally using Read.
In Chapter 8, Section 8.1.2 we mentioned that when calculating 
Which messages survived a process's crash it is necessary to take into 
account the fact that PENDING actually inputs the message that it detects. 
RECEIVE and PENDING both use the procedure Read to input messages, and so 
When a process crashes it loses those messages that are buffered within its 
input pipes (the Dataln in each of its input channels) and the messages 
that it has Read in since its last secure point. Those messages that were 
Read in prior to the process's last secure point will survive.
All of the code at the input channel end for supporting channel 
recovery during normal running is contained in Read. The code in RECEIVE 
and PENDING is solely concerned with preventing the PENDING-related 
inconsistencies from arising.
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Returning to channel recovery, there are three activities performed 
during normal running in order to ensure recovery. These ares
1) secure point insertion;
2) message storage;
3) message tagging.
Secure pointing is provided by a class type called SPoint. Every 
application process has a single object of this class called SP. A listing 
of SPoint is included in Appendix C.
SP exports a procedure called 'Execute'. When Execute is called it 
uses the kernel procedure ksecurepoint to perform the secure point. The 
reason for embedding the call of ksecurepoint inside a class is that SP 
also performs important housekeeping operations, details of which are given 
later.
In order to ensure correct recovery, a secure point must be 
executed prior to every SEND, and so the Ochannel procedure SEND calls 
SP.Execute before attempting to actually send the message.
When a channel is broken messages may become missing. In order to 
replace these messages with copies of the originals it is necessary to 
store copies of the originals. This is done by the output channels 
themselves.
SEND uses ksend to output the message. If ksend is successful 
(status = succeeded) a copy of that message is placed onto the cyclic queue 
'RevyStore' by calling the procedure 'save'.
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It is necessary to limit RcvyStore's size. To do this the maximum 
number of messages that can possibly be replaced at recovery time must be 
limited. This in turn means that the number of messages that can be lost 
must be limited. RcvyStore's size can then be set to that limit.
The messages that are lost from a channel when its receiver crashes 
are those still in the input pipe and those that had been Read from it 
since the receiver's last secure point. The former is limited by the size 
of the input pipe which is defined by the class parameter 'size', and the 
latter is limited by the input channel executing a secure point after a 
certain number of successful Reads.
Every time a message is successfully input Read increments the 
Ichannel variable 'Rcount'. When Rcount becomes equal to the maximum 
'mRcount' a secure point is performed. The maximum number, mRcount, is 
arbitrarily set to the defined size of the channel which is the class 
parameter 'size'.
Thus the maximum number of messages that can be lost from a 
particular channel is 2»size, and so RcvyStore's size is E^size. There is 
no explicit flow control for placing messages into RcvyStore. If the 
message has been sent, then the space existed in the channel and so the 
copy can be stored without overwriting a message that might still be needed 
for recovery.
When a receiver crashes it is restarted with an empty input pipe 
and then the missing messages are replaced. The maximum number of messages 
that might have to be replaced is twice the size of the channel, and these 
would not all fit into the input pipe Dataln. So a further requirement is 
to ensure that all of the lost messages will fit into the input pipe.
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To do this, the size of the Input pipe Dataln is increased from 
'size' to 'extsize' which Is equal to the maximum number of messages that 
can be lost, i.e. 2*size. However, it is then necessary to ensure that 
this does not mean that the number of messages that can be lost is also 
increased. This is why, when kread (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3) returns a 
message from an input pipe, it does not release the space that the message 
occupied. Hence When a message is Read (using kread) another message 
cannot be sent to take its place, and so the maximum number of messages 
that can be lost remains 2*slze.
Once a secure point has been performed the Read messages cannot be 
lost and so the space they occupy can be freed. This is done by calling 
the kernel primitive kfree which releases the space occupied by messages 
that have been kread from that input pipe since the last kfree.
Any secure point, executed by any of a process's input channels and 
output channels, will prevent the loss of all of the messages Read from all 
of that process's input pipes since the last secure point. This fact is 
used to reduce the secure pointing frequency.
Every time a secure point is performed the secure pointing class 
SPoint increments the value of its variable 'tstamp'. The current value of 
tstamp can be read by using the function 'Timestamp' which is exported by 
SPoint. This value is used by an input channel to identify individual 
secure points so that it can detect whether a secure point has been 
executed since it last Read a message. Input channels remember the last 
secure point's identity (SP.Timestamp) in 'timestamp'.
When Read is called the value of timestamp is compared with that of 
SP.Timestamp. If a secure point has been performed then kfree is called, 
timestamp is updated and the count of the number of Reads performed is re­
set to 0.
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In order to perform channel recovery It Is necessary to calculate 
ttoich messages are missing and which, if any, is premature. To facilitate 
this every message sent down a channel is labelled with a sequence number.
Each output channel maintains a count ('Sseqno') of the number of 
times it has been called upon to send a message. Every time SEND is 
called, Sseqno is incremented and its new value is used to tag the message 
sent. Every time a message is Read by an input channel the sequence number 
is stripped off and stored in 'Rseqno'. The use to which Rseqno and Sseqno 
are put is described in Section 9.3.3.
A channel's type is defined by the parameter 'basetype' which is 
passed to both input and output channels. To accommodate the sequence 
number the output pipe's type is extended from 'basetype' to 'extbasetype'.
9.3.2 Error detection
Every input channel class and every output channel class has an 
exception handler called 'Recovery' which is associated with an event. 
When such an event occurs the exception is said to have been raised and the 
exception handler associated with it is executed. To execute an exception 
handler the host process's execution is interrupted and control is passed 
to the handler. When the handler has finished, control returns to the 
point at which the host process was interrupted. This is different from 
accepted practice (for example Cristian 1980, Goodenough 1975 and Harland 
1981) where the interrupted code is aborted, and is closer to the software 
interrupt used in interprocess communication in DSN (Rashid 1980). By 
using exceptions in this way recovery can be performed when necessary 
without disturbing the work being done by the processes.
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Damage assessment and recovery is performed by the output channel. 
To do this the output channel needs to know:
a) the sequence number of the last message to be sent successfully down 
that channel;
b) the sequence number of the last message to be delivered successfully to 
the input channel and to survive the crash;
and also it needs to know when to perform the recovery.
The output channel already knows the first of these values as it is 
stored in Sseqno. The second value, as well as the prompt, is supplied by 
the input channel at the other end of the channel.
When a channel breaks - due to the sender and/or the receiver being 
restarted - the input channel's exception handler is executed. Detecting 
the channel break and raising the exception is performed by the receiver's 
current host kernel. Details of how the kernel does this are given in 
Appendix B.
Iehannel's exception handler determines the sequence number of the 
last message to have been successfully sent down the channel and to have 
survived the possible restarting of the receiver. If the input pipe is not 
empty then this message is the most recently delivered message in the input 
pipe, and if the input pipe is empty then the message was the last one to 
be Read. The sequence number in the latter case is contained in Rseqno and 
in the former case the sequence number can be obtained using kpeeklast 
(defined in Chapter 6, Section 6.3). Kpeeklast is called with a zero 
timeout so that it will only succeed if a message is already present in the 
input pipe. If kpeeklast succeeds then the sequence number of the message 
returned is the required sequence number; if not then Rseqno is the 
required number.
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The Input channel and the output channel are linked by a second 
pipe which goes from the input channel where it is called 'RevyOut' to the 
output channel where it is called 'Rovyln'. The sequence number is sent 
by the input channel to the output channel down this pipe. However before 
the message can be sent the pipe must be reconnected.
A process's descriptor contains a table that defines for each of 
its output pipes the address of the recipient input pipe (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3). This address contains the number of the input pipe's host 
computer. After a crash this computer number will be incorrect: if the 
sender crashed then on restarting the location will be set to zero, and if 
the receiver crashed then the receiver will be on a different computer to 
that specified in the table. Hence after a crash output pipes must be 
reconnected so that the table contains the current computer locations of 
the recipient input pipes.
The output pipes that are used to carry recovery messages (RevyOut) 
are reconnected by the input channel to which they belong and the output 
pipes that are used to carry user messages (DataOut) are reconnected by the 
output channel to which they belong. There is no need to reconnect the 
input pipes as they will accept messages from any source.
When an input channel's exception handler 'Recovery' is called it 
is passed two parameters by the kernel. One ('rloc') is the input 
channel's current computer address, and the other ('sloe') is the current 
computer address of the output channel. Sloe is used by Recovery in a 
kconnect call in order to reconnect RevyOut. Rloc is sent, along with the 
sequence number, down the reconnected pipe to the output channel where it 
can be used to reconnect DataOut.
When the recovery message arrives in Revyln the input channel's 
exception is raised and its exception handler is executed. That is the end 
of the error detection phase.
When an exception is raised it will be handled as soon as the 
current instruction being performed by its host process has been completed. 
If the current instruction is a kernel procedure that involves a wait, for 
example ksend, kreceive, kdoio and kread, then the exception is handled in 
parallel to the wait, thereby preventing the exception handling being held 
up. The other kernel procedures such as kconnect and ksecurepoint are 
completed before the exception is handled: an important feature as 
ksecurepoint requires the process to be inactive.
In effect a process and its exception handlers are executed 
concurrently. This concurrency is virtual rather than actual as the 
process is suspended while its exceptions are performed. This virtual 
concurrency results in the need for critical regions (Brinch Hansen 1973) 
to be created in order to prevent the concurrent accessing of shared data. 
For example, in an input channel both Read and Recovery access Rseqno, and 
in an output channel both SEND and Recovery access Sseqno, ngagged and 
RcvyStore. To prevent concurrent access of this data these procedures and 
the exception handlers are executed with exception handling turned off 
(achieved using the 'With ExceptionsOff Do' construct). While a process is 
within one of its input channel's or output channel's critical regions, 
exceptions raised within that class object will not be handled until the 
process has left the critical region.
As an object's exception handler cannot be executed while control 
is within its critical region (within its handler or its procedure) it must 
be ensured that the process will eventually leave the critical region. To 
facilitate this any outstanding or future kernel call that involves a wait 
such as ksend will be aborted with a status of failed. However, an
exception raised within one object does not result in the aborting of 
kernel procedures executed by another object. For example, an exception 
raised in one input channel will not cause a kread issued by another input 
channel to be aborted.
If the kread at the heart of the RECEIVE or the ksend at the heart 
of the SEND is aborted in this way then the result is passed back to the 
process that called the RECEIVE or the SEND. Recovery and computer crashes 
are not totally invisible.
9.3.3 Damage assessment
Damage assessment is performed by the input channel's exception 
handler Recovery. Recovery uses the sequence number received from the 
input channel and the sequence number contained in Sseqno to decide whether 
messages need to be replaced, or whether SENDS need to be gagged, or 
whether no recovery is needed at all.
If the sequence number of the last message to arrive in the input 
channel is less than the sequence number of the last message to be sent 
then messages may be missing and so must be replaced. If the sequence 
number of the last message to arrive is greater (by one at the most) than 
the sequence number of the last message sent then the next SEND performed 
on this channel must be gagged. If the two numbers are the same then, with 
respect to this channel, the sender and receiver are consistent and no 
recovery is needed.
9.3.1* Recovery
All of the recovery is instigated by the output channel's exception 
handler Recovery. First it reconnects DataOut using kconnect specifying 
the computer number sent to it by the input channel. Then if message 
replacement is needed it calls the procedure Replace, or if gagging is 
needed it sets 'ngagged* to the number of SENDS that must be gagged (Sseqno
- rm.seqno, which will be either 1 or 0).
Replace takes copies of the missing messages from RcvyStore and 
re-sends them in the order in which they were originally sent. The copies 
are not removed from the queue as they may still be needed in case of 
future crashes.
Sseqno, the value used to tag messages, is incremented every time 
SEND is called. It is not a count of the number of messages sent. Thus 
sseq-rseq is the maximum, not the actual, number of messages that could be 
missing. So before re-sending a message, Replace checks that the message's 
sequence number is within the range of those missing.
A SEND can fail either because its timeout expired or because an 
exception was raised within its input channel. As explained in Section 
6.3, although a SEND has failed it is possible that the message has been 
delivered. Some of the messages that are missing after a crash may be the 
product of failed SENDS, but they will not be replaced as there will not be 
a copy of those messages in RcvyStore. This is an advantage as it removes 
these inconsistencies.
Recovery sets ngagged. The actual gagging is performed by SEND 
itself. When SEND is called it checks the value of ngagged to see if there 
are any SENDs still to be gagged. If there are it simply sets its status 
parameter to succeeded, decrements ngagged and returns; it does not ksend 
the message. The SEND has been gagged.
A SEND that returned a status of 'failed', but actually transmitted 
the message, may be gagged if that SEND was performed during the restarted 
process's interrupted-task and if the resultant message survived the crash. 
As a SEND is a time-dependent function its outcome will not affect correct 
recovery, and so it does not matter that the status returned by the SEND 
when it is re-executed is different to the status returned when it was
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first executed.
Gagging is only performed by restarted processes. If a process 
has not been restarted, recovery only consists of message replacement.
When a backup replicate Is activated all of its input channel 
exceptions are raised and will be handled before the restarted process 
starts to execute its normal code. Its output channel exceptions however 
will not be raised until the receivers send their recovery messages. 
Because of this delay it is possible that a SEND may be performed on a 
channel that has not yet been recovered. Such a SEND will fail because 
DataOut will not have been reconnected yet. Once that output channel's 
exception has been handled it may be necessary for the SEND to be gagged, 
but it would then be too late. To prevent this it is necessary to hold 
SENDs up until the output channels on which they operate are recovered. 
This is done using insecure variables.
An insecure variable is a boolean variable which has a defined 
default value to which it will revert after a crash. Every output channel 
has an insecure variable called WaitRcvy. WaitRcvy has a default value of 
true. When the class is created using INIT, WaitRcvy is set to false. 
After a crash all of the process's output channels' WaitRevys revert to 
true. When an output channel's exception handler has finished it sets 
WaitRevy to false. SENDs are delayed by the 'Waituntil' statement until 
WaitRcvy is false; thus a SEND performed before its output channel has been 
recovered is delayed until that channel has been recovered.
An insecure variable is stored as part of the process's process 
descriptor, but would not be backed up by a secure point. A backup 
replicate's insecure variables would be set to the default value.
176
9.3*5 Continued running
Continued running la the period from when a backup replicate is 
activated, up until all of its channels have been recovered, at which point 
the restarted process enters its normal running phase again.
During the continued running phase a restarted process will execute 
its code while at the same time being Interrupted by the performance of its 
exception handlers. This section describes the effects that performing 
recovery has on such a process. It also describes the effect that 
supporting recovery has on an unaffected process that is connected to one 
or more restarted processes. One of the aims of process survivability is 
that it should be invisible to the processes, and so this section is, in 
part, a review of how successfully this aim has been met.
An unaffected process continues to execute its code uninterrupted 
except for the execution of exception handlers. If the unaffected process 
performs a SEND, or if a SEND is outstanding on an unrecovered channel, 
then that SEND will fail because the pipe DataOut has been broken and has 
not yet been reconnected. The SEND is not delayed by the WaltUntil 
statement as the process has not been restarted.
If an unaffected process performs a RECEIVE on an unrecovered 
channel, then the RECEIVE will be aborted with a status of failed if that 
input channel's exception is raised even though messages are present in the 
input channel. If the RECEIVE is not interrupted then it will act as 
normal.
When a backup replicate is activated all of its input channel 
exceptions will be raised, and they will be handled before the restarted 
process starts to execute its code. Any RECEIVE will be issued on a 
recovered channel and so will not be aborted due to an exception being 
raised. However, the RECEIVE's timeout period may expire before the
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missing messages are replaced, and so a RECEIVE may fail when it would have 
succeeded had it not been for the crash.
SENDs issued by the restarted process on an unrecovered output 
channel will be delayed in til the channel has been recovered. As the 
Waituntil is outside the SEND's critical region, the SEND will not be 
aborted i*ien its output channel's exception is eventually raised.
While the restarted process is in the continued running phase it 
also performs the operations performed during normal running in support of 
process survivability.
Process survivability is not totally invisible. In unaffected 
processes, SENDs and RECEIVES fail that would otherwise have succeeded, and 
in restarted processes RECEIVES that would otherwise have succeeded may 
fail and SENDs may be delayed past their timeout period. When a RECEIVE or 
SEND fails due to an exception being raised the process will treat it as if 
the timeout had expired as the two causes are indistinguishable. The major 
problem is extending the time taken to perform a SEND beyond its timeout.
Computers will not crash very often, and so the interruptions 
caused by process survivability are comparatively minor, especially when 
compared with the advantages of process survivability.
9.U Process survivability and multiple crashes
One of the stated design aims of process survivability is that it 
should be able to restore consistency despite multiple simultaneous, or 
nearly simultaneous, computer crashes. The computers are physically 
dispersed so as to reduce the chances of simultaneous crashes, but the 
possibility cannot be ruled out and so process survivability must be able 
to cope with this eventuality.
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Process-sets are based on multiple backup replicates so that as 
long as the number of computers that crash Is less than the level of 
redundancy, processes are not lost. Also the two-stage protocol used to 
send secure point data to the backup replicates is designed to establish a 
common secure point in all the replicates despite multiple crashes.
This section shows that the process survivability level is able to 
restore the processes to consistent states despite multiple crashes.
Simultaneous crashes are defined on a per-channel basis to be the 
crash of two or more computers such that the sender or the receiver process 
crashes while the exceptions raised by a previous crash are still raised or 
being handled. If the crash occurs after the class's exception handler has 
finished then the crashes are separate crashes.
The implementation described in the previous section can handle 
separate crashes. The fact that a separate crash has occurred earlier does 
not affect the handling of a later crash. Message replacement does not 
remove the message copies from RcvyStore and so they can be used again, and 
a gagged SEND stores a copy of the gagged message in RcvyStore so that it 
can be replaced if necessary. The rest of this section concentrates on 
simultaneous crashes.
A kernel detects that a computer has crashed when that computer's 
heartbeat fails. Different computers' heartbeats are staggered, as they 
cannot use the network at the same time, and so even if two computers crash 
at exactly the same instant, a kernel will detect one crash before the 
other. Hence a sender and a receiver never crash together.
We look first at the effect of simultaneous crashes on input 
channel recovery actions. Every time the kernel detects that the 
receiver's primary replicate has crashed or that the sender's primary 
replicate has crashed then the exception is raised in the input channel.
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If the receiver has crashed then the exceptions will be raised in different 
generations of the input channel. Where an exception has been raised a 
number of times the different instances are handled in the order in which 
they were created.
When the sender or the receiver crashes the input channel may:
1) already have its exception raised due to a previous crash;
2) be handling its exception;
3) already have handled a previous instance of the exception but recovery 
has still not been performed by the output channel to which the recovery 
message was sent.
The following describes the effect that the receiver or the sender crashing 
has on the actions of an input channel in each of the above situations. A 
combination of these three situations may apply; for example, an input 
channel may be handling one instance of its exception with another instance 
of that exception outstanding. The effect that a crash has in such a 
situation will be the union of the effects arising from the individual 
situations as described below.
1) The exception is already raised
a) receiver crashes
All of the outstanding instances of the exception are lost in the 
crash and so will not be handled.
b) sender crashes
The outstanding instances of the exception will be handled in turn. 
These outstanding instances are the result of the sender crashing 
several times before and so the computer location of the sender 
specified in each exception instance will be out of date, and so the 
sending of the recovery message will foil.
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2) A previous Instance of the exception la belt« handled
a) receiver crashes
The exception handling is terminated by the crash, but the recovery 
message may have been successfully sent prior to the crash.
b) sender crashes
The recovery message may have been successfully delivered before the 
sender crashed. If not then sending the recovery message will fail.
3) After a previous Instance of the exception has been handled
No matter Aether the sender or the receiver crashed the crash 
has no effect on the results of the previous exception - the recovery 
message has been sent.
On restarting (if the receiver was hit) or on handling all 
outstanding exceptions (if the sender was hit) the input channel class will 
handle the exception raised because of the last crash, and the recovery 
message will be sent to the output channel.
In the above there are examples of instances of the exception being 
lost before a recovery message could be delivered to the output channel 
class, and so multiple crashes do not always result in multiple recovery 
messages being sent to the output channel • An output channel is not 
always made aware of multiple crashes.
Alternatively, there are situations where simultaneous crashes do 
result in multiple recovery messages being sent to the output channel. 
Each recovery message contains data that was up to date when the exception
was handled, and these messages will arrive in the order in which they were
sent. The following describes the effect that a crash and the arrival of
the resultant recovery message have on an output channel that is performing
recovery.
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In the following we describe the effect that a crash has on 
recovery, and argue that interrupting recovery in this way does not affect 
the output channel's ability to perform recovery correctly. We first 
describe the effect of the receiver crashing, and then the effect of the 
sender crashing.
1) Receiver crashes
If the recovery being performed is gagging then it will not be 
affected by the loss of the receiver as it does not involve DataOut. If 
the output channel is performing message replacement at the time of the 
receiver's crash (or if the receiver crashed before it started) then 
those messages sent by the procedure 'replace' before the crash will 
have been delivered, but any ksends performed after the crash will fail.
The recovery message that was generated due to the receiver's 
crash will arrive. As the receiver crashed the only recovery that could 
be needed is message replacement. Message replacement prior to the 
crash will not have affected the contents of RevyStore, and if a SEND 
had been gagged then a copy of that message will have been stored and so 
can be replaced.
2) Sender crashes
Any recovery that was being performed is ended by the crash and 
any outstanding exceptions will be lost. When the sender is restarted 
its recovery data will have been reset as well and so will not be left 
in an inconsistent state by the crash. The recovery message sent as a 
result of the sender crashing will arrive, and the output channel will 
handle the exception as normal.
In the above we have shown by case analysis that process 
survivability can restore the processes to consistent states despite 
multiple computer crashes, even if those crashes interrupt the recovery
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performed by the input channel's and output channel's exception handlers.
9.5 Reducing the number of secure points needed
The presence of time-dependent functions in PROSUR's P/L means that 
every SEND must be preceded by a secure point. Such a secure point 
frequency appears to be heavy (although it is the same as the checkpoint 
frequency in Tandem), and in this section we present a way of reducing it.
The major problem is that SEND itself is a time-dependent function 
and so there can never be more than one SEND per task. The reason that 
SEND is a time-dependent function is that it includes a timeout. If the 
timeout were removed then SEND would no longer be a time-dependent function 
and there could be several SENDs in a task, and hence there would be less 
secure points.
A particular job will often be performed by a group of processes 
working together on the same computer. This association of processes has 
been recognised and has been used explicitly to structure the organisation 
of the application level in a number of distributed systems (Liskov 1979, 
Kramer et al. 1982).
He propose that processes can be grouped together to form a 
module. All processes in a module are on the same computer. Processes 
within a module are connected by intra-module channels, and processes in 
different modules are connected by inter-module channels. Intra-module 
channels are also intra-computer, but inter-module channels can be either 
inter-computer or intra-computer.
The backup replicates of processes in the same module are located 
on the same computers and in the same order. This ensures that after a 
crash a module's processes are still on the same computer, and so intra­
module channels remain intra-computer despite crashes. Inter-module
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channels may alter between being inter-computer and intra-computer.
Transferring a message between computers may take a long time 
because the network may be busy and because delivering the message 
correctly could (in theory) take an infinite amount of time. To prevent 
this delay affecting a sender process's response time the SEND command has 
a timeout. If a message is being sent intra-computer then there is no such 
delay, and so there is no need for the timeout. By omitting timeouts and 
status parameters on intra-computer SENDs, those SENDs are no longer time- 
dependent SENDS.
We propose that all SENDs and RECEIVES on intra-module channels do 
not have timeout and status parameters. Hence these SENDs and RECEIVES are 
not time-dependent functions.
An intra-module SEND that succeeded during a process's 
interrupted-task will succeed when repeated, as there is no timeout to 
prevent it. An intra-module RECEIVE that was executed during an 
interrupted-task will succeed and input the same message, as (having no 
timeout) it will wait for the missing message to be replaced or for the 
repeated message to be sent by the intra-module SEND which will succeed as 
it has no timeout either.
Furthermore, intra-module SENDs and RECEIVES cannot fail due to an 
exception being raised. As intra-module channels are also intra-computer 
both sender and receiver will be restarted. The receiver's input channel 
exceptions will be handled before it starts to re-execute its interrupted- 
task, and so intra-module RECEIVES cannot be interrupted by an input 
channel exception being raised. The sender is restarted as well and any 
re-executed SEND will be delayed on its 'Waituntil' statement until after 
that output channel's exception has been handled and so the SEND will not 
be interrupted by that exception.
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Inter-module SENDs, Inter-module RECEIVES, DOIOs and PENDINGs are 
still time-dependent functions. Intra-module SENDS and RECEIVES are not 
time-dependent functions. All SENDs, whether Intra-module or Inter-module, 
must be separated from preceding time-dependent functions by a secure 
point. A task can now contain a number of intra-module SENDs, but still 
only only one inter-module SEND. As it is likely that the amount of 
intra-module comminlcation will be higher than the amount of inter-module 
commvnication, being able to have several intra-module SENDs in a task 
should result in a good reduction in the number of secure points.
In the simulation presented in the next chapter we compare the 
performance obtained using this module-based secure point insertion 
strategy with the performance obtained using the 'worst-case' policy where 
every SEND causes a secure point.
The loss of timeouts from intra-module SENDs and RECEIVES may be a 
problem as they are also a way of preventing a process from being held up 
by a sluggish sender or receiver. However, as a module is a single entity 
and would be coded as such, this problem may not arise. The simulation 
study should give an indication as to whether this sacrifice is worth the 
reduction in the number of secure points that are performed.
9.6 Summary
In this chapter we have shown how the prooess-set is implemented by 
the distributed kernel level, and how process recovery is performed by the 
input channels and the output channels. Furthermore it has been argued 
that process survivability can cope with multiple computer crashes.
Supporting process survivability requires a secure point to be 
executed prior to every SEND. He have presented an alternative to this, 
based on the adoption of modules, which should considerably reduce the 
number of secure points performed.
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The process survivability level has been presented in earlier 
chapters as providing both the process-set and process recovery. However, 
the former task is performed by the distributed kernel level. The process 
survivability level consists of the input channels and the output channels, 
and only implements process recovery, but it remains convenient to continue 
presenting process-sets as being one of the services that the process 
survivability level provides.
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10. A Simulation of Proceaa Survivability
10.0 Introduction
Process survivability Is practicable, but is it practical? In the 
previous chapters we have argued that process survivability will work, but 
we do not know whether the overheads incurred will prohibit its useful 
adoption. A discrete event simulation of PROSUR has been Implemented in 
order to investigate the effects of these overheads.
The simplification and generalisations which of necessity have been 
introduced into the simulation prevent the results of the simulation being 
used to determine finally and irrevocably the practicality of process 
survivability. Instead it is intended that the results will provide us 
with an Insight into the probable effects that the addition of process 
survivability would have on a distributed computer control system’s 
performance.
10.1 The aims of the simulation
In this simulation the useful work performed by an application 
process is measured by the number of seconds for which that process was 
actually being executed (CPU seconds) in a given period of real time. A 
distributed computer control system’s performance is then measured by the 
average of the amount of useful work performed by each of its application 
processes.
As response time is an important factor in real-time systems it 
would arguably have been more useful to have used the average response time 
of the application processes as a measure of the system’s performance. 
However, in order to measure this an actual application would have had to 
been simulated, and unfortunately despite an extensive literature survey 
and letter writing campaign we were unable to find any suitable details for
187
an existing system, and it was decided that it would be impractical in the 
time available to invent a realistic application. In the summary to this 
chapter, we attempt to draw conclusions about how the response time is 
affected.
A distributed computer control system will spend almost all of its 
entire working life in the 'normal running' state. The effect that process 
survivability has on a system's performance during normal running would to 
a great extent determine whether it could be usefully adopted or not. For 
certain applications a further important (if not critical) consideration 
would be the length of time that it takes the system to recover from a 
crash. However, important as the latter is, we have limited the simulation 
to the investigation of the effect that process survivability has on normal 
running performance in order to keep the simulation within manageable 
proportions.
To achieve our aim the following aspects of process survivability 
have been investigated:
a) In the previous chapter we described two secure point insertion 
strategies. One was worst case, requiring a secure point before every 
SEND. The other was an optimisation based on the use of modules within 
PROSUR's P/L which should lead to a reduction in the number of secure 
points and possibly to a reduction in the overheads as well. Both 
Insertion schemes are modelled and the comparison of the results will 
enable us to gauge the advantages that might result from adding modules 
to PROSUR's P/L and from the adoption of the optimised insertion 
strategy.
b) The level of redundancy will increase the amount of work involved in 
performing a secure point thus increasing the overheads. The way in 
which performance is affected by different levels of redundancy is
investigated.
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c) In both secure point insertion strategies it is the SENDS that determine 
the position of the secure points. An increase in the frequency with 
which the processes perform SENDs will increase the frequency of secure 
points and hence the overheads. The effects of varying the SEND 
frequency are investigated.
d) An accepted (if expensive) way of increasing a distributed computer 
control system's performance is to increase the number of computers. He 
investigate whether such an increase is maintained after the addition of 
process survivability, and vrtiether increasing the number of computers is 
a way of maintaining performance after the addition of process 
survivability.
The model of PROSUR that was simulated is described in the 
following two sections. The experiments performed and the results obtained 
are described in the last four sections of this chapter.
10.2 The simulated distributed computer control system
10.2.0 Introduction
To simulate PROSUR in full detail would be a prohibitively large 
task. Instead a simplified version of PROSUR has been modelled. This 
section describes this simplified version.
Process survivability overheads during normal running involve a 
large amount of network activity in order to send secure point data to the 
backup replicates* host kernels. The network is a shared resource and so 
an increase in its use will affect the whole of the control system. The 
simplification of PROSUR is achieved by concentrating on the network 
related parts, so that the network activity is modelled realistically, and 
by simplifying the rest.
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10.2.1 Hardware
The hardware configuration ia shown in Figure 10a. The computers 
are linked together by a Cambridge Ring (Wilkes and Wheeler 1979). The
Cambridge Ring was chosen because of familiarity with its operation. Each 
computer is interfaced to the ring by a locally designed access logic unit 
(Bennett and Singleton 1982). The access logic unit (ALU) is a 
microprocessor based unit that implements the basic block protocol (Johnson 
1980) thereby presenting the computer with a high level interface to the 
network.
Cambridge Ring
Figure 10a
An ALU receives messages from its computer that are to be sent over 
the network. These are placed in output queues, one for each possible 
destination computer. The ALU serves its output queues in round-robin 
order sending a message from each in turn. The message to be transmitted 
is placed into a basic block (with a 3 word overhead) and then sent to the 
destination computer's ALU. The speed with idlieh a basic block can be 
transmitted is a function of the ring's raw data rate and the number of 
network nodes.
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The Cambridge Ring's raw data rate is 10 megabits/sec. Packet 
overheads and sharing result in each ALU having a guaranteed point-to-point 
share at the physical level equal to 4/(n+1) megabits per second, where n 
is the number of ALUs (Bennett and Singleton 1982). Throughout the 
simulation we use a 16 bit word, and so this data rate is equal to
1/(4*(n+1)) mega words per second. However, the maximum data rate that can
be supported by an ALU is 50 FCwords per second, and so the guaranteed 
minimum data transfer rate between two ALUs at the physical level is:
1/(M(n+1)) Mwords per second, for n > 4 
and
50 Kwords per second, for n <= 4.
This data rate is a worst case minimum, as it is based on the
assumption that every ALU is using the network as much as possible. In 
'real life' some of the ALUs would not be using their full share, and this 
unused network capacity would be available to the other ALUs. However, in 
the interests of simplicity we have used this worst case figure as the
maximum rate at which data can be transferred between ALUs despite the 
inactivity of other ALUs.
An ALU can only receive one basic block at a time as on receiving a 
basic block's header it sets the source select register of the Cambridge 
Ring station to the sender's address (Johnson 1980). If an ALU cannot 
deliver a basic block because the receiver is already receiving a basic 
block from elsewhere, it waits for 16 cycles (where a cycle is the time it 
takes to send one word over the network) then tries again. If it still 
cannot deliver the block, it gives up trying to send that block, leaves the 
message on its output queue, and continues to handle its output queues 
normally. (16 was chosen as any lesser number resulted in the simulation 
overrunning the available runtime.)
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10.2.2 The application level
We first describe the model used to represent all processes, and 
then describe how the processes are configured to form the application 
level.
Processes are grouped Into modules. Although modules are not part 
of PROSUR they have been added in order to Investigate the module-based 
secure point insertion strategy.
Each process is modelled as a RECEIVE-work-SEND cycle. The work 
period, measured in CPU seconds, is generated by a Normal distribution with 
mean m, standard deviation 1 and a truncated range of 0 to 2#m. All 
processes have the same mean.
A RECEIVE is satisfied by a message from any of the calling 
process's input channels. This corresponds to the best case where a 
process never has to wait for a message from one channel when messages are 
outstanding on other channels. (Were the channels to be specified it would 
be possible for the simulated control system to deadlock.)
Before a message can be sent the output channel must be chosen. A 
module consists of processes that work together to provide a service. 
Hence it is envisaged that most message passing will be intra-module, and 
it was decided that 801 of all message passing is intra-module and only 20> 
inter-module. Having determined whether an inter-module or intra-module 
output channel is needed, the specific channel to be used is chosen by 
round-robin. The sender is suspended until the message is safely delivered 
into the receiver's input channel.
Messages do not have any contents but they do have a size. Based 
on the survey presented by Prince and Sloman (1981), it was decided that 
there would be two types of message: command (4 words long) and data (256 
words long), and the ratio of command messages to data messages would be
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Flow control on channels is only partly modelled. A receiver will 
be hung up if there are no outstanding messages in any of its input 
channels and will be activated upon the arrived of the first message in any 
input channel. There is no flow control on the SENDS; it is assumed that 
input channels never fill up. Timeouts on RECEIVES and SENDS are not 
modelled.
For our purposes a distributed computer control system 
configuration consists of C computers, each containing M modules of P 
processes each. Every process has R inter-module output channels and L 
intra-module output channels, where C, M, P, R and L are constants for a 
particular configuration.
Within a module the processes are ordered cyclically and a process 
with L intra-module output channels will be connected to the next L 
processes in the circle excluding itself. For example, Figure 10b shows 
the internal structure of a module where P equals five, and L equals two: 
the five processes (circles) are each connected by two intra-module output 
channels (directed lines) to the next two processes in the cycle.
Figure 10b
Every computer has M modules of P processes, and each process has R 
inter-module output channels. Inter-module output channels from the pth 
process of the mth module will be connected to the pth process of the mth 
module on R different computers. The computers are organised into a 
circle, and a computer with M#P#R remote channels will be connected to the 
next M#P#R computers in the circle, excluding Itself. For example, Figure 
10c shows how the inter-module output channels of the four processes on the 
left-most computer would be connected in the configuration C=J|, M=2, P=2 
and R=1.
Figure 10c
All inter-module channels have been configured so as to be inter­
computer. This means that the network loading is worst-case, as in a real 
system some inter-module channels would be intra-computer. One of our 
experiments is to investigate the advantages of reconfiguring the 
application level onto more computers, and by having all inter-module 
channels inter-computer we ensure that despite reconfiguration the network 
loading remains constant and so does not affect our results.
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10.2.3 Distributed kernel level
The processes are time sliced. Each computer has a ready-queue. 
When a process is ready to run it is placed at the end of its host's 
ready-queue. The process at the front of the ready-queue is run for a time 
slice of 25 milliseconds or until it suspends itself on a SEND or a 
RECEIVE. Paging is assumed but it is not modelled.
Messages are transferred in basic blocks. However it is not 
sufficient to rely on the basic block protocol as it does not provide 
recovery from errors during transmission. To be able to recover from such 
errors a higher level protocol incorporating a positive acknowledgement is 
needed. This protocol is provided by the kernel.
Although we assume that all transfers are error free it is 
necessary to model the higher level protocol so that the network load is 
realistic. When a message is sent, it is placed on the appropriate queue 
in the sender's ALU. When it is received by the receiver's ALU it is 
placed in the receiver's input channel and an acknowledgement message is 
placed on the appropriate output queue in the receiver's ALU. Once the 
acknowledgement has been delivered to the sender's ALU the SEND is 
completed and the sender is activated and placed on the ready-queue again.
10.2.4 Process survivability
Every process has the same level of redundancy. For the module- 
based secure point strategy to work the backup replicates of processes in 
the same module must be on the same computer (see Chapter 9, Section 9.5). 
This organisation is also used when simulating the worst-case secure point 
Insertion strategy even though it is not necessary. The backups are 
distributed fairly between the computers.
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Two secure point Insertion strategies are modelled: worst-case and 
module-based. When a process executes a secure point, secure point data is 
sent to each of the kernels hosting that process's backup replicates.
Secure point data consists of those pages (a one Kword page is 
used) of the process's data segment that have been altered since the last 
secure point plus a copy of the process's volatile environment. The number 
of pages that have been altered since the last secure point is defined by 
the bar chart shown in Figure 10d, where the number of pages is determined 
by the number of CPU seconds of work performed since the last secure point.
Kwords
Figure 10d
The bar chart is based on the 'working set' curve (Denning 1968, 
Splrn 1977). The working set curve, first described by Denning, describes 
how the number of different pages accessed in time t (known as the working 
set) increases with t. The values along the axes are 'guesstimates' as 
there are no suitable published figures on which to base them.
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The two stage protocol that is used to broadcast the secure point 
data is performed by the processes themselves. A basic block can contain 
at most 1K words and so secure point data is divided into a header block 
followed by a number of blocks each containing one page. The header 
contains the number of pages, details as to which pages they are, and a 
copy of the process's volatile environment. Each of these messages is sent 
separately by the user process.
Some of the secure point message's pages would be in main memory 
and others in secondary storage. The latter would increase the time it 
takes to perform a secure point. However as paging is not modelled, we 
assume that all pages are in main memory and hence ready to be sent 
immediately. For the same reason we do not model the updating of the 
backup replicates with the secure point data; in fact the backup replicates 
are not modelled at all.
10.3 Implementation details
The simulation is performed by two programs. One generates a 
PROSUR configuration, and the other is the discrete event simulator that 
simulates the running of that configuration.
The configuration generator takes as input the number of computers, 
the number of modules per computer, the number of processes per module, and 
the number of local and remote channels per process. It produces as output 
a file containing a description of the distributed computer control system.
The discrete event simulation takes as input the configuration, the 
level of redundancy, the type of process survivability to be modelled, and 
the mean work period of the processes.
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Both programs are written In Pascal. The configuration generator 
is 158 lines long, and the simulator itself is 1498 lines long. 
Development and testing was carried out on a local GEC 4190, and the final 
production runs were done on a University of Manchester Regional Computer 
Centre CDC 7600.
10.4 The experiments performed
In pursuit of the aims described in Section 10.1 a total of 138 
distinct experiments were performed.
The application level simulated consists of 48 modules each of six 
processes. Each process is connected by intra-module output channels to 
all of the other processes in its module, and each process also has one 
inter-module output channel connected in the manner described in sub­
section 10.2.2.
Four configurations were formed by partitioning the modules equally 
onto 4, 8, 16 and 32 computers. A common proposal for distributed computer 
systems is that there should be but one process per computer. In order to 
investigate any possible advantage this may ensure for process
survivability a fifth configuration consisting of 192 computers, each with 
one process, was also simulated. Each process in this configuration has 6 
inter-module output channels and no intra—module output channels.
192 processes divided into modules of 6 processes were chosen 
because they could be evenly partitioned a number of ways. Also, for 
larger numbers of processes the CDC Pascal ' s heap storage became exhausted•
Each configuration was simulated in a number of different 
situations, where a particular situation is defined by a combination of
three factors:
1) the level of redundancy;
2) the secure point insertion policy used;
3) the SEND frequency.
The combination of configuration and situation defines an experiment.
The 8, 16, 32 and 192 computer configurations were simulated with 
redundancy levels of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6. The 4-computer configuration was 
simulated with redmdancy levels of 1, 2 and 3*
Each configuration was simulated with every level of redundancy 
using both worst-case and module-based secure point insertion. Each 
configuration was also simulated without process survivability in order to 
measure its normal performance.
A process is modelled as a RECEIVE-work-SEND loop. The work period 
is Normally distributed with the same mean and standard deviation for all 
processes. To investigate the effects of increasing the SEND frequency the 
above experiments were repeated using a mean work period of 2, 0.5 and 0.12 
seconds and standard deviations of 1, 0.1 and 0.01 seconds respectively.
Each simulation run simulates 30 minutes of real time. All of the 
measurements are reinitialised after 10 minutes in order to prevent the 
final results from being affected by any abnormalities produced while the 
simulation settles down. The final results are produced by the last 20 
minutes.
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10.5 The résulta
10.5.0 Introduction
The result produced by each experiment is the average of the useful 
work performed by each process. The results of all the experiments are 
presented In three sets of graphs - Figures 10e, 10f and 10g. These 
results are also given in tabulated form In Appendix D. The accuracy of 
these results is discussed in Appendix E.
Each set consists of two graphs. One graph presents the
performance of all the configurations withi worst-case secure point
insertion and the other their performance with module-based secure point
insertion.
Each set of graphs plots the configurations' performances with
different mean work periods: Figure 10e - 2 seconds, Figure 10f - 0.5
seconds, and Figure 10g - 0.12 seconds.
A configuration’s performance in CPU seconds is plotted against its 
level of redundancy. The points for a particular configuration are Joined 
together to form a curve, and the curve is labelled with the number of 
computers in that configwation. The value plotted against a level of 
redmdancy of zero is the configuration's performance without process 
survivability. Performance is the average of the amount of useful work 
performed by each process, and the standard deviations of the processes' 
performances are shown to scale as vertical bars.
These results are described in the following sub-sections. All 
comments are made with the proviso that they are only relevant to the 
configurations and situations simulated. Speculation concerning the 
performance of configurations and situations not simulated is left until 
the conclusion. The possible causes of the results described in this 
section are discussed in the following section, Section 10.6.
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10.5.1 Increasing the level of redundancy
First we describe the effect that increasing the level of 
redundancy has on a configuration's performance.
Every line in every graph can be considered to be a special case of 
the curve shown in Figure 10h. We interpret this to mean that:
a) A control system has an initial resilience to the overheads of process 
survivability, and so for low levels of redundancy its performance is 
either not affected or it is only slightly reduced by the addition of 
process survivability.
b) Once a control system's resilience is overcome, its performance 
decreases sharply with further increases in the level of redundancy.
c) When a certain level of redundancy has been reached, further increases 
in the level of redundancy only result in progressively smaller 
reductions in performance. (This latter characteristic is an important 
factor in the determining of process survivability's practicality.)
[
performance
Figure 10h
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The shape of a specific configuration's performance curve is 
determined by the balance of its natural resilience and the process 
survivability overheads of its situation. Some lines are virtually 
horizontal, for example lines 4 and 8 in Figure 10e.2, implying that in 
those configurations their resilience is not overcome and so their 
performance is maintained for all of the levels of redundancy tested. On 
the other hand, in some of the configurations resilience is immediately 
overcome by the overheads, for example in Figure 10f.2 line 32 falls 
sharply for low levels of redundancy.
10.5.2 Varying the process to computer ratio
Five configurations were simulated in order to study the effect 
that varying the process to computer ratio has on performance. In the 
following we distinguish between the configurations by their process to 
computer ratios.
Each of the six graphs plots the performance of all five 
configurations over the full range of redundancy levels with the same SEND 
frequency and with the same secure point insertion strategy. As the other 
factors are constant it is concluded that the differences between the 
configurations' performances must be due to their different process to 
computer ratios.
The following comments are based primarily on Figures 10f and 10g. 
The effects described below are not as well developed in Figure 10e, 
although a tendency towards them can be seen.
All comparisons are made between lines within the same graph, and 
not between lines in different graphs.
208
When simulated without process survivability the performance 
figures are approximately inversely proportional to the configurations’ 
process to computer ratio. The lower the ratio the better the performance. 
Doubling the number of computers and halving the number of processes per 
computer results in an approximate doubling of the system's performance; a 
suitable return for the extra cost.
The most obvious difference between the configurations is that the 
smaller the process to computer ratio the greater the degradation in the 
configuration's performance. To be more precise, the smaller the ratio:
a) the lower the level of redundancy needed to overcome the configuration's 
resilience; and
b) the steeper the initial drop in performance.
As the lower ratio configurations are more adversely affected, 
their performances converge on the performances of the higher ratio 
configurations as the level of redundancy is increased. Convergence occurs 
in the order of increasing process to computer ratios; for example, in 
Fig ire 10f .2, line 192 converges on line 32, these two then converge on 
line 16, and finally all three converge on line 8. After two or more 
configurations' performances have converged, their performances remain 
converged for all further increases in the level of redundancy, and their 
performances slowly decline together as the level of redundancy increases.
Once converged, the performance of the lower ratio eonflguration(s) 
falls marginally below that of the higher ratio configuratlon(s). For 
example, in Figure 10f.2, when lines 192 and 32 converge on line 16, they 
both drop below line 16 and remain there. Performance is an average and so 
the performances of the individual processes in a configuration are spread 
over a range of values, with the size of the spread indicated by the 
standard deviation. A certain amount of overlapping between each
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configuration's range of performances can be seen, making such a ranking of 
configuration performances less distinct.
Despite the configurations' widely different initial performances, 
the convergence means that for the higher levels of redundancy a similar 
performance can be achieved with 8 computers as with 16, 32 or 192
computers, a considerable financial saving.
As observed in the previous sub-section, some configurations' 
performances are unaffected by the introduction of process survivability no 
matter what level of redundancy is used. These unaffected configurations 
are always those with the higher ratio of processes to computers.
10.5.3 The two secure point insertion policies
Two different secure point insertion strategies were simulated. 
The worst-case Insertion strategy results in a secure point being performed 
every SEND. The module-based insertion strategy results in less secure 
points but the secure point messages are larger.
Figure 101 consists of three graphs - 101.1, 101.2 and 101.3 - 
which were formed by superimposing the two graphs in each of Figures 10e, 
lOf and 10g respectively. (Standard deviations are omitted.) Each 
configuration's performance curve is labeled by the number of computers in 
that configuration, and by the letter 'w' or 'm' to indicate whether the 
performance curve was obtained using worst-case or module-based secure 
point insertion. These three graphs show the relative effects of the two 
insertion policies on each configuration for each SEND frequency simulated. 
Again comparisons are not made between performances obtained with different 
SEND frequencies.
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For some configurations with certain SEND frequencies there are 
either minimal differences in the performances obtained or no differences 
at all and these are omitted from the graphs in Figure 10i. The 192-
computer configuration has one process per computer and so all SENDS are
remote which results in both policies inserting a secure point prior to
every SEND. There are also cases where neither insertion policy results in 
overheads sufficient to affect the performance; for example, the «-computer 
configuration with a SEND frequency of 2 seconds and 0.5 seconds.
All further comments apply to those cases where there is a 
difference in performance between the two strategies.
Where performance is affected by process survivability a higher 
performance is maintained with the module-based insertion strategy. When 
worst-case insertion is used resilience is overcome by a lower level of
redundancy and the fall in performance after that is steeper. The 
convergence of the performances of different configurations also occurs at 
a lower level of redundancy with worst-ease insertion.
The three graphs in Figure 10J show the increases in a 
configuration's performance that are achieved by using module-based 
Insertion rather than worst-case insertion. Again those configurations 
that do not exhibit a difference are omitted.
The performance Increase obtained with module—based insertion first 
increases along with the level of redundancy, peaks, and then as the level 
of redundancy increases further it falls. It appears that with a 
sufficiently high level of redundancy all advantage would be lost.
21«
For some configurations with certain SEND frequencies there are 
either minimal differences in the performances obtained or no differences 
at all and these are omitted from the graphs in Figure 101. The 192-
computer configuration has one process per computer and so all SENDS are
remote which results In both policies Inserting a secure point prior to
every SEND. There are also cases where neither insertion policy results in 
overheads sufficient to affect the performance; for example, the 4-eomputer 
configuration with a SEND frequency of 2 seconds and 0.5 seconds.
All further comments apply to those cases where there is a 
difference in performance between the two strategies.
Where performance is affected by process survivability a higher 
performance is maintained with the module-based insertion strategy. When 
worst-case insertion is used resilience is overcome by a lower level of
redundancy and the fall in performance after that is steeper. The 
convergence of the performances of different configurations also occurs at 
a lower level of redundancy with worst-case insertion.
The three graphs in Figure 10 J show the increases in a 
configuration's performance that are achieved by using module-based 
insertion rather than worst-case insertion. Again those configurations 
that do not exhibit a difference are omitted.
The performance increase obtained with module-based insertion first 
increases along with the level of redundancy, peaks, and then as the level 
of redundancy increases further it falls. It appears that with a 
sufficiently high level of redundancy all advantage would be lost.
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Figure 10J
Because of the convergence described In the previous sub-section 
which occurs with both insertion policies, the increase in performance 
obtained in each configuration is virtually the same for high levels of 
redundancy. However, if the extra performance is considered as a
percentage of the configuration's performance without process 
survivability, then it can be seen that the greater advantage is obtained 
in the highest ratio configuration; viewed this way the performance 
advantage decreases along with the process to computer ratios.
These observations imply that the overheads are higher with worst- 
ease insertion, as was expected. The transmission of smaller secure point 
messages more frequently results in a higher overhead than does sending 
larger secure point messages less frequently.
10.5.4 Increasing the SEND frequency
We now look at how a configuration's performance varies as its SEND 
frequency is increased.
Prior to the addition of process survivability a configuration's 
performance is approximately the same for all three SEND frequencies. Once 
process survivability is added a better performance is obtained (for all 
levels of redundancy) with a 2 second mean work period than with a 0.5 
second mean, and both are better than that obtained with a 0.12 second 
mean. This is true for both secure point insertion strategies. The 
smaller the mean the worse the performance.
As the mean work period decreases, the configuration's resilience 
is overcome by lower levels of redundancy, and the initial fall in 
performance is sharper. Convergence of the different configurations' 
performances occurs at a lower level of redundancy.
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These results Imply that overheads are greater with the faster 
frequencies. More frequent SENDs result In more frequent secure points 
which, although the secure point messages will be smaller, result In 
greater overheads.
10.6 The causes of the effects described
10.6.0 Introduction
In this section we present possible explanations for the effects 
that were described In the previous section.
10.6.1 Increasing the level of redundancy
In Section 10.5.1 we presented Figure 10h as being the general 
shape of a configuration's performance curve as redundancy increases. In 
this sub-section we explain what makes the curve that shape, and why all 
the performance curves In Figures 10e, 10f and 10g, even the horizontal 
ones, are special cases of this curve.
In order to Illustrate our explanation we look at all five 
configurations when operating with worst-case secure point Insertion and a 
mean work period of 0.5 seconds. The performance figures for these 
configurations when operating in these situations are presented In Figure 
10f.2. (Any of the other combinations of insertion policy and mean work 
periods could have been used.)
All of the processes execute a RECEIVE-work —SEND cycle, where the 
SEND may be preceded by a secure point. The more of these cycles that a 
process performs the more work It performs.
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The average time that it takes a process to perform a RECEIVE in 
each of these configurations under these conditions is shown in Figure 10k. 
Similarly, the average time to perform a secure point and the average delay 
in performing a SEND are presented in Figures 101 and 10m respectively. 
The lines are labelled by the number of computers in each configuration. 
The tables for these graphs are in Appendix F. Standard deviations are 
omitted from the graphs but are included in the tables.
As the level of redundancy is Increased the time it takes to 
perform a secure point increases because the secure point data has to be 
sent to more backup replicates. In Figure 101 this increase can be seen to 
be virtually linear. The extra network activity caused by secure pointing 
in turn causes the delay on the SENDs to increase. As the secure point 
time increases the number of cycles performed, and hence the number of 
SENDs performed, decreases. As the RECEIVE phase is terminated by the 
arrival of a message, the Increased scarcity of messages increases the time 
it takes to perform a RECEIVE. The time it takes to execute a secure point 
plus the extra delays incurred in a SEND and a RECEIVE are the performance 
overheads of process survivability.
The increase in the time it takes to perform a SEND and a RECEIVE 
and a secure point is approximately linear (although the SEND delay figures 
are not linear they are too small to affect the overall linearity caused by 
the secure point and the RECEIVE). Hence the time it takes to execute a 
RECEIVE-work-SEND cycle also increases linearly, which results in the 
number of cycles that can be performed in a given time decreasing 
geometrically. He alústrate this last point in Figure 10n where we plot 
the graph y » 10/x.
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y=10/x
Figure 10n
10
We believe that the plunge and then the levelling-off of the 
performance curve shown in Figure 10h is due to the nearly linear increase 
In the time it takes to perform a secure point and a SEND and a RECEIVE.
We turn now to the cause of the initial resilience that a 
configuration's performance has to the process survivability overheads, and 
answer the question of why the curve in Figure 10h is initially horizontal.
Processes on the same computer are time shared. Those processes 
that are executing the work phase of a RECEIVE-work-SEND cycle are 
'contained' in the computer's ready-queue. The more processes there are in 
a computer's ready-queue the longer it will take those processes to 
complete their work phases.
222
We believe that a configuration's initial resilience is due to a 
combination of two factors:
1) While the number of processes in the ready-queue is high, and the 
process survivability overheads are low, the predominant factor in 
determining a process's performance will be the time that it takes the 
process to perform its work phases. As the process survivability 
overheads Increase, the ready-queue length will decrease and the 
predominant factor will become the time it takes to perform the SENDS, 
RECEIVES and secure points, and performance will fall.
2) As the process survivability overheads increase the number of processes 
that are executable at the same time decreases and so does the number of 
processes on the ready-queue. This reduction means that processes can 
perform their work phases faster, which partly compensates for the 
increase in the time spent RECEIVEing, secure pointing and SENDing.
Hence, a configuration's performance is limited for small levels of 
redundancy by the length of its ready-queue, and then for the higher levels 
of redundancy by the process survivability overheads. As the process
survivability overheads increase the ready-queues' sizes decrease, and
initially it is possible for this to compensate for the increased process 
survivability overheads, thereby maintaining the processes' cycle speed and
performance. Once the process survivability overheads have reached a
certain level (and this varies between configurations and situations) the 
reduction in ready-queue sizes no longer compensates for the increased 
overheads and so performance falls. The rate at rfiich performance falls is 
still alleviated by the shorter ready-queues.
Not all the curves in Figures 10e, 10f and 10g are the same shape 
as the general curve shown in Figure lOh. This is due to the different 
balances of ready-queue length and process survivability overheads in the
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different configurations and situations.
It was noted in Section 10.5.1 that those configurations with a 
higher process to computer ratio have the higher resilience to the 
overheads of process survivability. In fact, in the case of the 4-computer 
configuration its performance curves are all basically horizontal. This 
resilience is due to these configurations having the longer ready-queues. 
Those configwations with a lower ratio of processes to computers, such as 
the 32-computer configuration, have shorter ready-queues and so the ready- 
queue length does not dominate the process survivability overheads to the 
same extent; hence the lower-ratio configurations have a lower resilience.
Prior to performing the simulation it was expected that the network 
would be the bottle neck and that system performance would be limited by 
the need to share the network. As we have explained above, performance is 
limited by other factors, and not by the network. As an example, Figure 
10o presents the ALU performance for all five configurations, again 
operating wider worst-case secure point insertion and with a mean work 
period of 0.5 seconds. (These results are also presented in tabular form 
in Appendix G.) ALU performance is the average number of seconds worked by 
each ALU presented as a percentage of the 20 minutes simulated.
In general, ALU performance increases linearly for the lower levels 
of redundancy and then levels off over the higher levels of redundancy. 
The level of redundance at irtiich ALU performance levels off varies between 
the configurations and in the 4-computer configuration it does not occur at 
all.
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Figure 10o
Were the network to be the dominant factor we would expect all of 
the curves to approach 100J, and not level off below that. Also, referring 
back to Figu-e 101, if the network were the limiting factor we would not 
expect the secure point times to increase linearly; neither would we expect 
the SEND delays, shown in Figure 10m, to level off as they do. We believe 
that the levelling off in ALU performance is due to a reduction in the 
demands made on the ALUs by the processes as it corresponds to the 
levelling off in the configurations' performance curves as can be seen in 
Figire 10f.2.
10.6.2 Varying the process to computer ratio
In this sub-section we explain why the performances of the 
configurations converge. To illustrate our discussion we use the 16- 
computer and the 32-computer configurations again running with worst-ease 
secure point insertion and a mean work period of 0.5 seconds.
As can be seen in Figure 10f.2 the performance curves of the 16- 
computer and the 32-computer configurations converge for levels of 
redundancy of two and greater. The table in Figure 10p presents the 
average time spent in each RECEIVE—work—SEND cycle performing the RECEIVE, 
the SEND and the secure point.
Prior to a redundancy level of two the overheads are less in the 
32-computer configuration. From a redundancy level of two onwards the 
overheads in the 32-computer configuration are worse, although the 
difference remains constant as the level of redundancy increases.
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configuration
16 32
0 3.07 1.63
1 3.77 3.53
level 2 6.24 7.29
of
redundancy 3 9.65 10.88
4 13.02 14.24
6 19.44 20.78
Figure 10p
Despite the convergence in the process survivability overheads the 
32-eomputer configuration should still have a better performance as there 
are less processes per computer, but as we can see in Figure 10f.2 this is 
not the case. The ready-queues in the 16-computer configuration will 
decrease in length as the reduidancy level increases and at a certain 
level, two in this case, the length of its ready-queues will almost be the 
same length as in the 32-computer configuration and the processes will be 
able to execute their work phases as fast. For a redundancy level of 2 and 
greater, the length of the ready-queue in both configurations will be about 
the same size.
By halving the queue length and doubling the time it takes to send 
a basic block, the time it takes from request to completion to transmit a 
message, or to send secure point data, will remain about the same. This is 
why the process survivability overheads (which are predominantly made up of 
network utilisation) for the two configurations presented in Figure 10p are 
almost the same.
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As we have explained before, the ALUs and the network are under 
utilised. Were this not the case, then the above would probably not be 
true.
10.6.3 Insertion policies and SEND frequencies
It was expected that worst-ease secure point insertion would have a 
worse effect on the configurations' performances than module-based 
insertion would, and the results presented earlier support this assumption.
Figire 10q shows the average of the total time spent performing 
secure points by each process in the 16-computer configuration, operating 
with a mean work period of 0.5 seconds and with both secure point insertion 
policies. It can be seen that for all levels of redundancy a process will 
spend less time secure pointing with module-based insertion than with 
worst-case insertion.
worst-case module-bas
1 152.10 59.10
2 425.96 154.32
level
290.38of 3 565.91
redundancy
389.404 624.82
6 675.02 
Figure 10q
482.16
Similarly, it was expected that increasing the SEND frequency would 
Increase the number of secure points and decrease performance. That the 
performance is decreased has already been shown. Again using the 16- 
computer configuration operating with worst-case insertion, we ohow in 
Figire lOr that the total time spent by each process in secure pointing 
does increase as the SEND frequency increases.
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Mean work period
2 0.5 0.12
1 54.90 152.10 476.93
2 126.25 425.96 642.96
level
of 3 238.02 565.91 683.84
redundancy
4 382.15 624.82 697.33
6 526.99 675.02 721.19
Figure 10r
Worst-case insertion results in secure points being executed more 
often, and increasing the SEND frequency also increases the secure pointing 
frequency. These results are consistent with the graph, presented in 
Figure 10d, that defines the size of the secure point data, as there it can 
be seen that the higher the frequency of secure pointing the more data that 
must be transferred, as increasing the time since the last secure point 
does not Increase the size of the secure point data proportionally.
10.7 Sunn ary
Our experiments indicate that a high ratio of processes to 
computers is more practical for high levels of redundancy than a low ratio. 
For high levels of redundancy a comparable performance can be achieved with 
an 8-computer configiration as with 16, 32 or 192 computer configurations - 
a considerable financial saving.
The maximum level of redundancy that can be achieved in a 
distributed computer control system is limited by the number of computers. 
Because of this the larger computer configuration, although financially 
wasteful, may still be adopted in order to achieve the high levels of
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redwdancy required.
The attainment of high levels of redwdancy is facilitated by the 
levelling off of performances for high levels of redwdancy. If, for 
example, the performance obtained with a level of redwdancy of six is 
acceptable, then the performance obtained with a level of eight is also 
likely to be acceptable.
Unfortunately if performance falls below an acceptable level then 
there is no way of improving it other than by adopting module-based secure 
point insertion. It was hoped that increasing the number of computers 
would increase the performance, but convergence prevents this.
The adoption of modules into PROSUR's P/L and the use of module- 
based secure point insertion leads to an improved performance over all 
levels of redwdancy. The performance improvement is more significant in 
the higher ratio configurations trtiere it forms a higher percentage of the 
performance that can be obtained without process survivability. As the 
level of redwdancy is increased this advantage is reduced and it is 
possible that it might become negligible for very high levels of 
redwdancy.
As expected the process survivability overheads Increase as the 
SEND frequency increases. This may inhibit the adoption of process 
survivability for applications that involve a high frequency of message 
passing.
Response time in a real time system is a very Important 
characteristic. Unfortwately it was not possible to measure response time 
directly. However, it is possible to hazard a guess as to how response 
time might be affected.
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The most primitive response to a request is the RECEIVE-work-SEND 
cycle executed by every process. More complex requests would involve the 
server process issuing requests of its own to other processes. Hence, the 
increase in the time it takes to perform a RECEIVE-work-SEND cycle is a 
rough indication of the way that response time would be affected.
Referring back to the arguments presented in Section 10.6.1, the 
time it takes to perform the RECEIVE, SEND and secure point part of the 
cycle will increase linearly with the increase in redundancy. The time 
taken to perform the work phase of the cycle will depend on the size of the 
ready-queues and these will decrease as the time it takes to perform the 
rest of the cycle increases.
He believe that vrtiile performance remains unaffected by process 
survivability the response time will also be unaffected. Once the 
performance starts to fall, response time will increase linearly. As the 
ready-queues get smaller, there may be a slight decrease in the rate of 
increase but nothing as drastic as the levelling off that can be seen in 
the performance curves.
It was found that, contrary to expectations, configuration 
performance was not limited by the network. However, were the number of 
application processes to be increased, then the extra load on the network 
might result in the network becoming the limiting factor, and all of the 
above conclusions might be nullified.
Whether or not a particular performance or a particular response 
time is acceptable depends on the particular application involved. The 
most encouraging result is the levelling off of performance as the level of 
redundancy increases, rather than a steady fall. Unfortunately, this 
advantage may be nullified by the linear, or near linear, increase in 
response time as redundancy increases.
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11. Conclusion
11.1 The aim of process survivability
Possibly the greatest advantage that a distributed computer control 
system has over a centralised system Is that the failure of one or more of 
Its constituent computers does not prevent the other computers from 
operating normally. This advantage can be further enhanced by basing the 
distributed computer control system around a local area network so that the 
computers can be physically dispersed over a large area thereby limiting 
the damage that could be caused by a major catastrophe such as a fire. 
Unfortunately the loss of the executive and application software that was 
hosted by a crashed computer will prevent the surviving part of the control 
system from fulfilling its role. Although after a crash the majority of 
the distributed computer control system's processing power is still 
available the control system will have been crippled by the loss of vital 
software components.
Whereas it is possible to design the executive software of a 
distributed computer control system so that the loss of one of its 
constituent kernels will not prevent the others from functioning normally, 
it is not possible to do this for the application software. Process 
survivability was conceived as a way of preventing application processes 
from being lost in a computer crash.
Process survivability is a way of making the application level of a 
distributed computer control system 'n out of m' crash tolerant: the 
computer control system is able to tolerate the crashing of n out of its m 
computers. Process survivability enhances a distributed computer control 
system's natural high availability by making it invulnerable to computer 
crashes.
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11.2 A review of the work presented In this thesis
In this thesis we have established the need for process 
survivability in a distributed computer control system and we have 
Identified a number of applications that could beneficially be based on 
such a control system. Previous work in this field has been described and 
we have related process survivability to this work.
We have described PROSUR the distributed computer control system 
that we specially designed in order to have an environment in tdiich to 
design and develop process survivability.
The major part of this thesis is concerned with the implementation 
of process survivability in PROSUR. We have described how process-sets are 
implemented by the distributed kernel level, and how the process 
survivability level recovers the restarted application processes to a 
consistent state after a crash.
We believe, and we hope that it has been shown, that process 
survivability is practicable and that it could be implemented. However, 
the factor that would decide whether process survivability could be adopted 
or not, is the way in which the distributed computer control system's 
performance is affected by the overheads resultant from process 
survivability. A simulation study was performed to investigate this and 
the results of this study have been presented and some conclusions drawn.
11.3 An appraisal of process survivability
In Chapter 5 we specified that process survivability should ensure 
that all application processes survive multiple computer crashes (up to the 
limit of the processes' redundancy) no matter when these crashes occur, and 
that the provision of process survivability should be transparent to the 
application programmer. Furthermore, it was specified that each process
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should have only a single outstanding recovery point and that processes 
should be recovered Independently of each other, thereby avoiding the 
domino effect. He have been successful in meeting all of these 
requirements.
Another aim specified in Chapter 5 was to attempt to limit the 
overheads Imposed on the control system as a result of supporting process 
survivability. Unfortunately, because of the presence of time-dependent 
functions in PROSUR's P/L it is necessary to perform a secure point prior 
to every SEND. This seems to be a very high rate, although it is the same 
as that found in Tandem. A way of reducing the secure point rate was 
however described, and others no doubt could be found.
The simulation study has not provided us with a categorical answer 
to the question of whether process survivability is practical or not, but 
then, it was not intended to. Instead it has provided us with a number of 
interesting indications as to process survivability's practicality over a 
range of different situations. Without repeating the summary of the 
previous chapter we would like to reiterate the major conclusion that we 
have drawn.
Process survivability is better suited to distributed computer 
control systems that have a high ratio of processes to computers. The 
performance obtained in these configurations is less affected by process 
survivability, and for high levels of redundancy the performance of these 
configurations is better than that of those configurations with a lower 
ratio of processes to computers. Even then, process survivability with 
high levels of redundancy may be precluded because of its effect on 
response time, which appears to increase linearly with increases in 
redundancy.
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A further point to be made is that process survivability was not 
designed to cope with process death, and in order to prevent
inconsistencies arising due to process death all processes have the same
level of redundancy, and recovery is only guaranteed for as long as the
number of computer crashes is within that level of redundancy. If process 
survivability were to be enhanced so that it could cope with process death, 
then each process could have its own level of redundancy based on its 
importance, and this should reduce the overheads. In Appendix H we briefly 
describe the inconsistencies that can arise after a process dies and we 
explain the potential set of circumstances that causes them to arise.
11.it Future development
We believe that process survivability as it stands is a sound basis 
on which to develop a crash tolerant distributed computer control system. 
Rather than develop the combination of PROSUR and process survivability any 
further, we believe that it would be more profitable to add process 
survivability to an established distributed computer control system, 
perferably one with a definite application, as this would allow
concentration on and direction of process survivability's future
development.
Although process survivabiltiy was developed specifically for 
PROSUR this does not preclude its inclusion in other distributed computer 
control systems. Process survivability has been designed to be transparent 
to the application prograsimer. This transparency means that process 
survivability could be added to an existing distributed computer control 
system without having to rewrite application programs and re-train 
application programmers. Re-working would be limited to the distributed 
kernel level and to the hardware level so that they provide the support 
needed by the process survivability level. Although process survivability 
has been designed for a distributed programming language based on
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asynchronous message passing we cannot see any reason why it could not be 
adapted to cope with any of the other Interprocess communication 
mechanisms.
If process survivability is to be exploited to its full potential 
Its future must be In this direction: It must be developed with a 
particular application in mind.
Appendix A. Clase Conatruct
The class construct described below is based on those proposed by 
Wirth (1978) and Brinch Hansen (1977), and the terminology used to describe 
them is taken from Dahl and Hoare 1972.
A class type defines an abstract data type by grouping together a 
complex data structure and the procedures that manipulate that data 
structure. An instance of a class type is called an object.
The syntax of a class type is shown in Figure A.a. A class type 
consists of a class heading, input divisions, export divisions, 
declarations and main body. The variables and procedures declared within a 
class are its attributes. The import and export divisions define the 
interface between the class and the rest of the program.
CLASS— <identifier>— «parameter list>;  ------------ — \.
I------------------------------------------------------------------------------- * ----------------- <
-^-IMPORT FROM «class identifier) «import list>;-><
-^-EXPORT «export list);--------------- >--------- '
-^•«declarations) «main body).
Figure A.a
The formal parameters in the class heading enable an object to be 
tailored to a specific task when it is created. The class's main body 
contains the code to initialise the object's data structure. To create an 
object the program executes the command:
»IT «objectname) ( «actual parameters) ) 
where «objectname) has been deolared to be an instance of some class type.
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When INIT la called the object la created according to the parameter'a 
apeelflcatlon and the claaa'a main body la executed to lnitlaliae the 
object'a data atructure. Once an object haa been created lta data atructure 
exlata forever, and the data atrueture'a valuea are maintained even when 
control la not within the claaa'a code.
The Export diviaion apecifiea thoae procedurea declared within the 
claaa that can be uaed by the aurrounding program and by other claaaea. 
Only thoae procedurea that are explicitly exported by a claaa can be 
acceaaed. The other proeedurea and the data atructure declared within a 
claaa are private.
The Import diviaiona apeclfy thoae procedurea that are uaed by the 
claas and which are defined outaide of it. Theae procedurea can come from 
other claaaea and from the main program ltaelf. Each source has a separate 
Import statement.
The main program Implicitly Imports all procedures exported by its 
classes. Any procedure declared globally in the program la Implicitly 
exported to Its classes and implicitly imported by its classes.
To use a procedure exported by an object the procedure's name is 
preceded by the name of the object (if any), for example:
To.Send ( .... )
would call the procedure 'Send' imported from an object called 'To'.
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Appendix B. Exception Raising
In order to support exception raising each kernel maintains a 
number of tables and linked lists. Figure B.a illustrates these tables and 
lists for a particular kernel.
Computer
number
input
pipe
number
2n
Figure B.a
The first of these tables, Table 2 in Figure B.a, is part of every 
primary replicate's and every backup replicate's process descriptor. This 
table defines for each of the replicate's input pipes whether that pipe is 
used to carry user messages (in irtiioh case it is a Data In) or recovery 
messages (in which case it is a Revyln). The table also contains, for each
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input pipe that carries user messages, a list of the computer addresses of 
the replicates of the sender process that is linked to that input pipe. 
These lists are maintained in the order in which the sender’s replicates 
will be activated. There is no such list for input pipes carrying recovery 
messages.
Our example shows a particular replicate's table. The sender 
linked to this particular replicate by input pipe number 1 has replicates 
on computers 1, 4, 2 and others. The computer address of the sender’s 
current primary replicate is the first number in the list - 1.
The second table, Table 1 in Figure B.a, links together all of the 
list elements for a particular computer; there is only one of these tables 
per computer. The final piece of information needed by a kernel is its 
host computer's address.
All of the information needed to fill these tables is provided by 
the system manager at system initialisation time.
Every time a kernel places a message into an input pipe it 
determines whether that input pipe carries recovery messages or user 
messages. If the former is true then that pipe must be a Revyln in an 
Oehannel class and so that class's exception is raised.
When the kernel detects the crash of a computer it uses its Table 1 
to remove that computer's address elements from the input pipe's lists. If 
an element is removed and it is at the front of the list, and if the 
replicate to which the input pipe belongs is a primary replicate, then an 
exception is raised in the input channel class that contains that input 
pipe.
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In our example Table 2 belongs to a primary replicate. If computer 
1 crashes then the exception In the Input channel class to which input pipe 
number 1 belongs will be raised. The kernel will pass to the exception 
handler the receiver's current computer address (4) and the new computer 
address of the sender - 4.
When a backup replicate is activated all of its input channel 
exceptions are raised because all of its input channels have broken. Each 
exception handler is passed the address of the backup replicate's host 
computer and the address of that channel's sender (the first entry in that 
class's input pipe's list). If in our example Table 2 were to belong to a 
backup replicate that is activated, then the values 4 and 1 would be passed 
to the exception handler of the input channel class that hosts input pipe 
1.
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In our example Table 2 belongs to a primary replicate. If computer 
1 crashes then the exception In the Input channel class to which Input pipe 
number 1 belongs will be raised. The kernel will pass to the exception 
handler the receiver's current computer address (4) and the new computer 
address of the sender - 4.
When a backup replicate Is activated all of Its input channel 
exceptions are raised because all of its input channels have broken. Each 
exception handler is passed the address of the backup replicate's host 
computer and the address of that channel's sender (the first entry in that 
class's input pipe's list). If in our example Table 2 were to belong to a 
backup replicate that is activated, then the values 4 and 1 would be passed 
to the exception handler of the input channel class that hosts input pipe 
1 .
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Appendix C. Class Code
* The Input Channel Class
Class Iehannel (size : Integer; basetype : Type);
Import From SP
Timestamp, Execute;
Export
RECEIVE, PENDING;
Const 
extsize 
mRcount
s size • 2; 
= size;
Type
extbasetype = Record
seqno : Integer; 
data : basetype; 
End;
IPCstatus s (succeeded, failed);
RevyMsge = Record
seqno : Integer; 
loc : Integer; 
End;
Var
Da tain : klnputpipe [extsize] Of extbasetype;
Rseqno : Integer;
Rcount : Integer;
RevyOut : koutputpipe Of RevyMsge;
timestamp : Integer;
Pflag : Boolean;
Pstore : basetype;
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{ RECEIVE and PENDING }
Procedure Read (Var message : basetype; Var status : IPCstatus;
timeout : Integer);
Var
m : extbasetype;
Begin
With Exeeptionsoff Do 
Begin
If timestamp < SP.Timestamp Then Begin
Rcount :« 0;
kfree (Dataln);
timestamp : = SP.Timestamp;
End;
kread (Dataln, m, status, timeout);
If status = succeeded Then Begin
message := m.data;
Rseqno := m.seqno;
Rcount :■ Rcount ♦ 1;
If Rcount = mReount Then SP.Execute; 
End;
End;
End;
Procedure RECEIVE (Var message : basetype; Var status : IPCstatus;
timeout : Integer);
Begin
If Pflag Then Begin
status : = succeeded; 
message := Pstore;
Pflag :* false;
End
Else Read (message, status, timeout);
End;
Function PENDING : Boolean; 
Var
status : IPCstatus;
Begin
If Pflag Then PENDING :* true 
Else Begin
Read (Pstore, status, 0);
If statusssucceeded Then Pflag := true
Else Pflag :* false;
End;
PENDING :* Pflag; 
End;
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{ The Exception Handler }
Exception Handler Recovery (rloc, sloe : Integer); 
Var
m : extbasetype;
rm : RcvyHsge ; 
status : IPCstatus;
Begin
With Exceptionsoff Do 
Begin
rm.loc :» rloc;
kpeeklast (Dataln, m, status, 0);
If status s succeeded Then rm.seqno :• m.seqno
Else rm.seqno :« Rseqno; 
kconnect (RcvyOut, sloe); 
ksend (RcvyOut, rm, status, -1);
End ;
End;
Begin 
Rseqno 
Rcount 
timestamp 
Pflag 
End.
{ Main Body - initialisation code }
* 0;
= 0;
« 0 ;
= false;
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The Output Channel Class
Class Oehannel
Import From SP 
Execute;
Export
SEND;
Const
extslze
Insecure
WaitRevy
Type
extbasetype
IPCstatus
RcvyMsge
Var
Da ta Out 
RcvyStore
Sseqno
ngagged
Rcvyln
(size : Integer; basetype : Type);
= size • 2;
= true;
= Record
seqno : Integer; 
data : basetype; 
End;
s (succeeded, failed); 
= Record
seqno : Integer; 
loc : Integer; 
End;
: koutputpipe Of extbasetype;
: Record
fifo : Array [1..extsize] Of extbasetype; 
top : Integer ;
End;
: Integer ;
: Integer;
: kinputpipe [MaxNoHits] Of RcvyMsge;
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{ SEND }
Procedure SEND (message : basetype; Var status : IPCstatus;
timeout : Integer);
Var
m : extbasetype;
Procedure save (m : extbasetype);
Begin
{ works with exception handling turned off by SEND )
With RcvyStore Do 
Begin
If top = extslze Then top := 1
Else top :* top + 1;
fifo[top] := m;
End;
End;
Begin
SP. Execute;
Waituntil ( WaitRcvy = false );
With Exceptionsoff Do 
Begin
Sseqno := Sseqno + 1; 
m.seqno :» Sseqno; 
m.data:s message;
If ngagged > 0 Then Begin
status := succeeded; 
ngagged := ngagged - 1;
End
Else ksend (DataOut, m, status, timeout); 
If status = succeeded Then save (m);
End;
End;
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{ The Exception Handler }
Exception Handler Recovery
Var
rm
status
: RcvyMsge; 
: IPCstatus
Procedure replace (sseq, rseq : Integer);
Var
i, J : Integer;
Begin
{ works with exception handling turned off by recovery }
With RcvyStore Do
Begin
ngagged := 0;
For i : = (top + 1) - (sseq - rseq) To top Do
End;
Begin { Recovery }
With Exceptionsoff Do 
Begin
WaitRcvy :* false;
kreceive (Revyin, rm, status, 0);
kconnect (DataOut, rm.loc);
If Sseqno > rm.seqno Then replace (Sseqno, rm.seqno)
Else If Sseqno < rm.seqno Then ngagged := rm.seqno - Sseqno 
Else { do nothing, they are already consistent };
End;
End ; { Recovery }
Begin
If i <= 0 Then J :* extsize ♦ i
Else j :■ i;
If fifo[ J].seqno > rseq
Then ksend (DataOut, fifo[J], status, -1)
End;
End;
{ The Main Body - initialisation code )
Begin
Sseqno
RcvyStore. top
ngagged
WaitRcvy s false
End.
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The Secure Pointing Claes
Class SPoint ( );
Export
Timestamp, Execute;
Var
tstamp : Integer;
Function Timestamp : Integer; 
Begin
Timestamp : = tstamp;
End;
Procedure Execute;
Begin
tstamp : = tstamp + 1; 
ksecurepoint;
End;
Begin
tstamp : = 1; 
End*
The Device Class
Class IOdeviee (device : IOdeviee; basetype, argtype : Type);
Export
DOIO;
Type
IOdevice = (Lineprinter, disk, VDU ... );
IOoperation = (input, output, move, control);
IOstatus = (complete, failure ... );
Procedure DOIO (operation : IOoperation; Var data : basetype;
Var status : IOstatus; Var arguments s argtype);
Begin
kdoio (operation, data, device, status, arguments); 
End;
Begin
{ empty ) 
End.
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Appendix D. Performance Figures
All figures are shown to two decimal places.
Mean work period - 2 seconds
Secure point insertion - module-based
Mean
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 25 25 25 25 na na
8 49.32 49.40 49.19 49.18 49.45 49.30
configuration 16 90.28 93.80 96.08 89.30 94.00 90.68
32 176.81 178.85 162.36 158.72 146.44 114.44
192 954.02 262.32 140.35 92.78 71.38 48.25
Standard Deviation
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 5.66 5.57 5.76 5.85 na na
8 9.45 9.35 7.71 11.37 9.62 9.20
16 15.00 14.05 11.85 16.08 13.56 13.18
32 17.28 14.90 29.15 19.96 15.68 14.77
192 9.03 6.15
ooT“e& 3.48 3.56 2.71
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Mean work period - 2 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
configuration
configuration
Mean
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 25.00 25.00 24.98 25.00 na na
8 49.32 49.33 49.47 49.05 49.68 48.66
16 90.28 94.74 93.29 90.70 83.83 62.81
32 176.81 172.61 142.52 107.46 87.31 62.39
192 954.02 262.32 140.35 92.78 71.38 48.25
Standard Deviation
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 5.66 5.81 5.86 6.02 na na
8 9.45 8.92 9.69 9.28 8.29 8.90
16 15.00 13.89 16.24 14.05 12.25 10.33
32 17.28 16.93 18.70 20.12 15.96 10.55
192 9.03 6.15 4.18 3.48 3.56 2.71
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Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point Insertion - module-based
configuration
configuration
Mean
level of reduidancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 25.000 24.82 24.77 24.90 na na
8 48.03 48.78 48.81 48.68 48.44 46.85
16 93.54 93.48 91.79 85.60 74.16 54.13
32 173.83 167.17 125.59 90.35 73.95 51.15
192 913.67 117.54 58.80 39.24 30.53 20.05
Standard Deviation
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 3.11 3.46 3.58 3.14 na na
8 6.16 5.00 5.40 4.36 5.18 4.38
16 7.22 7.38 7.47 7.92 6.63 6.34
32 11.08 9.48 8.47 6.11 6.00 5.65
192 4.35 1.50 1.12 0.79 0.78 0.46
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Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
Mean
configwation
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 25.00 24.78 24.97 24.82 na na
8 48.03 48.72 48.69 47.71 42.02 30.80
16 93.54 92.13 75.43 55.25 42.91 29.66
32 173.83 130.47 75.11 52.35 40.54 28.14
192 913.67 117.54 58.80 39.24 30.53 20.05
Standard Deviation
level of reduidancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 3.11 3.23 3.16 3.33 na na
8 6.16 5.18 4.87 3.86 4.76 4.09
16 7.22 7.64 6.93 5.11 5.06 4.20
32 11.08 7.50 6.83 4.76 4.46 3.21
192 4.35 1.50 1.12 0.79 0.78 0.46
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Mean work period - 0.12 seconds
Secure point insertion - nodule-based
configuration
configiration
Mean
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 24.59 24.74 24.75 24.61 na na
8 48.89 48.28 47.97 43.78 36.45 25.74
16 95.00 90.79 65.28 46.53 35.52 24.12
32 177.68 113.73 61.71 42.95 32.90 22.01
192 551.88 50.17 24.84 16.46 12.78 8.54
Standard Deviation
level of redwdancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 2.04 1.79 1.76 1.74 na na
8 2.66 2.76 2.72 2.98 2.57 2.14
16 3.85 3.68 3.15 3.40 2.39 1.59
32 5.44 4.01 2.77 2.40 1.92 2.00
192 0.39 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.09
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Mean work period - 0.12 seconds
Secure point Insertion - worst-case
Mean
config »ration
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 24.59 24.71 24.63 23.12 na na
8 48.89 48.18 38.84 27.26 20.86 14.09
16 95.00 70.20 37.64 25.62 19.41 13.24
32 177.68 67.13 34.22 23.45 17.99 12.15
192 551.88 50.17 24.84 16.46 12.78 8.54
Standard Deviation
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 2.04 1.75 1.71 1.51 na na
8 2.66 2.94 3.47 3.05 1.96 1.60
16 3.85 3.66 2.19 1.87 1.72 1.22
32 5.44 3.25 2.08 2.45 1.33 1.37
192 0.39 0.17 0.23 0.10 0.22 0.09
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Appendix E. Accuracy of the Simulation Results
The performance of a configuration under a given set of 
circumstances Is defined by a distribution X with a mean E[X]. We wish to 
estimate E[X] for each experiment performed.
Running an experiment once produces a sample from the distribution 
X. By repeating the experiment with different random number seeds we can 
produce a sample mean X, which is the average of the samples taken.
The sample mean x Is an unbiased estimator of E[X] (Sanders et al. 
1976). We aimed to take sufficient samples from each distribution In order 
to achieve a 99* confidence level that E[X] will be within 0.5 seconds of 
the sample mean i.e.
P ( X - 0.5 < E[X] < X + 0.5 ) = 0.99
Unfortunately, the amount of processing needed to achieve this 
level of accuracy for all 138 experiments was so great that the computer 
time and resources required to perform it were unavailable. Instead we 
first ran each experiment once so that the important ones could be 
Identified, and then these 54 were repeated (each time with a different 
random number seed) to achieve the required accuracy. Even then it was not 
possible to do this for all 54, as some of them would have had to be run 
several hundred times.
Other less important experiments were run 11 times each, and others 
only once. In each case the sample mean is used to estimate E[X] although 
without any great accuracy.
The tables below show which experiments are accurate (those marked 
with a '•') and how many samples were taken from each of the others. To 
achieve this limited overall accuracy required Just under 100 hours of CPU 
time on a CDC 7600.
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Mean work period - 2 seconds
Secure point insertion - module-based
configuration
Mean work period - 2 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
configuration
Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point insertion - module-based
level of redimdancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 1 11 11 11 na na
8 1 • • 1 • 1
configuration 16 1 28 • 1 • 1
Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point Insertion - worst-case
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 1 11 11 11 na na
8 1 • ft 1 • 1
16 1 • ft 1 • 1
32 1 31 • 1 • 1
192 1 11 11 1 h 1
Mean work period - 0.12 seconds
Secure point Insertion - module-based
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 1 11 11 11 na na
8 1 • • 1 * 1
16 1 • * 1 « 1
32 1 • ft 1 • 1
192 1 11 11 1 h 1
Mean work period - 0.12 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
level of redundancy
configuration
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 1 11 11 11 na na
8 1 ft ft 1 • 1
16 1 ft ft 1 • 1
32 1 ft ft 1 • 1
192 1 11 11 1 h i
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IAppendix F. Send, Receive and Secure Point Tlmea
All figures are shown to two decimal places, or more where appropriate.
Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
Mean Receive Time
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 9.07 9.81 9.48 9.23 na na
8 6.00 5.52 5.20 4.84 5.46 7.09
16 3.07 2.83 3.19 4.27 5.43 7.70
32 1.63 1.85 3.11 4.28 5.54 7.43
192 0.09 0.84 1.36 2.08 2.38 3.50
Standard Deviation of Receive Time
level of redundancy
configuration
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 16.71 18.79 18.39 17.28 na na
8 11.31 10.21 9.94 9.12 10.33 13.86
16 5.59 5.34 6.07 7.92 10.34 15.14
32 2.91 3.42 6.01 8.41 10.58 13.76
192 0.14 1.43 2.44 3.62 4.07 6.12
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Mean Send Delay
configuration
configuration
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 0.000003 0.0057 0.013 0.026 na na
8 0.000014 0.02 0.058 0.13 0.20 0.31
16 0.00006 0.084 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.36
32 0.00021 0.27 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.42
192 0.02 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.49
Standard Deviation of Send Delay 
level of redundancy
0 1 2 3 4 6
4 0.00012 0.01 0.018 0.03 na na
8 0.00029 0.028 0.065 0.14 0.21 0.30
16 0.00088 0.097 0.23 0.29 0.34 0.36
32 0.0023 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.38 0.43
192 0.05 0.70 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.78
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Mean Secure Point Time
configuration
configuration
level of redundancy
1 2 3 4 6
4 1.98 3.92 5.42 na na
8 1.00 2.21 3.87 5.99 10.43
16 0.85 2.84 5.11 7.27 11.38
32 1.41 3.85 6.20 8.31 12.93
192 3.22 7.87 12.13 16.22 25.14
Standard Deviation of Secure Point Tine 
level of redundancy
1 2 3 4 6
4 0.90 1.61 1.99 na na
8 0.47 0.89 1.19 1.74 2.63
16 0.33 1.04 1.77 2.31 3.30
32 0.70 1.23 1.85 2.31 3.13
192 1.17 2.02 2.73 3.29 4.92
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Appendix G. ALU Performance Figures
All figtres are shown to two decimal places.
Mean work period - 0.5 seconds
Secure point insertion - worst-case
level of redundancy
configuration
0 1 2 3 4
4 0.05 11.64 25.6 41.29 na
8 0.09 23.68 53. **1 77.99 88.19
16 0.16 46.44 78.13 86.07 88.97
32 0.28 55.63 74.15 80.56 82.73
192 8.79 51.91 57.59 60.73 62.73
6
na
94.05
91.79
85.77
63.99
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Appendix H. Proceaa Death
If all of an application proceaa'a replicatea are loat then that 
proceaa la aaid to have died. When a proceaa dlea inconsistencies do not 
arise between the dead process and its communicants, but they can arise 
between two processes that commwicate with each other via the dead 
process. There follows a description of how these inconsistencies arise.
Figure Ha shows three processes at the time of a crash. Prior to 
the crash Process-1 sent a message to Process-2, and then, as a direct 
result of receiving this message, Process-2 sent Proeess-3 a further 
message. The crash results in Process-1 being restarted, and in Proeess-2 
dying. On restarting Prooess-1 will repeat its SEND and this will fail 
because Process-2 is dead. This leads to an inconsistency arising between 
Process-2 and Process-3 as Process-3 has received a message which with 
respect to Process-1's current state it should not have been sent.
CRASH DIES
SEND
Process-1
SEND- RECEIVE
RECEIVE
Process-2 Process-3
Figure H.a
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This Inconsistency cannot be prevented as the recovery of a process 
to a consistent state requires the assistance of that process's 
comminicants. In our example Process-1 cannot be recovered by gagging its 
SEND, because Process-2 has died. Tfce only way that this could be overcome 
is if a process's recovery were to be completely self-contained and not 
require assistance from its comminicants.
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